


PAKISTAN AND A WORLD IN DISORDER

*A Grand Strategy for the
Twenty-First Century*

JAVID HUSAIN



Pakistan and a World in Disorder

Javid Husain

Pakistan and a World in Disorder

A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century

palgrave
macmillan

Javid Husain
South Asia Institute
University of Texas at Austin
Austin, Texas, USA

ISBN 978-1-137-60029-5 ISBN 978-1-137-59962-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59962-9

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016941237

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Cover illustration: © george robertson / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Nature America Inc. New York

This book is dedicated to the memory of my revered parents who never failed to inspire me, and to my dear wife, Shama, and our beloved children without whose support it would not have seen the light of the day.

CONTENTS

1	Introduction	1
2	A World in Disorder	7
3	China's Rise and the Global Order	33
4	India: An Aspiring Hegemon	51
5	Regionalism and Pakistan	69
6	Post-2014 Afghanistan	85
7	Iran: An Estranged Friend	105
8	Islamophobia and the West	127
9	Evaluation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy	143
10	Toward Comprehensive Security	171

11 A Grand Strategy for Pakistan	183
Bibliography	201
Index	211

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Fig. 2.1	Actual and projected top 20 economies ranked by GDP at market exchange rates	15
Fig. 5.1	Evolutionary path of a regional economic organization	76
Fig. 9.1	Short-term vs. long-term security	152

Introduction

This book is the outcome of a report that I addressed under the same title, that is, “Pakistan and a World in Disorder,” to the senior officers of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry in August 1995 when I was serving as the Ambassador of Pakistan to the Netherlands. The report made a forceful case for the synthesis of the country’s security, economic, and foreign policies into a grand strategy. My concern then was, as it still is, that our foreign policy was out of sync with the ground realities at regional and global levels, it failed the tests of a sound foreign policy, and, therefore, it called for a fundamental review. The report was divided into four sections: characteristics of the post–Cold War era, tests of a sound foreign policy, evaluation of Pakistan’s current foreign policy, and required policy adjustments in Pakistan’s policies.

The report elicited a mild degree of interest from some of the senior officers of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry. On the whole, the ministry remained preoccupied and content with tactical day-to-day adjustments of foreign policy instead of focusing on its strategic directions. In view of this flaw, the inertia, and the absence of long-term policy planning from which the Pakistan Foreign Office has generally suffered, barring some notable exceptions here and there, the report failed to generate the fundamental review of our policies that it had called for.

With the passage of time as I became more and more familiar with the ad hoc manner in which Pakistan’s major policy decisions were taken without any advance planning or necessary spade work and, many a time,

without necessary coordination among the relevant ministries/departments of the government, I have become convinced of the need for a major overhaul of its policy framework and policies. A partial rather than a comprehensive approach to policy making in Pakistan is a major flaw from which Pakistan's policy-making process continues to suffer. To some extent, this flaw is the result of the turf war between the various ministries and departments of the government of Pakistan. Pakistan's defense establishment, for instance, has often insisted on the adoption and pursuit of security policies that were out of sync with the compulsions of the country's economic and diplomatic policies. But this flaw of a partial approach in policy formulation also reflects the absence of the concept and practice of a grand strategy that should bring into a coherent whole the country's political, economic, security, and diplomatic policies.

This book, as its title, *Pakistan and a World in Disorder—A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, suggests, attempts to overcome this conceptual and operational flaw in the country's policy-making process by proposing the adoption of a coherent and well-thought-out grand strategy. It attempts to delineate the role that Pakistan should play in its best long-term interests in the largely anarchic world of the twenty-first century. Its main aim is to provide guidance to Pakistan's policy makers in the formulation of a grand strategy for the country covering its political, diplomatic, security, and economic policies. The proposed grand strategy has to be based on an in-depth analysis of the evolving global and regional security environment within the framework of which it must operate. It must also draw appropriate lessons from Pakistan's past experience.

The book, therefore, in its initial chapters provides an analysis of the emerging global and regional security environment followed by a critical evaluation of the past record of Pakistan's foreign policy bringing out both its successes and failures, and its strengths and weaknesses. Taking into account these analyses and the country's past performance in general in the security and economic fields, it draws conclusions regarding the course that Pakistan should adopt in steering the ship of state in the choppy waters of international politics of the current century. It advocates a comprehensive rather than a partial approach to policy making. Keeping in view all of these factors, it provides guidelines for a grand strategy for Pakistan toward ensuring its security and prosperity, and for achieving a dignified place for the country in the comity of nations in the twenty-first century.

Chapter 2, entitled "A World in Disorder," analyzes the salient features and characteristics of the emerging global order of the twenty-first century

and draws some general conclusions for the benefit of Pakistan's policy makers. It takes note, *inter alia*, of the anarchic nature of global politics, the theses of the end of history and the clash of civilizations, the passage of the US unipolar moment, the prevalence of power politics, the weakened position of the UN on strategic issues of international peace and security, the primacy of economic forces, globalization, regional economic integration, the issues of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and the implications of a knowledge-driven world.

Chapter 3 deals with "China's Rise and the Global Order." It traces the background of China's dramatic rise during the past three decades and analyzes its long-term strategic and economic implications for Pakistan, the region, and the current West-dominated and US-led global order.

Chapter 4 takes note of India's rise and analyzes India's global and regional strategic policies under the title "India—an Aspiring Hegemon." It also brings out the likely repercussions of India's quest for hegemony in South Asia for Pakistan and the rest of the region.

Chapter 5, under the title "Regionalism and Pakistan," focuses on the rationale for the emergence of regional economic groupings in various parts of the world and analyzes Pakistan's options for regional cooperation after comparing the pros and cons of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Chapter 6, entitled "Post-2014 Afghanistan," as the title suggests, tries to anticipate the likely development of the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for the regional countries, especially Pakistan. It also recommends policy measures for the restoration of durable peace and stability in Afghanistan, which is a sine qua non for durable peace and stability in Pakistan and the region as a whole.

Chapter 7, under the title "Iran—An Estranged Friend," focuses on the evolution of Pakistan-Iran relations after the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the mistakes that both countries have made in managing this vital relationship. Drawing on the lessons of the past, it presents some recommendations for the improvement of Pakistan-Iran relations within the framework of the emerging regional and global scenario.

Chapter 8 deals with "Islamophobia and the West." It takes note of the lingering misunderstandings and misconceptions between Islam and the West, which sometimes cause tensions, strains and complexities in international relations, and calls for dialogue among civilizations to promote mutual understanding, tolerance, and harmony. The failure of the

international community to move in that direction would aggravate tensions at global and regional levels that would have their consequential negative repercussions on Pakistan also.

Chapter 9 is a critical evaluation of Pakistan's foreign policy as the title, "Evaluation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy," suggests. It lays bare the major flaws from which Pakistan's foreign policy has historically suffered and continues to suffer while indicating broadly the directions that Pakistan's foreign policy should take on the basis of the lessons learnt from the past experience.

Chapter 10, entitled "Towards Comprehensive Security," presents a case for the adoption of a comprehensive approach toward national security in contrast with the uni-dimensional and military-dominated national security policy that Pakistan has followed in the past and continues to do even now.

Chapter 11, the final chapter, under the title "A Grand Strategy for Pakistan," brings together the various strands of thought given in earlier chapters and, on the basis of an analysis of the desirable features of strategy and grand strategy, proposes a grand strategy for Pakistan to safeguard and promote its national interests in the twenty-first century.

This is not a book on the history of Pakistan's foreign policy although the literature available on it has been duly analyzed in reaching the conclusions and recommendations relevant to the formulation of a grand strategy for Pakistan for the twenty-first century. It is also not a book exclusively dealing with Pakistan's foreign policy, as the scope of the grand strategy is much wider than that. The book instead aims at evolving guidelines for Pakistan's grand strategy covering its political, economic, security, and foreign policies, taking into account the emerging global and regional security environment and the country's past experience.

There is hardly a book on the market that attempts to present a comprehensive analysis of the various factors affecting Pakistan's political stability, security, foreign affairs, and economic prosperity with a view to recommending a grand strategy for the country for meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. There is thus an acute need for a book that would try to provide policy makers with guidelines for a grand strategy for Pakistan based on an in-depth analysis of the global and regional security environment. Hopefully, this book, by filling up this void, would provide a useful insight into the ways and means of ensuring a secure and prosperous future for Pakistan in the context of the emerging regional and global security environment. It is further hoped that the book would help

generate a serious debate both in governmental and academic circles in Pakistan on the contours of the country's grand strategy in the turbulent times to come.

Pakistan, because of its status as a de facto nuclear-weapon state and its critically important strategic location at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, is destined to play an important role in regional affairs covering Afghanistan, Iran, China, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and India. Developments in Pakistan and its policies, good or bad, inevitably will have wide-ranging repercussions on the rest of the world, as Afghanistan's history over the past three and a half decades conclusively shows. How Pakistan conducts its internal and external policies should, therefore, be a matter of interest to the world outside. Hopefully, students of foreign policy, security, and strategy, researchers and general readers, both in Pakistan and abroad, would find this book useful and interesting in comprehending the complexities and the constraints within which this de facto nuclear-weapon state of about 190 million people has to operate in the anarchic world of the twenty-first century.

A World in Disorder

It is axiomatic that Pakistan's grand strategy for the twenty-first century must be decided on the basis of a realistic assessment of the emerging global and regional security environment. A grand strategy that is out of sync with the ground realities at the regional and global levels will sooner or later come to grief. Pakistan's own past experience during its short history is sufficient to establish this point. The most telling example was the disaster that struck the country in 1971 when it combined the gross neglect of the regional and global realities with the acute mismanagement of the internal situation leading to the dismemberment of the country. Therefore, as Pakistan comes to grips with the challenges of the twenty-first century, it is imperative that its policy makers have the benefit of a realistic assessment of the evolving global and regional security environment. It is only in the light of such an assessment and an accurate understanding of its implications for Pakistan that they can hope to formulate a grand strategy in its best interests.

NATURE OF THE WORLD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A World in Disorder

The world of the twenty-first century is in quest of a new equilibrium among the various centers of power, which would establish a rule-based order designed to promote peace, stability, justice, and human progress.

Unfortunately, the experience of the two decades and a half since the end of the Cold War shows that mankind is far from that goal. Instead of an equilibrium, we witness a growing challenge to the existing US-led and West-dominated order from the emerging powers, particularly China, and a reassertive Russia. Even countries such as India, otherwise closely aligned with the USA, and Brazil have serious disagreements with the West when it comes to defining the rules of business in the spheres of environment and international trade. Second, major world powers have exhibited a dangerous tendency to resort to unilateralism in blatant disregard of the principles of international law and the UN Charter when dealing with strategically important issues of war and peace. The US invasion of Iraq of 2003 is a case in point. This, of course, is not the only instance where principles were sacrificed at the altar of realpolitik. Several other major world powers have been equally guilty of disregard toward the principles of international law in handling world affairs since the end of the Cold War. A relevant example is the way the European powers handled the Bosnian crisis in 1990s.

Third, justice and fair play have been the least of the considerations guiding the conduct of the major world powers in dealing with external affairs. The denial of justice to the Palestinians as an example substantiates this tendency. Finally, major world powers have generally failed to rise above narrow national considerations in the interest of the progress and welfare of mankind at large, especially in dealing with such global issues as climate change and international trade. It remains to be seen whether the world, learning from its experience of the past, will be able to move toward a rule-based world order in the best interest of mankind. Meanwhile, the world will remain in a state of disorder primarily because of the anarchic nature of international politics.

The end of the Cold War generated unrealistic hopes of a new world order based on justice, fair play, and the principles of the UN Charter. Even before the end of the Cold War, statements were made by world leaders, notably by Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech to the UN General Assembly on 7 December 1988, containing ideas for the creation of a new world order. In his speech, Mikhail Gorbachev called for “a consensus of all mankind in the movement toward a new world order.”¹ He envisioned a world that would be mutually connected and integrated. The underlying principles of the new world order would be rejection of the threat or use of force as an instrument of foreign policy, freedom of choice, detaching interstate relations from ideological considerations, mutual tolerance, and cooperation.

The Malta Summit of 2–3 December 1989 between George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall on 9 November 1989 provided another opportunity for reinvigorating the debate on the new world order. It was naively hoped by some observers and analysts that superpower cooperation would replace containment thereby helping in tackling such problems as arms reduction, settlement of regional disputes, stimulation of economic growth, protection of environment, and so forth. However, unsurprisingly, the outcome of the conference fell far short of these expectations.

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush delivered a speech to a joint session of the US Congress on 11 September 1990 calling for a new world order. The speech laid emphasis on the rule of law, reinvigoration of the UN, freedom from the threat of terror, and the pursuit of liberty, justice, and peace in the construction of the new world order. This statement and similar others that flowed from Washington, which had emerged victorious from the Cold War following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, gave strength initially to hopes for the establishment of a new world order based on justice and the principles of the UN Charter.

Later events belied these hopes as realpolitik prevailed upon idealism in the US foreign policy and the foreign policies of other major world powers. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the USA emerged as the sole superpower. Freed from the straightjacket of bipolarity, the certainties of the Cold War were replaced by an unstable and unpredictable global environment. In view of the anarchic nature of the international system and the human greed for more and more power, it was inevitable that the USA would exploit the unipolarity for establishing and strengthening its global hegemony. An important Pentagon planning document leaked to the press in 1992 had the following to say on the overarching US strategic goal in the post–Cold War global scenario: “Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival...that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union.... Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor.”²

It was not entirely surprising, therefore, to hear President George W. Bush elaborate the US military strategy in pursuance of the aforementioned strategic goal in the following words of his address at West Point on 1 June, 2002: “America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other

eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”³ Another outcome was the announcement by the Bush administration in September 2002 of the US doctrine of unilateral and preemptive military action in the face of external threats to its security in a marked departure from its obligations under the UN Charter.⁴

Washington took advantage of the Russian weakness to expand NATO eastward contrary to the understanding that had been given to Moscow at the time of the German reunification although there was no formal deal to that effect.⁵ The USA invaded Iraq in 2003 without any UN Security Council sanction in a clear violation of the principles of the organization, thus weakening the authority of the UN. It is only more recently that the USA under President Obama, faced with its unhappy experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, the growing international disquiet, and the increasing assertiveness of Russia in its near abroad as witnessed in Ukraine, has started placing enhanced emphasis on multilateralism in contrast with the preceding administration’s obsession with preemptive and unilateral military interventions in the management of international relations. Meanwhile, the original promise of a new world order based on justice and the principles of the UN Charter was lost. Instead, the world was faced with the frightening prospect of growing disorder because of the unbridled pursuit of power politics by major powers.

Commenting on the emerging world order, Samuel Huntington wrote the following:

The expectation of harmony was widely shared. Political and intellectual leaders elaborated similar views. The Berlin wall had come down, communist regimes had collapsed, the United Nations was to assume a new importance, the former Cold War rivals would engage in ‘partnership’ and a ‘grand bargain’, peacekeeping and peacemaking would be the order of the day. The President of the world’s leading country proclaimed ‘the new world order’; ...The moment of euphoria at the end of the Cold War generated an illusion of harmony, which was soon revealed to be that. The world became different in the early 1990’s, but not necessarily more peaceful. Change was inevitable; progress was not.The illusion of harmony at the end of that Cold War was soon dissipated by the multiplication of ethnic conflicts and ‘ethnic cleansing’, the breakdown of law and order, the emergence of new patterns of alliance and conflict among states, the resurgence of neo-communist and neo-fascist movements, intensification of religious fundamentalism, the end of the ‘diplomacy of smiles’ and ‘policy of yes’ in Russia’s relations with the West, the inability of the United Nations and the

United States to suppress bloody local conflicts, and the increasing assertiveness of rising China.⁶

Thus, idealism in international relations predictably once again fell victim to *realpolitik*. As a result, the world, in contrast with the earlier promise of a just and fair world order, is still groping for a new balance and equilibrium in international relations that would ensure peace, justice, progress, and strict observance of the principles of the UN Charter. The emergence of a multipolar world with several centers of power to check and balance one another may provide, in due course of time, the required equilibrium and stability in international relations. However, it is debatable whether even this equilibrium would ensure justice and fair play in international relations. For a world order to be stable, peaceful, and progressive, we require not only equilibrium among the various centers of power but also the rewriting of international rules so that they are seen as just and fair by the participants of the international system and accommodate changes necessary for human progress. In other words, there has to be the right balance between power and principles. Unfortunately, the world currently is far from that stage.

Meanwhile, the present era marked by the absence of the checks and balances of the Cold War, the domination of power over principles, the diminished authority of the UN on strategic issues of war and peace, the rise of new great powers demanding modification of the present pro-West international system to accommodate their interests, civilizational fault-lines, the growing number of nonstate actors active on the international political scene in the form of terrorist groups, and shifting alliances can be accurately described as “a world in disorder.” Pakistan must understand the nature of this world of the twenty-first century and its implications to be able to safeguard its security, economic prosperity, and cultural identity.

The End of History?

In the exuberance of the victory over communism in the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama argued that liberal democracy might constitute the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government,” and as such constituted “the end of history.”⁷ This point was contested by others who were not ready to concede that the evolutionary process in human history and ideology had come to an end. Indeed, past experience and the elements of competition and desire for

recognition in human beings suggest that the process of evolution will continue indefinitely to propel mankind to new and unimaginable heights. It is also inconceivable that the process of ideological evolution or the evolution of the art of government will remain immune from the general evolution of human life.

In particular, it is hard to claim that the liberal democracies have achieved internally the ideal combination of liberty, egalitarianism, justice, rule of law, and progress that the governments should aim at. As noted by John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge in their article “The State of the State—The Global Contest for the Future of Government,” the modernizing authoritarianism pursued by Asian countries such as China and Singapore poses a serious challenge to the concept of liberal democracy in the crafting of the best kind of state and the best system of government.⁸ Externally, liberal democracies motivated by economic greed and quest for more and more power, exhibited especially during the colonial period but also even during the post-Cold War era, have failed to achieve the ideals of international peace, justice, and progress.

It is interesting to note that within the past two decades and a half since the end of the Cold War, the USA has engaged in or initiated three major wars in Iraq and Afghanistan besides several armed conflicts of lower intensity. There is no denying the fact that the US invasion of Iraq of 2003, in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing it, constituted a flagrant violation of international law and the UN Charter. The legality of even the US invasion of Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 is questionable, as no prior UN Security Council resolution clearly sanctioned it.

The moral is that being a liberal democracy is no guarantee that a country would not embark on acts of aggression or engage in acts in violation of the principles of international law or the UN Charter when its perceived strategic interests so demand. The harsh reality is that in strategic matters of peace and security, the principles of power politics rather than the principles of international law prevail in the conduct of nations whether they are governed under a liberal democratic system or otherwise.

In short, the best of mankind, ideologically speaking, is still ahead of us although one must acknowledge that the representative institutions in modern democracies constitute a substantial advance over other forms of government so far known to mankind. It is, therefore, unrealistic to claim that ideological competition among nations has come to an end. Even

Francis Fukuyama has recognized the limitations of his earlier thesis in his latest book, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy*.⁹

Clash of Civilizations?

In an attempt to explain and interpret the evolution of global politics after the Cold War, Professor Samuel Huntington put forward the thesis in his article “The Clash of Civilizations?” in the summer 1993 issue of the journal *Foreign Affairs* that “the central and the most dangerous dimension of the emerging politics would be conflict between groups from different civilizations.” He elaborated this point later in his widely acclaimed and hotly debated book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, published in 1996.¹⁰ The thesis that clashes between civilizations would be the greatest threat to world peace in the post–Cold War world understandably generated a great deal of controversy. There is no doubt that cultural self-identity which leads to identifying “others” as enemies is a powerful force in explaining many important developments in contemporary global politics. It, therefore, helps in understanding international politics as it is rather than as it ought to be.

So there is a great deal of validity in Huntington’s diagnosis. However, Huntington’s prognosis of global politics may be too deterministic as it underestimates the importance of universalistic ideas, tendencies, and developments in international politics as part of the process of globalization. Further, the danger is that his analysis may become the basis of encouraging policies that ignite or aggravate inter-civilizational conflicts with catastrophic consequences for mankind. His thesis, therefore, carries the risk of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Policy makers need to make use of Huntington’s diagnosis of global politics with great care and due caution. On one hand, they must take into account the possibility that inter-civilizational factors may be responsible for some of the international conflicts and tensions. On the other, the ideal of global peace and the tendency toward growing interdependence in an increasingly globalized world call for well-considered and conscious policies to steer humanity towards dialogue, understanding, and cooperation rather than toward inter-civilizational conflicts. As a policy guidance, therefore, due emphasis must be placed on dialogue among civilizations as proposed by former President Khatami of Iran and endorsed by the UN

General Assembly in 1998 through a resolution rather than on clash of civilizations.

The fact of the matter is that no single thesis is able to capture fully the complexity of the post-Cold War era or of the world in the twenty-first century. Each thesis explains one or the other aspect of contemporary international politics while ignoring or underestimating the importance of other factors influencing its substance and direction. For understanding the complex nature of global politics in the twenty-first century, it would be a more useful approach instead to focus on its main characteristics or salient features as elaborated in the succeeding paragraphs.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Gradual Erosion of the US Global Domination

The USA emerged at the end of the Cold War as the sole superpower with global reach. There was no other state that could challenge its political, military, and economic supremacy. Some analysts declared that the world had entered an era of the unipolar world. But Charles Krauthammer more accurately described the phenomenon as “the unipolar moment,” thereby anticipating its short duration. Richard Haas later confirmed this assessment in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 2008 by stressing that the US dominance, which lasted only 15-20 years, was just a moment in historical terms.¹¹

There is no doubt that the USA still remains the most powerful state in military terms. Its defense expenditure surpasses by far the military expenditures of other great powers. The US National Defense Budget Estimates proposed an allocation of US\$575 billion for the fiscal year 2015.¹² This amounted to about 37% of the world military expenditure.¹³ No other country even comes close to the US annual military expenditure. China, which is the next highest military spender in the world, allocated an amount of US\$132 billion for defense for the year 2014–15.¹⁴ According to some projections, even in the year 2030, the projected US defense expenditure would exceed that of China.¹⁵ The USA also enjoys a formidable lead over other countries in military technology, the sophistication and effectiveness of its weapons and military equipment, and the global reach of its military forces. The US dominance in the military field is, therefore, likely to continue at least in the first half of the twenty-first century.

But the situation begins to change if one takes into account economic power. The US economy, with a GDP of approximately US\$16.80 trillion in 2013 was the world's largest and accounted for roughly 25% of the world's total output. But there were also other important centers of economic power including China, Japan, the European Union (EU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Russia, India, Brazil, Turkey, Nigeria, South Africa, and South Korea. The combined GDP of the EU countries alone in nominal terms (US\$17.37 trillion) exceeded that of the USA in 2013. China was the second-largest economy in the world in nominal dollar terms in that year with a GDP of US\$9.18 trillion. Japan with GDP of US\$4.9 trillion occupied the third position in world ranking in 2013.¹⁶

According to some past studies, China was expected to have the biggest economy in the world in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms (US\$29.6 trillion) followed by the US (US\$28.8 trillion) in 2020.¹⁷ More recent estimates by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicate that the Chinese economy in PPP terms surpassed the US economy in 2014. As a result of the updating of its data on the world economy in October 2014, the IMF estimated the size of China's economy in terms of PPP at US\$17.6 trillion in 2014 as against US\$17.4 trillion for the USA. According to some estimates, China's GDP will surpass the American GDP even in nominal terms by 2030 (Fig. 2.1).¹⁸

The figures given above show that there is going to be even greater dispersal of economic power in the years to come because of the higher




Fig. 2.1 Actual and projected top 20 economies ranked by GDP at market exchange rates (Source: World Bank estimates for 2011, PwC estimates for 2030 and 2050)

growth rates in emerging economies such as China, Brazil, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Nigeria, and Mexico. This is what Fareed Zakaria calls “the rise of the rest” in his book, *The Post-American World*.¹⁹

Besides military and economic power in which the USA remains far ahead of any other country at present, it has tremendous influence worldwide in the cultural field. Its attractive democratic values, advocacy of market economy, achievements in science and technology, vibrant media, highly developed educational system, movies, powerful financial system, and advanced corporate sector play a dominant role internationally. Thus, the USA also enjoys an overwhelming advantage over other states in the sphere of soft power. The dominant position of the US international influence is further strengthened by its alliances with the member states of NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and others. On the whole, the USA currently looms large on the global scene as a formidable power with unique capabilities of deploying its military forces in far-flung areas of the globe through its aircraft carrier groups and network of alliances. No other country of the world has such capabilities and is unlikely to have them in the next 30 years or so. This is approximately the time that China is likely to take in catching up with the USA in military terms. Thus, the USA will remain the most powerful country in the world for a long time to come, certainly in the first half of the current century.

Despite the lead that the USA currently has over other states in military, economic, and cultural terms, the long-term trend is toward a multipolar world in the twenty-first century. Other poles besides the USA, such as China, the EU, Japan, India, Russia, South Korea, Brazil, ASEAN, Nigeria, Turkey, and South Africa will play an increasingly important role in international politics in the years to come because of their high economic growth rates and the rapid increase in their military capabilities. There will be a corresponding decline in the overall relative power and influence of the USA, particularly in the second half of the current century.

The global security scenario will also witness shifts in alliances in the coming decades as major powers and other countries scramble to safeguard their national interests through the formation of alliances to counter perceived security threats from their opponents/rivals. During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a strategic partnership between the USA and China to counter the perceived security threat from the Soviet Union. Following the disintegration of the USSR, there was a radical transformation in the global geopolitical scene. Both Russia and China now felt threatened by the US hegemonic ambitions.

Russia saw a threat to its vital security interests in the eastward expansion of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the EU. As Russia recovered from its strategic defeat in the Cold War in 1990s, it began to reassert its power in its near abroad under the leadership of President Putin. The Ukraine crisis of 2014 was the result of this reassertion of Russian power in the face of the eastward expansion of NATO and the EU. Similarly, the US policy of containment of China is a source of concern to Beijing. The US policy to contain China is reflected in its decision to rebalance its forces in favor of the Asia-Pacific region; efforts to strengthen its alliances with such allies as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia; encouragement to ASEAN to stand up to China; and the strategic decision announced by Washington in March 2005 to help build up India as a major power of the twenty-first century to check the southward expansion of the Chinese power in the Indian Ocean region.

Russia and China have reacted to these moves by strengthening their own strategic partnership both bilaterally and within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Their close cooperation in resisting the expansion of the US influence in Central Asia and in dealing with the Iranian nuclear program is a testimony to this strategic partnership brought about by the convergence of their global security interests. It is a measure of the gradual decline of the American power vis-à-vis China and Russia that it has failed so far to have its way fully both in Central Asia and Ukraine. Central Asia, in particular, has witnessed a remarkable growth of the Chinese influence in recent years because of its rapidly developing economic and commercial links with China.

US policies in support of the forces that are trying to overthrow the government of Bashar al-Assad, have been opposed by Russia and Iran because of their own strategic interests and close affiliations with that government. Consequently, Washington has failed to achieve fully its strategic objectives in Syria. The emergence of ISIS as a potent force operating against both the Syrian government and the US interests in Syria and Iraq has further complicated Washington's task. The emergence of ISIS is directly related to the mismanagement of the costly war, economically and militarily, that the USA fought in Iraq with little to show in terms of achievements. Iraq is in a much greater mess now than it was in 2003 when the USA attacked it. The political vacuum created by Saddam Hussein's overthrow has been filled up by pro-Sunni ISIS, which has acquired control over large parts of Iraqi and Syrian territories. In Afghanistan, Al

Qaeda was badly degraded but its franchises have sprouted up in other parts of the world. As for the Afghan Taliban, they have staged a comeback and may pose a serious threat to the US-supported government in Kabul following the US military withdrawal from Afghanistan, despite the divisions within the movement following the death of their supreme leader, Mullah Umar. We will, of course, have more to say about it later in the chapter on Afghanistan. These developments show that the USA is no longer in the position to dictate to the rest of the world unilaterally, a position that it enjoyed briefly in the 1990s and even in the first few years of the twenty-first century.

*The Primacy of Power Politics and the Dominant
Position of the West*

A salient feature of the current international system is the primacy of power politics as against the principles of the UN Charter and international law. The positions of major world powers on strategic issues of peace and security are increasingly dictated by the compulsions of power politics rather than the recognized principles of interstate conduct. On such issues, the authority of the UN was reduced considerably in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War because of the absence of an effective countervailing force to check the US proclivity to take actions unilaterally or in coordination with its close allies in support of its perceived national interests rather than in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a telling example of the disregard of the principles of the UN Charter. The enunciation of the US doctrine of unilateral and pre-emptive military intervention in 2002 was another example of this tendency.

The US “unipolar moment” is behind us but the world has not yet recovered fully from the body blows delivered by Washington to the international security regime contained in the UN Charter. There is a continued tendency on the part of the great powers and major regional powers to flout the principles of the UN Charter in pursuit of their national interests as long as they and their allies have the power to overcome their opponents. US-Israel veiled threats of military strikes against Iran because of the latter’s nuclear program reflected the disdain with which the major powers view the principles of the UN Charter and international law. Hopefully, the Iranian nuclear deal of 14 July 2015 has put an end to these threats. The way Israel, with US support, has been able to violate the provisions of

the UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions pertaining to the settlement of the Palestinian issue is another example of the disregard of the principles of the UN Charter.

Pending the establishment of a just new world order based on recognized principles of interstate conduct, the prospect of which is rather bleak for the foreseeable future, power will remain the ultimate arbiter of international strategic issues of peace and security. In this prevailing environment, the West led by the USA enjoys overwhelming superiority. The combined GDP of the USA and other Western countries accounts for almost 55% of the global GDP. The military power of the NATO countries is unrivaled. They also exercise enormous influence worldwide in cultural fields. Therefore, despite the emergence of new centers of power, the West under the leadership of the USA plays the most influential role in determining the international agenda as well as the rules of interstate behavior in political, security, economic, cultural, humanitarian, and other fields. It is not surprising, therefore, to see that in the critically important institutions dealing with issues of international security and economy such as the UN Security Council, the World Bank and the IMF, the Western countries virtually control the decision-making process, and no decision on any important issue is possible without their agreement.

The Western countries naturally use their national power and their control of or influence in multilateral institutions to safeguard and promote their national interests. While so doing, they, in accordance with the prevailing international environment, are guided more by the principles of realpolitik than by the rules of international law or the principles of the UN Charter, particularly in the consideration of strategic issues of security and economy. This is perhaps as should be expected in this anarchic world marked by the absence of a central authority over states or a world government. As explained by realists in their theories of international politics, states in such conditions are guided by power considerations more than anything else; that is, they constantly compete for power among themselves. John J. Mearsheimer, in his widely acclaimed book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, asserts that in such a world there are powerful incentives on the part of states to gain power at the expense of their rivals.²⁰

It is almost certain that as China gains the top position in the world in economic and military power, and as other new centers of power such as India, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, and Turkey emerge, the West's relative advantage over other countries in power and influence will gradually decline. This transformation, which will be spread over a fairly

long period of time, will produce inevitable consequential changes and adjustments in the global and regional security and economic environment. For one, this would involve the rewriting of the rules of interstate conduct in political, security, and economic fields to accommodate the interests of the emerging powers.

*International Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMDs)*

From the point of view of global security, issues of international terrorism and proliferation of WMDs, particularly nuclear weapons, have been raised by the Western countries to the top of the international agenda because they see in them not just a threat to international peace and stability but, more importantly, the germs of a latent or long-term challenge to their world supremacy. It is true that international terrorism poses a grave threat to global peace and stability as evidenced by 9/11, the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan, and other developments that have deeply destabilized the West Asia region as well as several African countries besides having negative repercussions on the global security. There cannot be two opinions, therefore, about the necessity of fighting and eliminating the menace of international terrorism defined as the indiscriminate use of violence against innocent civilians.

The question arises, however, whether the use of overwhelming force alone to crush international terrorism is the best way to fight this menace or whether a more sophisticated and nuanced strategy employing military, political, economic and cultural instruments of policy is called for. The experience of the USA and other Western countries in fighting Al Qaeda and its various affiliates suggests that the reliance merely on the use of brute force, instead of helping, tends to aggravate the threat of international terrorism and expand the radius of its activities geographically. The excessive reliance by states on the use of force alone can also generate the problem of state terrorism and lead to extensive collateral damage resulting in the loss of innocent civilian lives and material destruction.

What is needed instead is a comprehensive strategy covering political, economic, military, and cultural policy dimensions to deal with the threat of international terrorism. It is also important to underscore that a definitive solution of the problem of international terrorism cannot be found without eliminating its root causes. In many cases, this problem can be traced to policies of aggression and foreign occupation followed by

imperial and expansionist powers, denial of the right to self-determination of the people under foreign or alien occupation, economic injustice and deprivation due to the unjust exploitation of the economic resources of a country by foreign powers, blatant cultural discrimination, and flagrant violations of human rights. The problem becomes acute when the international system and domestic politics fail to provide the remedy for the aggrieved people, forcing them to resort to the asymmetric use of force to seek redress.

The Palestinian issue is a classic example of the deprivation of the national rights of a people and the occupation of their land by an expansionist power. The continued occupation of Palestinian land by Israel in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and its persecution of the Palestinian people are perhaps the most important factors responsible for the genesis of Al Qaeda and its terrorist activities. The adoption of fair and just policies to resolve the Palestinian problem and put an end to the Israeli occupation of Arab lands would go a long way toward eliminating the root causes of Al Qaeda's terrorist activities. It goes without saying that the legitimate national liberation struggle of the Palestinian people needs to be distinguished from Al Qaeda's terrorist activities.

The issue of the proliferation of WMDs is an example of the lack of sincerity and double standards of the Western countries in dealing with security issues that have serious implications for the whole world. Let us examine the issue of nuclear proliferation, which has attracted so much attention during the past four decades. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was concluded in 1968, was based on a fundamental bargain between the nuclear-weapon states, which were allowed to retain nuclear weapons, and non-nuclear-weapon states. As part of the bargain, non-nuclear-weapon states voluntarily agreed not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons while they retained their right to develop and use nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes. Nuclear-weapon states assumed the obligations to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament," and to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.²¹

However, it appears from the later conduct of nuclear-weapon states that the real purpose of the NPT was to retain their monopoly of nuclear weapons so as to perpetuate a state of nuclear apartheid and maintain their global domination militarily and politically. It was for this reason that they failed to make any significant progress toward the goal of nuclear disarmament.

In fact, despite substantial reductions in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons of the USA and the Soviet Union through the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, for a long time nuclear weapons were an essential element of the strategic doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw bloc, and peace was maintained on the fragile basis of the balance of terror.

Even after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it is doubtful that the USA, Russia, or other recognized nuclear-weapon states would meaningfully work for the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Further, instead of facilitating international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear technology, new restrictions were instituted through the Nuclear Suppliers' Group preventing non-nuclear-weapon states from benefiting fully from the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In particular, non-nuclear-weapon states in the Third World were denied the possibility of acquiring nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities on the pretext of preventing nuclear proliferation. But the same facilities, in some cases, were made available to or allowed in friendly non-nuclear-weapon states allied with the West such as Japan and the Netherlands.

The case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which had been subjected to intense pressure to suspend its uranium enrichment activities even after those activities had been placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as required by paragraph 2 of article III of the NPT, is relevant in this regard. It is true that the lack of transparency of the Iranian nuclear program in the past may have been partly responsible for the absence of trust and for the international pressure exerted on Iran. Still, Iran's right under the NPT to establish uranium enrichment facilities in its territory under appropriate IAEA safeguards was undeniable. It is only now after protracted negotiations between Iran and P5+1 and the signing of the agreement on Iran's nuclear program in July 2015 that its right to enrich uranium under stringent IAEA safeguards has been finally recognized by the West. It is interesting to note by way of contrast that in the 1970s even after the heightened international concern over the issue of nuclear proliferation because of India's so-called peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974, Iran, which was allied to the West at that time, was offered full nuclear fuel cycle facilities by the USA.

The double standards of the USA and other Western countries in dealing with the issue of nuclear non-proliferation are also evident from the way in which they connived in the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel. Another evidence of these double standards is their agreement, under US persuasion, to engage in nuclear cooperation for

peaceful purposes with India, which delivered a severe blow to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime through its nuclear explosions of 1998, while denying the same facility to Pakistan, which carried out nuclear explosions subsequently merely to restore strategic balance in South Asia. Obviously, the driving factor for this decision to commence civilian nuclear cooperation with India was its increased strategic importance as a counterweight to China in the eyes of the USA, which declared in March 2005 its intention to help make India a major world power of the twenty-first century.

The foregoing analysis leads one to the definite conclusion that the world currently is governed primarily by the dictates of power politics more than anything else in dealing with important matters of international peace and security. Powerful countries such as the USA are able to impose their will on others despite the constraints of international law and the UN. As mentioned earlier, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was not backed by the sanction of the UN Security Council or the principles of international law. The Abbottabad operation of 2 May 2011 to kill Osama bin Laden, irrespective of its justification on US national security grounds and the need to combat international terrorism, was a blatant violation of Pakistan's sovereignty and the principles of the UN Charter.

If this practice is stretched to its logical conclusion, the USA and other powerful countries would, in the future, be able to justify their acts of aggression against other sovereign countries simply by linking them in some fashion to the requirements of their national security. In fact, the USA and Israel had been doing precisely that while subjecting Iran to threats of military action in dealing with the issue of its nuclear program. If this tendency becomes a regular international feature, the whole edifice of the UN collective security system will collapse, leading to a chaotic global situation in which international law and morality will cease to have any meaning in practical terms. It is, therefore, not only in the interest of international peace and security but also in the long-term US national interest to check the tendency to take unilateral military actions in violation of the principles of international law.

Limitations of Medium-Size Powers

It is true that international law and the UN are the first line of defense of a small or a medium-size power. It is, therefore, in their own interest to strengthen the UN collective security system and the international

law. Further, while powerful countries sometimes can and do violate the principles of international law with impunity, the same license is not available to small and medium-size nations. At the same time, one must also recognize that in the emerging international scenario with a weakened UN collective security system and the primacy of power politics, the ultimate guarantor of a country's security would increasingly be its national power and the collective power of the coalition of its friends.

This conclusion underscores the need for Pakistan and other similarly placed countries to build up strategic partnerships and friendly relations with other countries to be able to face the pressure that may be exerted on them from time to time by powerful countries. Pakistan is fortunate to have in China a powerful friend in its neighborhood whose strategic interests converge with those of Pakistan. The importance of Pakistan's strategic cooperation with China, therefore, cannot be overemphasized. This factor also calls for strengthening Pakistan's friendly relations and cooperation with other countries, particularly those in its neighborhood such as Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.

As mentioned earlier, weak and small or even medium-size countries such as Pakistan can ignore the norms of international law only at their peril. For instance, on the issue of global terrorism on which an international consensus has developed, Pakistan cannot afford to follow an approach that is different from that of the rest of the world. Therefore, it must not only take decisive action against terrorists but should also demonstrate and project to rest of the world in a convincing manner its firm determination to do so. Pakistan should not allow any daylight between its antiterrorism declaratory and operational policies, which would only serve to create doubts in the international community about its resolve to eradicate the menace of terrorism.

Importance of Economic Power

In the modern world, the importance of economic strength in the calculation of a country's national power and in the realization of its national goals cannot be overemphasized. The Soviet Union collapsed not because of the shortage of conventional and nuclear weapons but mainly because its weak economy could not sustain the enormous burden of its strategic commitments and military superstructure. It was a classic case of strategic overstretch. As Henry Kissinger notes, "Four decades of

imperial expansion in all directions could not be sustained on the basis of an unworkable economic model.”²² Economic development is not only an indispensable condition for a country’s economic well-being but also an important source of strength to its military power and an essential ingredient in the calculus of its national security, especially in any long-term military contest.

Further, the development of a country’s economic and commercial relations with foreign countries can produce an impact on the configuration of the international security environment. Economic and commercial links provide strength and substance to a friendly relationship. They can also play an important role in limiting the damage to the bilateral relationship. The depth of the impact on the regional and global security environment would be determined obviously by the strength of the country’s economy and the level and extent of its foreign economic and commercial relations. For example, currently China’s fast-growing economic and commercial links with the rest of the world, particularly with Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America, are changing global alignments in subtle and not so subtle ways, thereby transforming the global security environment.

Paul Kennedy elaborated at length the importance of the relative economic rise and fall of a Great Power in determining in the long run its growth and decline as an important military power in his seminal book, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. He underscored that “there is detectable a causal relationship between the shifts that have occurred over time in the general economic and productive balances and the position occupied by individual Powers in the international system.”²³ He pointed out that “a large military establishment may, like a great monument, look imposing to the impressionable observer; but if it is not resting upon a firm foundation (in this case, a productive national economy), it runs the risk of a future collapse.”²⁴ According to him, the main issue facing the governments was one of “balancing the short-term security afforded by large defense forces against the longer-term security of rising production and income.”²⁵ He also drew attention to “a noticeable ‘lag time’ between the trajectory of a state’s relative economic strength and the trajectory of its military/territorial influence.”²⁶

In view of the phenomenal economic progress achieved by China, which became the largest economy in the world in PPP terms in 2014, the position of the Japanese economy as the third-largest economy in the world in nominal dollar terms, and the rapid growth of such countries as South

Korea, Indonesia, and India, it is not surprising that the international center of gravity is gradually shifting toward the Asia-Pacific region. This shift will be the harbinger of momentous developments not only in the global economy but also in the international political and security environment as reflected by the US decision to rebalance its forces in favor of the Asia-Pacific region.

Ideally, at the initial stages of its development, a country should assign a higher priority to the growth of its economic strength than to building up its military power because a sound military superstructure can be built up only on the solid foundation of economic prowess. Reversing the order of priorities as Pakistan seems to have done since its independence can lead a country to disastrous consequences, which are visible now in the country. China's experience since late 1979, when under the guidance of its paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, it assigned the highest priority to the goal of national economic development, is highly instructive for developing countries such as Pakistan.

Globalization

Another distinctive feature of the current international scenario is globalization in the form of instantaneous communications through the Internet technology revolution, global reach of the mass media and the multinational corporations, fast means of transportation, and the decline in restrictive trade practices under the World Trade Organization. The consideration of environmental and health issues, which have transborder impact, also has the effect of bringing the countries closer together and encouraging international cooperation. These developments are gradually tearing down cultural and national barriers, and turning the world into a global village. Thus, whereas globalization tends to erode cultural and national barriers, power politics and economic competition among the different civilizations and nations tend to reinforce those barriers. It remains to be seen which of these influences will ultimately prevail. It appears for the time being, however, that power politics and the element of competition in international politics have the upper hand compared with the universalistic consequences of the process of globalization. The policy makers must take into account both of these tendencies in the formulation of national internal and external policies. It would be an error to overemphasize one or the other of these factors in understanding the future evolution of international politics.

Regional Economic Integration

Simultaneously with globalization, there is also a growing trend toward the emergence of regional economic groupings to benefit from an efficient allocation of resources on the basis of the principle of comparative advantage and the economies of large-scale production through free intraregional trade. Other possible advantages of these regional economic groupings include increased inflow of foreign investment and technology, enhanced influence of the member states in international fora, and the strengthening of regional peace and security by defusing tensions, discouraging confrontational policies, and building up linkages among the member states in various fields. The prerequisites for a successful scheme of regional economic cooperation include community of interests, economic complementarities, geographical proximity, cultural affinities, absence of serious disputes, and the nonexistence of hegemonic designs among the member states.

The EU is a prime example of a regional economic grouping that has successfully journeyed from a customs union, in which the member states trade freely among themselves with a common external tariff, to an economic union that involves the coordination of the fiscal and monetary policies of the member states in addition to common external trade policies. An economic union ultimately implies the amalgamation of the economies of the member states into a single unit with uniform fiscal, monetary, and external trade policies and free mobility of labor and capital. Inevitably, the path to economic union also generates impulses for the coordination of the foreign and security policies of the member states because of their close link with the economic policies. The coordination of these policies enables the member states to enhance their influence in international political and economic fora.

Besides the EU, other examples of regional economic cooperation organizations in different parts of the world include North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur (in South America), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which are at different stages of regional economic integration. In view of the importance of this subject, it would be interesting to examine this trend toward regional economic cooperation at greater length in a subsequent chapter. Chap. 5, on “Regionalism and Pakistan,” initiates this discussion with a view to recommending possible policy options for Pakistan.

A Knowledge-Based World

Last but not least, knowledge has become an important source of strength in the modern power-driven international system. Advancement in science and technology and other branches of knowledge has become an indispensable condition for a country's economic progress and prosperity on a sustainable basis as well as for strengthening its military power. Those nations that have learned this lesson have pulled ahead of others in the race for economic growth. Those that have ignored it and instead focused on superficial indicators of progress have lagged far behind. Pakistan unfortunately belongs to the second category of nations. The assigning of low priority to education during the past several decades is perhaps one of the most important causes for Pakistan's economic backwardness. Tragically, Pakistan's leaders and policy makers continue their woeful neglect of education in the allocation of resources. As against the international norm of 4 % to 6 % of GDP set by UNESCO for the developing countries,²⁷ Pakistan, in the past, has generally allocated around 2% of GDP or even less to education at the national level.²⁸ No wonder it has turned into a nation of illiterates or semiliterates with such serious problems as low level of literacy, low economic productivity, cultural obscurantism, religious extremism, and political authoritarianism. There is obviously an urgent need to assign the highest priority to education in the formulation of national policies and the allocation of resources.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Pakistan is faced with an anarchic and extremely competitive global security environment marked by the domination of power politics over international law, diminished authority of the UN on the strategic issues of war and peace, civilizational faultlines, primacy of economic power, importance of science and technology in determining the power of states and its growth, the rise of new powers demanding the accommodation of their interests in the international system, and shifting alliances. It is this "world in disorder" with an unpredictable and inhospitable international environment, in which Pakistan has to operate to safeguard its security and attain the goal of economic prosperity so that its people may realize their full potential.

Pakistan's grand strategy must come to grips with these ground realities in such a manner as would safeguard its legitimate national interests. This will not be an easy task. But it should be possible to evolve such a grand strategy if the nation takes into account the salient features of the

global and regional security environment, learns from its past experience, and develops a coherent and well-thought-out mix of political, economic, security, and diplomatic policies to overcome the challenges confronting it.

The subsequent chapters of this book will analyze in greater detail some specific aspects of the regional and international security environment impinging on Pakistan's security and economic well-being before offering views on how Pakistan can best safeguard its national interests in the largely anarchic world of the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. Mikhail Gorbachev, "Address to the 43rd United Nations General Assembly Session," New York, 7 December 1988, at <http://www.c-span.org/video/?5292-1/gorbachev-united-nations>.
2. "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival," *The New York Times*, 8 March 1992, at <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/excerpts-from-pentagon-s-plan-prevent-the-re-emergence-of-a-new-rival.html>.
3. George W. Bush, "Remarks at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy," West Point, New York, 1 June 2002, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>.
4. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2002), at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>.
5. Mary Elise Sarotte, "A Broken Promise?—What the West Really Told Moscow about NATO Expansion," *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2014 issue, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-11/broken-promise>.
6. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996), pp. 31–32.
7. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, no. 16, Summer 1989, pp. 3–18; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, NY: Avon Books, 1992), p. xi.
8. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, "The State of the State—The Global Contest for the Future of Government," *Foreign Affairs*, July-August 2014 issue, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-05-29/state-state>.
9. Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy* (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014).

10. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993 issue, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/United-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations>; and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1997).
11. Richard N. Haas, "The Age of Nonpolarity," *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2008 issue, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/United-states/2008-05-03/age-nonpolarity>.
12. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2015* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2014), at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/def-budget/fy2015/FY15_Green_Book.pdf.
13. Dinah Walker, "Trends in US Military Spending, Council on Foreign Relations," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 15 July 2014, at www.cfr.org/defense-budget/trends-us-military-spending/p28855.
14. Jeremy Page, "China to Boost Military Budget by 10.1%," *Wall Street Journal*, 4 March 2014, at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-boost-military-budget-by-about-10-1425457646>.
15. G. John Ikenberry, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West," *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2008 issue, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west>.
16. IMF, "Report for Selected Countries and Subjects," *World Economic Outlook Database*, April 2014, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx>.
17. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Foresight 2020* (New York, NY: The Economist, 2006), at http://graphics.eiu.com/files/ad_pdfs/eiuForesight2020_WP.pdf.
18. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), "The BRICS and Beyond: Prospects, Challenges and Opportunities," *World in 2050*, PwC Economics, January 2013, at www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-report-january-2013.pdf, p. 23.
19. Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2008), p. 1.
20. John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2001), p. 21.
21. Articles II, IV, and VI of the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*, New York, 1 July 1968, *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 729, no. 10485, at <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20729/volume-729-I-10485-English.pdf>.
22. Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2014), p. 313.

23. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York, NY: Vintage Random House, 1987), p. xxii.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 444.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 445.
26. *Ibid.*, p. xxiii.
27. Kishore Singh, "Legal and Policy Framework for Financing Basic Education," *UNESCO Future Seminar on "Innovative Financing for Education,"* 14 September 2010, at <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Education/SeminaInnovativeFinancingEducation.pdf>.
28. S. Ejaz Wasti (Economic Advisor), *Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-14* (Islamabad, Pakistan: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, 2014), at http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey_1314.html.

China's Rise and the Global Order

The joint statement issued at the end of Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Pakistan on 20-21 April 2015 rightly stressed that Pakistan considered its friendship with China the "cornerstone of its foreign policy." The Chinese side also affirmed that it had "always placed its relationship with Pakistan on a priority position in its foreign policy agenda."¹ The foundation of this vital relationship for both Pakistan and China was laid in early 1960s. China was in search of friends in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian war of 1962, growing differences with the Soviet Union, and continued opposition by the USA and its allies to allowing it to take its rightful position in the UN. Pakistan needed the help and support of a major regional power to counter the grave threat to its security posed by India. The signing of the Pakistan-China border agreement in 1963 removed a possible hurdle in the development of friendly relations and multifarious cooperation between the two countries.

Pakistan-China friendship has stood the test of time since then. The main reason for the durability of this friendship and its steady development is the convergence of the strategic interests of the two countries. Pakistan needs China's support in facing the threat to its security posed by India. China is also the source of important military and economic

Portions of this chapter were previously published in Javid Husain, "China's Rise and the Global Order," *Criterion Quarterly* 8, no. 3 (2013), at <http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/china%E2%80%99s-rise-and-the-global-order/>.

support to Pakistan besides being an important trade partner. On the other hand, China also needs friends in view of the US policy of containment of China pursued through the strengthening of its alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, the rebalancing of its forces in favor of the Asia-Pacific region, encouraging Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries to resist China's territorial claims in South China Sea, and building up India as a major world power of the twenty-first century to counter the expansion of China's power and influence in South Asia and the India Ocean regions. Pakistan's friendship with China will help the latter in countering the challenge posed by a rapidly growing India, providing it with a shortcut for access to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea for economic and commercial cooperation, and a strategic foothold at the mouth of the Persian Gulf through its presence at the Gawadar deepwater seaport. Thus, China's links with Pakistan will enable it to achieve a strategic bypass avoiding the circle of alliances that the USA is building up on its eastern and southern peripheries.

The likelihood is that this convergence of interests will remain in effect throughout the twenty-first century. Both countries have been the source of support to each other on issues of critical importance to them. China extended critically important support to Pakistan in the 1965 Pakistan-India war. Pakistan firmly supports China on the Taiwan issue. There is extensive cooperation between the two countries in the defense and security sphere. China has extended valuable assistance to Pakistan in the economic field. Currently, Pakistan-China trade is estimated to be over \$15 billion per annum. During President Xi Jinping's visit to Pakistan in April 2015, it was agreed to raise the level to \$20 billion in the next 3 years. The visit also saw the signing of several agreements aimed at the development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which will connect China's Xinjiang province with Gawadar through a high-quality road network, and Chinese investment in energy, infrastructure, and industrial projects. It was announced that these projects will entail the huge Chinese investment of about \$46 billion in Pakistan during the coming years. Both the countries agreed to "elevate the Pakistan-China relationship to the All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership, enriching the Pakistan-China Community of Shared Destiny, to ensure the perpetual continuity of Pakistan-China friendship from generation to generation."²

China's phenomenal economic progress during the past three decades followed by the steady growth of its military power has dramatically transformed the global and regional security environment. It can be emphasized

without any fear of contradiction that the rapid growth of China's economic and military power will be the most momentous development of the twenty-first century. It is, therefore, necessary to understand the implications of China's rise for the regional and global security environment from which Pakistan cannot remain immune. This is all the more essential in view of the growing significance of Pakistan's friendship with China for its security and economic development. What happens to China and around China is of critical importance to Pakistan whose security and economic well-being are closely linked with those of China. Islamabad must, therefore, develop an accurate understanding of the factors behind China's rise and its implications for its security and economic growth in the formulation of its grand strategy for the current century.

CHINA'S PHENOMENAL ECONOMIC RISE

China's rapid economic growth over the past three decades has catapulted it to the position of the second-largest economy in the world in nominal dollar terms, surpassing Japan in 2010. With the estimated GDP of \$9.18 trillion in nominal terms in 2013,³ China is likely to overtake the US economy by 2027 and emerge as the biggest economy in the world, if the current trends are projected into the future. A recent study by PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated that China's GDP in 2027 in nominal terms would be \$24,356 billion as against \$23,376 billion for the USA.⁴ In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, China overtook the US economy in 2014. According to the updating by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of its data on the world economy in October 2014, China would have GDP of \$17.6 trillion in PPP terms as against \$17.4 trillion for the USA in 2014. It is true, however, that due to its much bigger population (1.34 billion) as against 318 million for the United States in 2014,⁵ it will take China much longer, perhaps several decades, to catch up with the USA in terms of GDP per head even under the best of circumstances.

These estimates are based on the bold assumption that China is able to maintain its high economic growth rates in the next few decades, which, of course, is not guaranteed. Historically, as countries reach high levels of economic development, their economic growth rate generally slows down. This may happen to China also. In fact, already China's GDP growth rate was reported to have slowed down to 7.4% in 2014, the lowest growth rate since 1990.⁶ In such an eventuality, it would take China a longer time to overtake the USA in terms of nominal GDP or GDP per head than the

estimates given above. But it is almost certain that as the twenty-first century progresses, the center of gravity of the world economy will gradually shift from the USA to China. By the time China overtakes the US GDP per head, China's economy because of its much bigger population would be about four times the size of the US economy.

Just to give some idea of the kind of change we are talking about, if China had the same GDP per head as the USA was expected to have in 2014, that is, about \$54,920,⁷ its GDP in nominal terms would be \$74 trillion as against the US GDP of \$17.4 trillion. Of course, China is nowhere near catching up with the USA in terms of GDP per head in the near future. Professor Hu Angang of Tsinghua University calculates that China's GDP per head would barely match half the United States GDP per head around 2030.⁸ But the possibility of the Chinese economy's catching up with the US economy in terms of GDP per head sometime in the second half of the twenty-first century is very much there. This possibility must be taken into account by the leaders and the policy makers of the countries of the world engaged in long-term foreign policy calculations and planning.

China's rise will in a way restore it to the pre-eminent position that it used to enjoy in the world economy in the past before the industrial revolution and the onset of the colonial era lowered its position in world rankings. Henry Kissinger in his book on China has noted the following:

Not only was the scale of China traditionally far beyond that of the European countries in population and in territory; until the Industrial Revolution, China was far richer. United by a vast system of canals connecting the great rivers and population centers, China was for centuries the world's most productive economy and most populous trading area.... In fact, China produced a greater share of total world GDP than any Western society in eighteen of the last twenty centuries. As late as 1820, it produced over 30 percent of the world GDP--an amount exceeding the GDP of Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the United States combined.⁹

China's decline and later humiliation at the hands of the Western powers started in the nineteenth century as these powers, strengthened economically and militarily by the industrial revolution and advances in science and technology, embarked upon the expansion of maritime trade and a worldwide campaign of subjugation and conquest of distant lands. China could not remain immune from the expanding power and influence of the Western states, which were bent upon exploiting the resources of the rest

of the world to their advantage. This, however, was by no means a unique phenomenon because most powerful empires and states in the past had expanded the areas under their influence or direct control through trade, subjugation, or outright conquest.

Zbigniew Brzezinski notes the negative repercussions on the Asian economies of their relative decline vis-à-vis the European colonial powers and their exploitation by the latter in the following manner: “As late as the year 1800, Asia accounted for about 60% of the world’s total GNP, in contrast to Europe’s 30%. India’s share alone of the global product in 1750 amounted to 25% (according to Jaswant Singh, former Indian finance minister), much like that of the United States today. But during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with the intrusion of European imperialism backed by Europe’s surging industrial innovation and financial sophistication, Asia’s global share declined precipitously. By 1900, for example, under prolonged British imperial rule, India’s share shrank to a mere 1.6%.”¹⁰ In 1970, the shares of China and India of the global GDP were estimated to be 0.78% and 0.87%, respectively.¹¹

The Opium War (1840–42) imposed by the British on China to force it to allow the import of opium was the beginning of the series of humiliations that China suffered in the next century or so at the hands of the West European powers, the Americans and Japan in the form of unequal treaties and the cession of the Chinese territory.¹² The success of the Mao Zedong-led communist movement and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 brought a definite end to the reverses that China had suffered during the preceding century. While the Mao Zedong-led communist revolution emancipated China from colonial shackles, it did not generate economic prosperity in the succeeding three decades because of the flawed economic policies of the era. This obstacle was removed in 1979 when the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping put China on the road to rapid economic progress.

This brief reference to an unhappy part of China’s relatively recent history is necessary to understand the feelings of self-satisfaction and justified pride of the Chinese people and leaders now when China is rapidly closing the gap in economic prosperity between it and the states that had subjected it to humiliations in the past. It also gives the Chinese people the hope that China would in the foreseeable future regain its rightful place in the comity of nations. China’s incumbent President Xi Jinping reflects these hopes when he says that the “greatest Chinese dream” is the “great revival of the Chinese nation.” Although President Xi has not given

a precise interpretation of “the Chinese dream,” the Chinese Communist Party’s long-term plans call for the “attainment of a ‘moderately well-off society’ by 2021...and the creation of a ‘rich, strong, democratic, civilized and harmonious socialist modern country’ by 2049.”¹³

The secret of China’s rapid economic growth lies in the policies of economic reforms and opening to the outside world approved by the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978 at the behest of Deng Xiaoping and initiated in right earnest in 1979. Deng decreed that “poverty is not socialism” and “to get rich is glorious.” Henceforth, rapid economic development was to be the supreme national goal of China and all of China’s policies were to be geared to its realization. Deng’s program of reforms, called “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” embodied the move to a market economy internally and the policy of opening to the outside world while maintaining the Communist Party’s rule. Thus, economic liberalization was to be combined with the continuation of one-party rule.

Internally, the Mao-era emphasis on egalitarianism was jettisoned in favor of reward for private initiative, thus, providing an incentive for hard work and innovation instead of rewarding lethargy and monotonous repetition of age-old practices. In pursuance of the new policy, the economy was gradually liberalized by allowing competition and market forces to play an increasingly important role in different sectors. The process of reforms was initially introduced in the rural sector and, after its success, was extended to the urban sector starting from 1984.¹⁴ During my posting as Minister/Deputy Head of Mission in the Pakistan Embassy, Beijing, from 1985 to 1988, I personally saw with great admiration the pragmatic, skillful, and well-calibrated manner in which the Chinese authorities expanded these reforms from the rural to the urban sector, learning from practical experience as they went along.

To support its single-minded pursuit of the objective of rapid economic growth, China also decided to pursue “a low-risk foreign policy” for a long time to come to avoid the possibility of its involvement in a major armed conflict and to limit the diversion of its resources to the military. According to the information that came to my notice during my posting at Beijing, a decision was taken by the Chinese leadership led by Deng Xiaoping at the highest level that China would not get involved in a major armed conflict at least till 2050. In pursuance of this policy, China under Deng, soon after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, entered into negotiations with the Soviet Union and India on border

disputes to defuse tensions in its relations with those countries. Under Deng Xiaoping's directions, the Chinese defense expenditure was sharply reduced from as high as about 6.8% of GNP in early 1983 to 1.5% of GNP by 1989. By 1995, it was further lowered to 1.0% of GNP where it remained for several years before rising gradually to 1.4% of GNP where it is at present.¹⁵ This has enabled China to allocate a high percentage of its resources, as high as over 45% of GDP in some years, to the task of economic development.¹⁶

The policy of opening to the outside world was meant to attract foreign investment and expose China to the modernizing influences at play in the developed countries of the world, particularly advances in sciences, technology, and management techniques, so as to benefit from them in the race for economic growth on which China was embarking. When some of Deng Xiaoping's colleagues expressed the apprehension that the policy of opening to the outside world might allow some undesirable foreign influences to penetrate the Chinese society, Deng famously stated that one must open the window to get fresh air even if there was the danger that some flies might also get in.

These policies have produced astonishing results. As noted by Fareed Zakaria, the "size of the (Chinese) economy has doubled every 8 years for three decades."¹⁷ Between 1978 and 1998, the size of China's GDP increased five times as against the target of fourfold increase. Even after 1998, the Chinese economy has been growing at high growth rates of 8%–10% in most of the years.¹⁸ Professor Hu Angang highlights that for 33 years from 1978 to 2011, China maintained an average growth rate of nearly 10%.¹⁹ There has been some slowing down of the Chinese economy more recently because of the severe recession in most of the developed world, internal structural problems, and the general tendency of the economic growth rate to slow down in the middle phases of development. But even then China has been able to maintain a GDP growth rate of about 7%.

Besides internal structural economic problems, China in the long run would also have to deal with the issue of reform of the political sector keeping in view the demands of a liberalized economic sector in which the private sector makes the predominant contribution to its gross national product (GNP). The possibility cannot be ruled out that as the scope of choice and private initiative is expanded in the economic sector, the Chinese people may also demand political pluralism or greater choice in the political sphere. China's future in the decades to come may depend

heavily upon the way in which the Chinese authorities combine political reform with their single-minded pursuit of economic growth. Ideally, China should move gradually toward increased democratization in a controlled and well-sequenced fashion. The inability of the Chinese leaders to carry out political reforms may aggravate social tensions and have negative repercussions on China's economic growth in the future.

The rapid growth of China's economy is reflected in other economic indicators. In 2013, China surpassed the USA as the biggest trader in goods with total trade in goods estimated at \$4.16 trillion. Its exports and imports were estimated to be \$2.21 trillion and \$1.95 trillion, respectively, in that year.²⁰ China's enormous foreign exchange reserves, the biggest in the world, were estimated to be \$3.89 trillion at the end of September 2014.²¹ In view of the rapidly growing strength of the Chinese economy and its vast foreign exchange reserves, it is not surprising that many Central Banks are adding Chinese currency to their portfolios because they "view renminbi as a viable reserve currency."²²

GROWTH OF CHINA'S MILITARY POWER

China's growing economic strength has allowed it to increase its military expenditure rapidly to safeguard its essential national security interests. China's budget for 2014–15 allocated a sum of \$132 billion for defense. This, of course, is far below the US annual military budget, which was estimated to be about \$575 billion for the year 2014–15.²³ But the situation is likely to change to the disadvantage of the USA as China increases its military budget over the coming decades and the USA is forced to apply brakes because of its economic constraints. According to a forecast by *The Economist*, China's military spending may overtake America's after 2035.²⁴

As part of its program to modernize the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and to deter US military intervention in areas falling within the First Island Chain, which links Japan with Taiwan and includes most of the South China Sea, China has focused on affordable asymmetric weapons. According to the Pentagon planners, China wants to acquire A2/AD or anti-access/area-denial capabilities. In pursuance of this strategy, China is rapidly developing land-based attack missiles. Second, China has strengthened and enlarged its submarine fleet. It has also been working on antisatellite weapons.

In 1993, the Chinese government gave the task of winning "local wars under high-tech conditions" to PLA. The emphasis of PLA now is on

“informatization” or what is called “unified C4ISR” in the West, where C4 stands for command, control, communications, and computers; and ISR stands for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The objective is to ensure that the armed forces operate as a closely knit network. However, in terms of the quality of its military equipment and military technology, China is still far behind the USA, which is likely to maintain its military superiority over China during the next three to four decades.²⁵ This is particularly so in the case of the Chinese navy and air force, which are decades behind the USA in terms of the quality and sophistication of their equipment and weapon systems. For instance, as against the 10 Nimitz class aircraft carriers in the US Navy, China has only one aircraft carrier of much lower capabilities. According to rough estimates, even under the best of circumstances it would take China 30-40 years to catch up with the USA in terms of the strength of its naval and air forces.

IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S RISE

Historically, the rise of a great power such as China has been generally accompanied by a period of international strife and conflict in which the rising power tried to force itself to what it thought was its rightful position in the comity of nations in the face of resistance by the status quo or declining power or powers. One notable exception to this trend was the peaceful manner in which Great Britain vacated the top position in the rankings of great powers in favor of the USA at the beginning of the twenty-first century as the latter overtook it in economic and military power. It is, however, unlikely that the USA would easily vacate the top position in the comity of nation for China. This is particularly so as the USA is still far ahead of China currently in military power, science, and technology, and is likely to remain so for quite some time to come.

The normal expectation would be that the USA would use all the levers of power at its disposal to resist the expansion of China's power and influence. Predictably, therefore, the USA has decided to rebalance its forces in favor of the Asia-Pacific region to reassure its allies and to safeguard what it considers its essential security interests in the area. It is also in the process of strengthening a string of alliances around China, including those with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, to contain the latter. The US intention to help build up India as a major world power of the twenty-first century, declared in March 2005, is also an essential element of its policy of containment of China.

Perhaps the most important issue of the twenty-first century from the point of view of international politics would be the manner in which China's rise is accommodated in the existing global order by the USA and other Western powers that have crafted its basic rules. These rules give an inherent advantage to the USA and other Western powers in the conduct of interstate relations. One of the advantages of being a powerful state such as the USA is that it plays an important role in determining the agenda of the interstate discourse besides deciding the rules governing international relations. So powerful states decide not only which game will be played in the arena of international politics but also the rules of that game! That gives them quite an advantage over the less powerful states, which they would not like to give up easily.

A group of distinguished scholars including Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth in an article in *Foreign Affairs* pointed out a number of advantages that the prevailing global order offered to the USA. To start with, the authors elaborated, "After all, today's rules and institutions came about under its (the US) auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated action with several Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms." They added that the US broader leadership makes "it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect US interests."

They further pointed out that the USA has also used its global dominance "to structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests.... More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund....The United States' political dominance also helps keep the US dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country (the US), such as the ability to borrow money."²⁶

The essential point is that the existing global political and economic order is heavily tilted in favor of the USA and other Western powers, which helped establish it in the first place. It is inevitable, therefore, that as China's economic and military power grows, it will seek to modify the rules of the existing world order so as to make them more even-handed

and to provide a fair opportunity for China's rise in the comity of nations. On the other hand, since these rules were laid down precisely to give an advantage to the Western powers led by the USA, they are likely to resist the Chinese attempts to modify them.

This explains the constant refrain of the Western leaders that China should conform to the rules of the existing global order as its economic and military power increases. China, in the long run, is unlikely to oblige the USA and its allies by complying with this demand. One of the main objectives of China in gaining greater economic and military power is precisely to reshape the world order with a view to making it even-handed and balanced from China's point of view. The prospect of growing international tensions is, therefore, built in the current international scenario because of the emerging US-China rivalry.

It would be critically important to watch the manner in which the USA and its allies manage China's rise with a view to assessing the future directions of international politics. They can either resist China's legitimate demand for modifications in the existing global political and economic order to make it fair and even-handed. Or they can peacefully agree to such modifications as would be necessary to remove its bias in favor of the West. Such modifications in many cases would be painful and might be resisted by domestic pressure groups, making it difficult for the Western governments to agree to them. This explains why the summit in California between Presidents Obama and Xi Jinping in 2013 did not produce any breakthrough on issues of vital importance to their relationship. It would require extraordinary sagacity on the part of the USA and its allies in the West to agree peacefully to the modification of the existing global order to make it fair and to accommodate China's rise. Unfortunately such wisdom is in short supply these days.

The use of the dollar as the international currency will be questioned increasingly in the years to come as the US external indebtedness grows because of its huge deficits in balance of trade and as China piles up massive reserves of foreign exchange, estimated to be about \$3.9 trillion toward the end of 2014, due to its recurring favorable balance of trade. It is inevitable that as this trend continues and as China liberalizes its external capital account, there would be growing demand for the Chinese currency as a reserve currency and less reliance on the dollar for this purpose. Further, as China's economic power increases, it would be well-placed to demand modifications of the organizational structures of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, which currently

give overwhelming clout to the USA and its allies in their management and operations. Unsurprisingly, the USA has been resisting reforms to give big emerging economies such as China greater say at the World Bank and IMF.

The establishment in July 2014 of the New Development Bank by BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) with Headquarters at Shanghai, in which China has the major share, to finance infrastructure and other development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies is just an initial sign of the kind of challenges that China's growing economic strength will enable it to pose to the domination of the USA and its West European allies of international financial institutions. This was followed by the establishment on 24 October 2014 of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with Headquarters at Beijing to finance infrastructure projects in Asia. Most of the Asian countries including Pakistan and India have joined it. Despite the US opposition, its allies such as the UK, France, Italy, and Germany have also become its members. AIIB, with 57 members and eventual authorized capital of \$100 billion, was expected to become operational by the end of 2015.²⁷ The Articles of the bank, according to the latest reports, entered into force on 25 December, 2015. China will have the highest stake of 30% of the authorized capital in the bank, which is viewed as an emerging rival to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. At the regional level, China will extend its economic influence through trade and investment in far-flung regions such as Africa and Latin America. Judging by the latest reports about the activities of Chinese economic entities, this process is already taking place.

On the political and security side, China will increasingly challenge the hitherto unquestioned dominance of the West in various regions of the world, especially those in its periphery in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. It will also pose a growingly potent challenge to the system of alliances through which the USA maintains its presence and influence in different regions of the world. Among other steps, China will strengthen its strategic cooperation with Russia, which is also being subjected to NATO's expansionist ambitions in Ukraine and other countries in Russia's near abroad. In May 2015, China and Russia conducted their first joint naval exercises in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. They also held joint military exercises in the Sea of Japan at the end of August 2015. As China's economic linkages with the rest of the world increase, countries sitting on the fence and those with less than total commitment

to the USA and other Western powers may be tempted to reconsider the nature of their external links to lessen their dependence on the West in economic and security fields.

Based on these considerations, noted American scholar John J. Mearsheimer concludes in his book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* that if China's economic growth continues at a robust pace, it would emerge as a potential hegemon in Northeast Asia. He adds, "In that circumstance, it is hard to see how the United States could prevent China from becoming a peer competitor.... Although it is certainly in China's interest to be the hegemon in Northeast Asia, it is clearly not in America's interest to have that happen."²⁸

It is advantageous to be powerful in the existing anarchic world where power is the ultimate arbiter of strategic issues of peace and security. Thus, national power, over and above international law and morality, is the only sure guarantee for a nation's security. National power also enables a state to safeguard its interests in the selection of and deliberation on major international security, economic, and commercial issues in international forums. China has learned the bitter lesson from its own history that nations have to pay a heavy price for their weakness. It is, therefore, likely to continue its pursuit of economic and military power in a single-minded fashion in the years and decades to come for safeguarding what it considers its legitimate national interests and making the existing world order fair and even-handed. As it does so, it is likely to be opposed by the West, which is the main architect and the beneficiary of the existing global order.

As noted earlier, the growing tensions between China and the West led by the USA can be resolved through conflict, as was mostly the practice in the past in the case of the emergence of new great powers; or through peaceful means, which would involve painful compromises mostly by the beneficiaries of the existing global order. If the past is any guide, the probability of a smooth and peaceful accommodation of China's rise by the West led by the USA is rather low. So the world is likely to witness a period of intense strife between the USA and China, especially after 2050 by which time the combination of China's economic and military power will pose a potent challenge to the US global supremacy. The Asia-Pacific region will be the main arena for the interplay of these great power conflicts.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

The radical transformation of the global economic and security environment brought about by China's phenomenal growth carries important implications for Pakistan. To begin with, Islamabad must attach the highest importance to its economic relations with China whose weight in the global economy will rapidly increase. The AIIB episode is a sign of the things to come. Pakistan's public and private sectors must reorient their outlook and policies to adjust to the momentous changes that are expected at the global and regional levels in economic and commercial fields. On the governmental side, Pakistan's Foreign Office and economic ministries must build up capacity, through additional allocation of human and financial resources and better training, for analyzing current developments and likely future trends in China's policies, to evaluate their implications for the country. The capacity of our embassy in Beijing and consulates in China to take advantage of the emerging opportunities for economic and commercial cooperation with China must also be enhanced.

Within the next decade or so, the center of gravity of the global economy is likely to shift to the Asia-Pacific region. Pakistan's public and private sectors must, therefore, pay increased attention, besides China, to this rapidly growing region and ASEAN as a whole, especially to countries such as Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia, which offer attractive opportunities for economic and commercial cooperation.

The importance of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in building up economic and commercial links between the two countries cannot be exaggerated. This project and the allied activities, which involve US\$46 billion worth of Chinese investment in Pakistan, also carry significant strategic implications. The full operationalization of CPEC by supporting economic progress of Pakistan, giving a boost to Pakistan-China relations, and providing China with easy access to Gawadar and the Arabian Sea through the Pakistani territory would send a loud and clear signal to the rest of the world of the enhanced strategic partnership between the two countries. It would also enable the western provinces of China to engage in maritime trade through the short and economical route to the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean that CPEC offers.

On the security side, as assessed by Mearsheimer, the likelihood is that the coming decades will witness growing strains in US-China relations as China asserts its growing power at regional and global levels and the USA resists the expansion of Chinese influence and power. The dragging of feet

by the USA on the IMF reform, which aims at giving greater weight to China and other emerging economies in the decision-making process as well as its opposition to AIIB are initial signs of things to come.²⁹ Within Asia, China and India ultimately will emerge as rivals for power and influence, especially in the Indian Ocean region. The USA is helping India emerge as a major world power of the twenty-first century. This help may have the indirect effect of supporting India's hegemonic designs in South Asia, which would be a source of serious concern to Pakistan. These factors reinforce the arguments for Pakistan and China to seek closer strategic and security cooperation with each other. Needless to say, enhanced cooperation in strategic and security fields between them must be combined with the strengthening of cooperation in economic, technical, and cultural spheres.

Further, as the US-led West exerts strategic pressure on Russia on the west as in Ukraine, and the USA and its allies do so on China from the east and the south, Beijing and Moscow will seek closer strategic cooperation with each other bilaterally and multilaterally within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to counter the perceived threat from the USA. It is also in their common interest to counter the US presence and influence in Central Asia, which has vast oil and gas resources. Pakistan must keep a close eye on these developments because of their direct relevance to its security. Further, besides strengthening strategic and economic cooperation with China, it should build up bridges of understanding and cooperation with Russia and play an active role in SCO to safeguard its interests. Pakistan's admission as a full member into SCO together with India at the 15th Summit of SCO held at Ufa, Russia, in July 2015 provides it with a useful platform to strengthen bonds of cooperation with the SCO member states, promote regional stability, and resist hegemonic designs at regional and global levels.

NOTES

1. Press Information Department, Government of Pakistan, "PR No. 190 Joint statement between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the People's Republic of China on establishing the all-weather strategic cooperative partnership," press release, 20 April 2015, <http://www.pid.gov.pk/press20-04-2015.htm>.
2. Ibid. For background historical information on Pakistan-China relations, see S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991); Latif Ahmed Sherwani, *Pakistan,*

- China and America* (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1980); and Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy---A Reappraisal* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000).
3. IMF, "Report for Selected Countries and Subjects," *World Economic Outlook Database*, April 2014, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx>.
 4. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), "The BRICS and Beyond: Prospects, Challenges and Opportunities," *World in 2050*, PwC Economics, January 2013, at www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-report-january-2013.pdf, p. 1.
 5. "The World in Figures," *The World in 2014*, *The Economist*, 18 November 2013.
 6. Calum MacLeod, "Chinese Economy Posts Lowest Growth Rate Since 1990," *USA Today*, 20 January 2015, at www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/01/19/china-2014-growth/22028737/.
 7. "The World in Figures," *The World in 2014*, *The Economist*, 18 November 2013.
 8. Hu Angang, "Embracing China's 'New Normal,'" *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2015 issue, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-04-20/embracing-chinas-new-normal>.
 9. Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2011), pp. 11–12.
 10. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision—America and the Crisis of Global Power* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2012), p. 15.
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
 12. For a lucid description of these developments, see Kissinger, *On China*, especially pp. 33–90.
 13. Chasing the Chinese Dream, *The Economist*, 4–10 May 2013, pp. 20–22.
 14. For a detailed description of the post-Mao reforms, see John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, *China—A New History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1992), pp. 406–451.
 15. "China's Defense Budget," *GlobalSecurity*, at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget-table.htm>.
 16. "Pedalling Prosperity—Special Report-China's Economy," *The Economist*, 26 May-1 June 2012, p. 4.
 17. Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2008), p. 89.
 18. "Pedalling Prosperity—Special Report-China's Economy," *The Economist*, 26 May-1 June 2012, p. 4.
 19. Angang, "Embracing China's 'New Normal.'"

20. Jamil Anderlini and Lucy Hornby, "China Overtakes US as World's Largest Goods Trader," *Financial Times*, 10 January 2014, at <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7c2dbd70-79a6-11e3-b381-00144feabdc0.html>.
21. Gordon G. Chang, "Blame Capital Flight for China's Biggest Ever Fall in Forex Reserves," *Forbes/World Affairs*, 19 October 2014, at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2014/10/19/blame-capital-flight-for-chinas-biggest-ever-fall-in-forex-reserves/>.
22. Saikat Chatterjee and Rachel Armstrong, "China Currency Claims a Bigger Share of Reserve Manager Portfolios," *Reuters*, 29 October 2014, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/29/us-china-summit-reserves-reuters-summit-idUSKBN0I10VX20141029>.
23. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *US Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2014), at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/fy2015_Budget_Request.pdf.
24. "The dragon's New Teeth," *The Economist*, 7-13 April 2012, p. 23.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-25.
26. Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, "Lean Forward," *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2013 issue, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2012-11-30/lean-forward>.
27. Mike Bird, "China's New Development Bank Is Becoming a Massive Embarrassment for Obama," *Business Insider*, 31 March 2015, at <http://www.businessinsider.com/us-allies-joining-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-aiib-embarrassment-2015-3>.
28. John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2001), pp. 399-400.
29. Wu Zhenglong, "US Should Agree to Democratize the IMF—Or Get Out of the Way," *The World Post*, updated on 14 March 2015, at www.huffingtonpost.com/wu-zhenglong/us-democratize-imf_b_6458146.html.

India: An Aspiring Hegemon

Since its birth in 1947, Pakistan has had difficult relations with India. The relationship between them has been punctuated by occasional wars and armed conflicts but was hardly ever free of tensions and strains. Several outstanding disputes, particularly Kashmir, have bedeviled Pakistan-India relations from the very commencement of their journey as independent nations. In view of this unhappy history and India's close geographical proximity, its policies have a direct bearing on Pakistan's security and economic well-being. Any effort to formulate a grand strategy for Pakistan must, therefore, take into account India's growth as a major regional power, its regional and global strategic goals, and the policies to attain them. It is important to know, in particular, whether India wants to have good neighborly relations with Pakistan based on the principles of sovereign equality, mutual respect, peaceful settlement of disputes, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, or whether it wants to establish its hegemony in the region while rejecting offers of friendship and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Portions of this chapter previously appeared as earlier versions/ adaptations in articles for *The Nation* (nation.com.pk) and in Javid Husain, "Long-Term Prospects of Pakistan-India Relations," *Criterion Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (2014), at <http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/long-term-prospects-of-pakistan-india-relations/>.

INDIA'S RISE AS A MAJOR REGIONAL POWER

As pointed out in the preceding chapter, China's inexorable rise, both economically and militarily, will pose a formidable challenge to the US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region in the foreseeable future. At the global level, this challenge will take a somewhat longer time, perhaps another half-century, to materialize as China's economic and military strength increases and the gap between it and the USA in scientific and technological advancement narrows down.

The geopolitical scene on the Asian continent, however, would also be radically transformed by another factor, that is, the rise of India as a major power of the twenty-first century. India, with an estimated population of 1.26 billion and gross domestic product (GDP) of \$2.14 trillion in nominal terms in 2014, already looms large on the South Asian subcontinent. None of the other South Asian countries comes even close to the size of India's population and economy. In fact, India's population and GDP are more than the combined population and GDP of all the other South Asian countries. By way of comparison, the estimated population and GDP of Pakistan, the second biggest country in South Asia, were 186 million and \$251 billion, respectively, in 2014. Thus, Pakistan's population is about one-seventh that of India and its GDP is about one-ninth of India's GDP.¹

Even in global terms, India's economy will rise up rapidly in world rankings. According to a study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, India's GDP in nominal terms will increase to \$7918 billion by 2030, making India the third-largest economy in the world after China (\$24,356 billion) and the US (\$23,376 billion). In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, India is already the third-largest economy in the world.² According to another forecast, India as the third-biggest economy in the world in PPP terms will have a GDP of \$9.29 trillion in 2020.³

On the Asian continent, India is currently the second biggest economy after China with the GDP of \$5481 billion in PPP terms in 2014. It is followed by Japan (\$4769 billion), South Korea (\$1680 billion), Indonesia (\$1384 billion), and Australia (\$1139 billion). However, in nominal terms India occupies the third position lagging behind Japan.⁴

India has also increased rapidly its defense expenditure and acquisition of advanced weapon systems to translate its growing economic strength into military power. India's defense budget was estimated to be \$37.4 billion during the year 2013–14. This represented an increase of 5.3% over the defense budget for the preceding year. The earlier two years

(2012–13 and 2011–12) witnessed growth in the defense budget at the rate of 17.6% and 11.6%, respectively.⁵ India received 9% of global arms transfers from 2006 to 2010, making it the world's leading importer of weapons. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India was also the leading importer of weapons during the period from 2008 to 2012.⁶ It has been acquiring advanced defense weapon systems from major world suppliers to increase its military capabilities. Its plans to acquire aircraft carriers reflect its intentions to project its power in far-flung areas of the Indian Ocean region.

In July 2014, the new Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government led by Narendra Modi revised upward India's defense budget for 2014–15 to \$38.35 billion, an increase of 12% over the previous year. The Indian Defense Acquisition Council announced in October 2014 that defense projects worth \$13 billion had been cleared to boost the country's defense preparedness. These projects included, *inter alia*, the purchase of six indigenously made submarines, 8356 Israeli antitank guided missiles, 12 upgraded Dornier surveillance aircraft and 362 infantry fighting vehicles.⁷ On 28 February 2015, India announced that it would increase its defense budget for 2015–16 to \$ 40.07 billion.⁸

INDIA'S STRATEGIC GOALS

India is generally recognized by the world community as an emerging major power because of its rapidly growing economic and military strength. It is now a member of many of the forums such as G-20 where important decisions about global politics and economy are taken. It is also a candidate for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. The USA has accorded an important role to India in its strategy to contain China. In a statement of far-reaching strategic importance issued in March 2005, Washington announced its intention "to help India become a major world power in the 21st century."⁹ This was later confirmed by Ambassador David Mulford in a US Embassy press release issued on 31 March 2005. Soon thereafter, the USA entered into agreements with India for commencing cooperation with it in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and for vastly expanding cooperation in the military field.¹⁰ The fact that the USA modified its domestic laws and persuaded other members of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group to commence civilian nuclear cooperation with India despite its nuclear explosions of 1998 showed the importance that it attached to its future strategic cooperation with New Delhi.

In view of the anarchic nature of international system, it is in the nature of an emerging great power such as India to seek hegemony as pointed out by John J. Mearsheimer in his widely acclaimed book, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. After analyzing the characteristics of international politics, Mearsheimer concludes, “Thus the claim that states maximize relative power is tantamount to arguing that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions. Even when a great power achieves a distinct military advantage over its rivals, it continues looking for chances to gain more power. The pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved.”¹¹

It should not cause any surprise, therefore, if India as an emerging great power seeks hegemony in South Asia. India’s conduct and statements by its spokesmen vividly bring out that it has every intention of asserting its power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean regions. It is in the process of developing its military capabilities and evolving a structure of alliances for playing that role. India’s determination to achieve hegemony in South Asia was unequivocally elaborated by noted Indian security analyst C. Raja Mohan as follows:

India’s grand strategy divides the world into three concentric circles. In the first, which encompasses the immediate neighborhood, India has sought primacy and a veto over the actions of outside powers. In the second, which encompasses the so-called extended neighborhood stretching across Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral, India has sought to balance the influence of other powers and prevent them from undercutting its interests. In the third, which includes the entire global stage, India has tried to take its place as one of the great powers, a key player in international peace and security.¹²

Interestingly, the first of the three factors that in C. Raja Mohan’s opinion have prevented India from realizing its grand strategic goals was the partition of South Asia and the creation of Pakistan (and later Bangladesh) along religious lines. This factor, according to him, left India with a persistent conflict with Pakistan and an internal Hindu-Muslim divide; separated India from Afghanistan, Iran, and, one may add, Central Asia; and created profound problems for India’s engagement with the Muslim Middle East because of Pakistan’s character as an Islamic state. The other two obstacles identified by Raja Mohan in the way of the realization of its grand strategic goals were its socialist system and the Cold War, which put

India on the losing side of the great political contest of the second half of the twentieth century. He further points out that while the second and the third obstacles identified by him have disappeared, India needs to deal with the first obstacle, that is to say Pakistan, in the realization of its grand strategic goals.

Indian hegemonic designs in South Asia and its ambitions to rival China are recognized by noted scholars of international politics. For instance, Zbigniew Brzezinski in his latest book *Strategic Vision—America and the Crisis of Global Power*, after taking note of the Indian ambitions and the emerging China-India rivalry, comments as follows:

Indian strategists speak openly of a greater India exercising a dominant position in an area ranging from Iran to Thailand. India is also positioning itself to control the Indian Ocean militarily; its naval and air power programs point clearly in that direction—as do politically guided efforts to establish for India strong positions, with geostrategic implications, in adjoining Bangladesh and Burma.¹³

Henry Kissinger takes note of India's hegemonic designs in South Asia and Indian Ocean regions in his latest book as follows:

Just as the early American leaders developed in the Monroe Doctrine a concept for America's special role in the Western Hemisphere, so India has established in practice a special position in the Indian Ocean region between the East Indies and the Horn of Africa. Like Britain with respect to Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, India strives to prevent the emergence of a dominant power in this vast portion of the globe. Just as early American leaders did not seek the approval of the countries of the Western Hemisphere with respect to the Monroe Doctrine, so India in the region of its special strategic interests conducts its policy on the basis of its own definition of a South Asian order.¹⁴

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS

The foregoing establishes conclusively India's hegemonic ambitions in South Asia. The historical record reinforces this conclusion. The way India tried to destabilize Pakistan soon after the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 through delay in sharing cash balances with Pakistan, cutting off the supply of river water from two headworks under her control in 1948, and the stoppage of trade with Pakistan in 1949 because of the

latter's refusal to devalue its currency in line with New Delhi's decision, was an early example of India's hegemonic ambitions. India's blatant military intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 in violation of the principles of international law and the UN Charter was an obvious attempt to cut Pakistan down to size. India's handling of its disputes with Pakistan, particularly Kashmir, Sir Creek, and Siachin, which it stealthily occupied in 1984, also reflects its hegemonic mindset. The same is true of India's frequent resort to coercive diplomacy when things don't go according to its liking in relations with Pakistan.¹⁵ India's quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is again in pursuit of a great power status to which India thinks it is entitled.

The Kashmir dispute, in particular, has been the bone of contention and the cause of wars and armed conflicts between the two countries. In accordance with the principle of Partition, the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which had overwhelming Muslim majority, should have acceded to Pakistan. The decision of its Hindu ruler instead to accede to India led ultimately to the first Pakistan-India war in 1948. The dispute was referred to the UN Security Council, which decided in several resolutions that the future of Jammu and Kashmir would be decided through a plebiscite held under the UN auspices to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiri people. India initially accepted the resolutions, but later reneged on its commitments to the holding of a plebiscite under the UN auspices. Since then, this dispute has been the most important source of tensions and conflicts between Pakistan and India. It is difficult to visualize genuine peace and amity between Pakistan and India without a peaceful settlement of this dispute in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions and the wishes of the Kashmiri people.¹⁶

Thus, India's hegemonic designs in South Asia and the Kashmir dispute have bedeviled Pakistan-India relations since 1947 when Pakistan came into being as a result of the free exercise of the right of self-determination of the people inhabiting the areas that formed the new country. Siachin, Sir Creek, and disputes on river water management are other issues that stand in the way of good neighborly relations between the two countries. Besides a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir and other disputes, Pakistan and India must reach an understanding on the latter's hegemonic designs so that the two countries can live in peace as good neighbors in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality, mutual respect, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

CURRENT STATUS OF PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS

Pakistan's domestic political instability, the debilitating war on terror in which it is engaged, its deplorable economic performance over the past decade and a half, and the American pressure on it because of the crisis in Afghanistan have worked to weaken Pakistan's position vis-à-vis India. On the other hand, India has been emboldened in the pursuit of its hegemonic ambitions by its much faster economic growth, its rapidly growing military strength, its status as a stable democracy, and the US strategic tilt in its favor to contain a rising China.

The strategic issues of peace and security are ultimately decided in this anarchic international system through the logic of power. Unfortunately, Pakistan's power relative to that of India has weakened over the past decade and a half. If the trend of the relative decline of Pakistan's power vis-à-vis India's continues, the latter's ability to dictate to Pakistan would grow in strength. Under the present circumstances, the chances of the resolution of major Pakistan-India disputes on satisfactory terms from Pakistan's point of view appear to be quite remote. India's decision to resile from the Pakistan-India agreement on Siachin is a case in point.

It is unlikely that India would be dissuaded from pursuing its hegemonic policies in South Asia just by expressions of friendliness on Pakistan's part and its desire for peaceful coexistence and cooperation as some of its politicians and analysts seem to think. What India wants instead is submissiveness on the part of Pakistan. It will use the full weight of its growing power and every trick of trade to achieve this goal. This would be particularly so under the newly elected BJP government of India led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has been a lifelong member of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). It is well-known that RSS is an extremist militant organization committed to Hindutva or the revival of Hindu nationalism. Narendra Modi's anti-Pakistan bias was on display during the election campaign in 2014. Earlier, he was blamed for large-scale massacre of Muslims in Gujrat in 2002 when he was the chief minister of the state. It would be logical, therefore, to expect the hardening of the India position on various issues relating to Pakistan whether it is Kashmir, Siachin, terrorism, or other outstanding disputes.

In May 2014, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met with Narendra Modi on the occasion of the latter's oath taking, Pakistan was asked to "abide by its commitment to prevent its territory and the territory under its control from being used for terrorism against India."¹⁷ Thus, India

arrogated to itself not only the authority to lay down the conditions for the resumption of the bilateral dialogue but also the position of a judge to decide whether those conditions had been met or not. There was no commitment by the Indian side for the immediate resumption of a structured and comprehensive bilateral dialogue to discuss outstanding issues and promotion of mutual cooperation. The two leaders merely asked their foreign secretaries to discuss modalities for the resumption of the bilateral dialogue. As if to send a strong signal to Pakistan, even this planned meeting of the foreign secretaries of the two countries, which was to be held at the end of August 2014, was canceled by India because of the meeting of the Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi with Kashmiri leaders even though such contacts had taken place in the past without any adverse reaction from India. India, thus, virtually blocked the dialogue process unless Pakistan followed the dictated line on such issues as Kashmir and terrorism.

Later, when Nawaz Sharif made a strong reference to the Kashmir dispute calling for its settlement in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, in his address to the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2014, Narendra Modi not only objected to it but also stated that the resumption of the bilateral dialogue depended on the creation of an appropriate environment by Pakistan as if India did not have any obligations on its part in this regard.¹⁸ Prolonged and heavier than usual shelling by the Indian forces across the Line of Control and the Working Boundary in October 2014 and later in July-August 2015 was another reflection of the muscular Indian posture on Pakistan-related issues under Narendra Modi compared with that in the past.

The Indian Foreign Secretary, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, paid a two-day visit to Islamabad commencing on 3 March 2015 as part of a tour of the SAARC countries. The visit was preceded by a call from Indian Premier Narendra Modi to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on 13 February to prepare the ground for it. Besides meeting his Pakistani counterpart, the Indian Foreign Secretary called on the Pakistan Prime Minister to deliver a letter from the Indian Premier. The visit did not result in any immediate decision to resume a comprehensive and structured bilateral dialogue.¹⁹

In the short term, Modi's rise as the prime minister of India and BJP's victory in the Indian elections in 2014, which reflected a rightward shift in Indian politics, does not bode well for Pakistan-India relations. There is little possibility of a radical transformation of BJP or of Narendra Modi

who is deeply steeped in the politics and philosophy of RSS, a well-known militant Hindu organization. Therefore, any dramatic breakthrough in Pakistan-India relations can be safely ruled out unless Pakistan decides to fall in line with the one-sided Indian demands and New Delhi's hegemonic designs.

Pakistan must, therefore, maintain its guard while avoiding any adventurist (e.g., Kargil) or provocative activity from its side. In particular, it must establish a firm grip on the various Jihadi organizations to prevent them from undertaking activities that may aggravate tensions between Pakistan and India. At the same time, Pakistan must avoid a posture of appeasement in the face of India's expansionist or hegemonic designs. The lesson of history is that a policy of appeasement toward an expansionist power merely whets its appetite for more, thereby precipitating precisely the crisis that it is supposed to prevent.

Unfortunately, the Nawaz Sharif government in Pakistan is pursuing an India policy based on illusions and naivete rather than a cold-blooded analysis of the ground realities and India's hegemonic designs in South Asia. There cannot be two opinions about the need for Pakistan to pursue a foreign policy aimed at the promotion of peace and stability in its immediate neighborhood. This is an indispensable condition for Pakistan's own security, stability, and economic development. However, a policy of peace in Pakistan's neighborhood should not be transformed into a policy of appeasement of India's hegemonic designs in South Asia at the expense of Pakistan's national interests as the Nawaz Sharif government seems to be doing.

The lopsided Pakistan-India joint statement issued at Ufa, Russia, on 10 July 2015, which tilted heavily in favor of the Indian point of view on outstanding bilateral problems and disputes, merely proves the point. Apparently, the Indian side took advantage of Pakistan's eagerness for the resumption of a structured and comprehensive bilateral dialogue to secure a joint statement favoring its position after the bilateral meeting between Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi. The government of Pakistan must recognize that while peace between Pakistan and India is a strategic imperative because of their de facto status as nuclear-weapon states and the need for rapid economic growth to eradicate grinding poverty in both the countries, bilateral dialogue is not a favor that India has to grant to Pakistan at its convenience. In fact, a structured and comprehensive bilateral dialogue is an indispensable condition for peace and tension-free relations between the two countries, something that is in the

best interest of both.²⁰ The agreement worked out at Ufa, unsurprisingly collapsed just a month later when the meeting of the National Security Advisers envisaged in it could not take place because of the contradictory expectations attached to it by the two countries.

LONG-TERM PROSPECTS OF PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS

The long-term prospects of Pakistan-India relations will be determined to a large extent by India's strategic goals and objectives in the context of the evolving regional and global security environment. The other part of the equation would be Pakistan's policy goals in its handling of this critical relationship. The geopolitical scene on the Asian continent is being radically transformed by China's phenomenal economic growth and India's rise as a major power of the twenty-first century to which a reference has been made earlier. Other noteworthy developments are the rebalancing of the US forces to the Asia-Pacific region, the strengthening of the US alliances in the Far East to contain China, some indications of the emergence of a more assertive Japan, growing strategic partnership between China and Russia, and the US strategic commitment to help build up India as a major world power of the twenty-first century. This is the scenario in which India's policies for the realization of its hegemonic designs in South Asia and the Indian Ocean regions will unfold.

The huge rightward shift in the Indian politics following Naredra Modi-led BJP's landslide victory in the general elections held in 2014 carries serious implications for Pakistan's security. This is particularly so because of Modi's lifelong membership of RSS and the deep commitment of RSS to Hindutva or the revival of Hindu nationalism. In view of this commitment to Hindutva, the strategy that India would employ in dealing with Pakistan is likely to be deeply influenced by the teachings contained in Kautilya's Arthashastra written around 300 B.C. for the benefit of Chandragupta Maurya. Just a few years ago, a former Indian National Security Adviser, Shiv Shankar Menon, praised this book as an important guide on strategy. Speaking at the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, on 18 October 2012, he called Arthashastra "a serious manual on statecraft—a realist description of the art of running a state."²¹

According to Henry Kissinger, "This work sets out, with dispassionate clarity, a vision of how to establish and guard a state while neutralizing, subverting, and (when opportune conditions have been established) conquering its neighbours."²² According to Kautilya, contiguous states existed

in a state of *latent* and *permanent* hostility. He argued that every nation acted to maximize its power and moral principles and obligations had little force in interstate relations. Kautilya recommended that a wise ruler should choose his allies from among his neighbors' neighbors. According to him, the enemy would become vulnerable when he is squeezed between the conqueror and his allies. Kautilya also propounded the concept of "silent war." Silent war, he wrote, was a kind of warfare with another state in which the ruler and his ministers—and, unknowingly, the people—acted publicly as if they were at peace with the opposing state, but all the while secret agents were busy assassinating important leaders in the other state, creating divisions among key ministers and classes, and spreading propaganda and disinformation with the ultimate objective of weakening and subjugating it.²³

By now, the main contours of the long-term Indian strategy to tame Pakistan are more or less clear. Pakistan's leaders and policy makers must carefully analyze the Indian strategy to draw appropriate conclusions for its own policy in dealing with India. The Indian strategy for dealing with Pakistan has political, military, economic, and cultural dimensions. Since Pakistan has acquired a nuclear deterrent, India is not in a position to inflict a conclusive military defeat on Pakistan for bringing it down on its knees through an all-out war, although the possibility of limited skirmishes and conflicts between the two countries cannot be totally ruled out.

Indian strategy in essence, therefore, would focus on political, economic, and cultural means to overcome Pakistan's opposition to its hegemonic designs in South Asia. It would continue its massive armament program, which would involve a high level of expenditure in absolute terms but not as a percentage of GDP. India's ostensible goal would be to position itself as a great power and to compete with China. But its real allied purpose would be to put pressure on Pakistan to raise its military expenditure to a high level of GDP, thus denying the economic sector the resources needed for Pakistan's rapid growth and prosperity. Meanwhile, India in reality would concentrate a high level of its resources and energy mainly on the task of economic development leaving Pakistan far behind in the race for economic growth. It appears that India has achieved a measure of success in its strategy. According to the World Bank, India spent 2.5% of its GDP on defense in 2013, whereas Pakistan's military expenditure in the same year was 3.4% of GDP.²⁴ The program of economic reforms that the Narendra Modi government is implementing would further enhance India's advantage over Pakistan in the economic field.

In the Indian calculations, this trend, if continued over a sufficiently long period of time, would place Pakistan in an untenable position of poverty and backwardness in the face of economic progress in India and force it to accept the Indian hegemony. Unfortunately, this is precisely what has been happening in the Pakistan-India equation. While India has been growing economically at a high rate since the mid-1990s, Pakistan's dismal performance has left it far behind. Pakistan's military expenditure is at an unsustainably high level while the allocation of resources to economic development as a percentage of GDP is at an extremely low level.

According to the Pakistan Economic Survey for 2013–14, Pakistan invested only 14.0% of its GDP for economic development, achieving a GDP growth rate of 4.1% during that period. As against that, India for several years has been investing over 30% of its GDP for economic development, achieving much higher growth rates of its economy. This remains more or less true despite the slowing down of the Indian economy in the recent past due to structural problems and the inability of the previous Manmohan Singh government to carry out necessary reforms to overcome the obstacles to rapid economic growth. Following Modi's assumption of the office of the Indian Premier, Indian economy was again expected to achieve a high growth rate of 7.5% in 2015.²⁵ It should also be a matter of serious concern to Pakistan's fiscal planners that for several years, the total of its military expenditure and debt servicing has been far in excess of the net revenues of the federal government.

For instance, according to Pakistan's budget documents for 2014–15, the total allocation for the military sector (Rs.1028 billion covering defense services, military pensions, and contingent liabilities) and debt servicing (Rs.1458 billion covering interest payment and repayment of foreign loans) would far exceed the net revenues of the federal government amounting to Rs.2225 billion. The federal government would rely on loans and bank borrowings amounting to Rs.1238 billion to meet its total current expenditure estimated to be Rs.3463 billion during that year. The burden of development expenditure is over and above the resource gap of Rs.1238 billion. This state of affairs is a recipe for an economic disaster if urgent measures are not taken to rectify the situation.²⁶

As the noted scholar of military strategy B.H. Liddell Hart has expounded in his classic book on the strategy of indirect approach, the essence of strategy is "concentration of strength against weakness." He elaborates that the concentration of strength against weakness requires the dispersion of the opponent's strength, which in turn is "produced by

a distribution of your own that gives the appearance, and partial effect of dispersion. Your dispersion, his dispersion, your concentration—such is the sequence, and each is a sequel. True concentration is the fruit of calculated dispersion.”²⁷ While applying these principles to the situation in South Asia, India would like Pakistan to fritter away its resources on the building up of its military machine while leaving the economic sector, and thereby the country as a whole, in a weak and vulnerable condition in the long run.

If such an economically weak Pakistan is also pushed into a South Asian Economic Union as some of its political leaders have been advocating, Pakistan’s capitulation would be complete without the firing of a single Indian bullet. Pakistan would then become merely an appendage of the Indian economy and the decisions about its economy would be taken in New Delhi rather than in Islamabad. Once that happens, it would not be too late before decisions about Pakistan’s politics and security are also taken under the influence of New Delhi because of the close link of economic issues with political and security affairs. Pakistan would thus be reduced to the status of India’s satellite thereby fulfilling India’s real strategic aim in South Asia.

The Indian economic offensive against Pakistan is spearheaded by a cultural invasion through the use or misuse of Pakistan’s electronic and print media, some misguided NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), and the soft power of the Indian film industry. This cultural invasion is targeted at the people and the intelligentsia of Pakistan. Its real aim is to convince Pakistanis that Pakistan and India are culturally the same. The propagation of this line of thought strikes at the very roots of Pakistan’s ideology and the rationale for its establishment. The purpose of this propaganda campaign is to break the will of the people of Pakistan to resist India’s hegemonic designs.

Even factually this propaganda lacks validity. A comparison of the essential characteristics of the Hindu and Islamic civilizations would show that they are far apart from each other. While Islam teaches human equality and brotherhood, Hinduism is based on the impregnable division of the society into castes barring vertical mobility. Those born in the lower strata of the society are condemned to accept their exploitation at the hands of the people in the higher castes without protest and any possibility of improving their lot. The untouchables, as the name suggests, are at the lowest rung of the society, destined to lead a life of abject misery and deprivation. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder, highlighted the

cultural differences between the Muslims and the Hindus in the following manner in his correspondence with Mahatma Gandhi in 1944:

We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions. In short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation.²⁸

It would be reasonable to assume that India would use all the means at its disposal to weaken Pakistan's polity by destabilizing it internally whenever and wherever it gets the chance. There is enough historical evidence to substantiate this assumption. Its blatant act of aggression against Pakistan in 1971 resulting in the country's dismemberment is well-known and needs no elaboration, although it is also true that Pakistan's military and political leaders made huge blunders in handling the political crisis in East Pakistan. More recently, according to the claims made by the government of Pakistan, India has been fomenting an insurgency in Balochistan. There have also been accusations of its involvement in some of the terrorist incidents in Pakistan, particularly in Karachi. A statement issued by the Pakistan military establishment on 5 May 2015 claimed, "The (Corps Commanders') Conference also took serious notice of RAW's involvement in whipping up terrorism in Pakistan."²⁹ This was followed by a statement by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary to the media on 15 May 2015 stressing that "RAW is involved in terror acts in Pakistan, and we have repeatedly raised this issue with India."³⁰

RECOMMENDATIONS

There is definitely a strategic imperative of peace between Pakistan and India because of their status as *de facto* nuclear powers and the need for them to focus their energies and resources on the gigantic task of economic development necessitated by widespread poverty. Unfortunately, these factors alone will not be able to usher in an era of durable peace and friendship between the two countries. In all likelihood, Pakistan-India relations will continue to suffer from recurrent periods of tension and strain because of

India's hegemonic designs in South Asia and outstanding disputes, especially the Kashmir dispute. Therefore, genuine friendship between the two countries will remain elusive in the foreseeable future. The best that can be hoped for is the maintenance of peace between them and normal relations marked by a low level of tensions, confidence building measures (CBMs), and cooperation in various fields on a mutually beneficial basis.

To safeguard its vital national interests, Pakistan has no choice but to resist India's hegemonic designs in the region while recognizing the strategic imperative of peace between the two countries. This would be possible, however, only if the people of Pakistan are able to achieve internal political stability, maintain their cultural identity, and increase their economic strength relative to that of India while maintaining a credible deterrent at the lowest level of armaments and armed forces. Its diplomacy should focus on defusing tensions with India to reduce the risk of an armed conflict and to enable it to divert its scarce resources from the military to the urgent task of economic development. It should definitely avoid adventurist initiatives such as the Kargil operation and provocations in the management of its relations with India.

Pakistan should maintain a firm and principled position on major Pakistan-India disputes without being provocative or adventurist. Hopefully, it would be possible to make some progress toward the resolution of the relatively less intractable disputes in the near future. Pakistan must, however, recognize that because of the historical and emotional baggage on both sides and the complexity of some of the disputes such as Kashmir, their satisfactory solution in the foreseeable future may not be attainable. In such cases, Pakistan should adopt a long-term approach instead of rushing into some arrangements that it might regret later.

For instance, in the case of the Kashmir dispute, while maintaining its principled position that the Kashmir dispute should be settled in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions and the wishes of the Kashmiri people, Pakistan should, in the short term, aim at ensuring, through dialogue with India, the autonomy of the Kashmiri people in the India Occupied Kashmir, protection of their human rights, demilitarization of the territory so that its people can lead their lives with dignity, and cross-LOC trade and travel. The final settlement of the Kashmir dispute should be left to some opportune time in the future when the necessary conditions for such a settlement are available. Trade with India should be conducted on a level playing field and a mutually beneficial basis with due regard to the health of Pakistan's economy.

Finally, Pakistan must strengthen its strategic partnership with China and friendly relations with Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia to balance India's power advantage. It should also build up bridges of understanding and cooperation with Russia while developing friendly relations with Central Asian Republics. For regional cooperation and integration, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) rather than the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) should be the regional organization of Pakistan's choice for reasons that will be elaborated later, as in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. *The World in 2014, The Economist*, 18 November 2013, pp. 107–8.
2. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), "The BRICS and Beyond: Prospects, Challenges and Opportunities," *World in 2050*, PwC Economics, January 2013, at www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-report-january-2013.pdf.
3. Media Eghbal, "Forecast: World's Largest Economies in 2010," *Euromonitor International*, 16 May 2013, at <http://blog.euromonitor.com/2013/05/forecast-worlds-largest-economies-in-2020.html>.
4. *The World in 2014*, pp. 107–8.
5. Laxman K. Behera, "India's Defence Budget 2012–13," *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, 20 March 2012, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasDefenceBudget2012-13_LaxmanBehera_200312.
6. Paul Holtom, Mark Bromley, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman, *Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2012* (Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, 2013), at http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=455#..
7. "India: Military Budget," *GlobalSecurity.org*, at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/budget.htm>.
8. "Indian Defence Budget Hiked by 11pc," *The Nation*, 1 March 2015, at <http://nation.com.pk/international/01-Mar-2015/indian-defence-budget-hiked-by-11pc>.
9. K. Alan Kronsstadt, *CRS Report for Congress: India-US Relations, updated Feb 13, 2007* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007), at <http://fpcc.state.gov/documents/organization/80669.pdf>, p. 4.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 15–20 and pp. 21–22.
11. John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2001), p. 34.
12. C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power," *Foreign Affairs*, July-August 2006 issue, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-07-01/india-and-balance-power>.

13. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision—America and the Crisis of Global Power* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2012), p. 85.
14. Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2014), p. 205.
15. For details of Pakistan-India relations, see S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991); Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947–2005: A Concise History* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2007); and Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000).
16. For details of the Kashmir dispute, see Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990* (London, UK: Roxford Books, 1991).
17. Press statement by Indian Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh in New Delhi on 27 May 2014, as quoted in Javid Husain, “The Enduring Indian Threat,” *The Nation*, 14 October 2014, at <http://nation.com.pk/columns/14-Oct-2014/enduring-the-indian-threat>.
18. Anwar Iqbal and Masood Haider, “PM Reiterates Stance on Kashmir in UN Speech,” *The Dawn*, 27 September 2014, at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1134604>; and “Bringing Disputes to UN Won’t Help, Says Modi,” *the Daily News*, 28 September 2014.
19. Maqbool Malik, “Pakistan, India Exchange Conflicting Narratives,” *The Nation*, 4 March 2015, at <http://nation.com.pk/national/04-Mar-2015/pakistan-india-exchange-conflicting-narratives>.
20. Javid Husain, “Unrealism and Incompetence at Ufa,” *The Nation*, 22 July 2015, at <http://nation.com.pk/columns/22-Jul-2015/unrealism-and-incompetence-at-ufa>.
21. Shiv Shankar Menon, “Speech of Indian National Security Advisor on 18 October: Kautilya Today,” *South Asia Monitor*, 18 October 2012, at southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=pers&nid=4114.
22. Henry Kissinger, “*World Order*”, p. 195.
23. Roger Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India,” *The Journal of Military History* 67.1 (2003) 9–37; Javid Husain, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Pakistan,” *the Nation*, 17 March 2015, at <http://nation.com.pk/columns/17-Mar-2015/kautilya-s-arthashastra-and-pakistan>.
24. World Bank, “Military Expenditure (% of GDP),” *The World Bank*, at data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS.
25. Economic and Financial Indicators, *The Economist*, 18–24 April 2015, p. 76.
26. Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, *Federal Budget 2014–15: Budget in Brief* (Islamabad, Pakistan: Government of Pakistan, 2014), at http://www.finance.gov.pk/budget/Budget_in_Brief_2014_15.pdf.

27. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Faber & Faber, 1954, 1967), p. 334.
28. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Sindh, Pakistan: Univesrsity of Karachi, 1965), p. 216.
29. Baqir Sajjad Syed, "RAW Instigating Terrorism, Says Army," *the Daily Dawn*, 6 May 2015, at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1180243>.
30. Maqbool Malik, "RAW Involved in Terror Acts Across Pakistan: Aizaz," *the Daily Nation*, 16 May 2015, at <http://nation.com.pk/national/15-May-2015/raw-involved-in-terror-acts-across-pakistan-aizaz-fo-rejects-hersh-report-on-osama-bin-laden>.

Regionalism and Pakistan

The successful evolution of the European Union (EU) into a dynamic association of European states cooperating for common economic, political, and security goals from the modest start of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and the economic prosperity that Europe has achieved since then have encouraged the growth of regional cooperation organizations in other parts of the world. In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) readily come to mind as examples of regional organizations striving to promote cooperation among the member states in economic and other fields. Similar regional cooperation organizations have sprung up in other continents such as Mercosur in Latin America, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC).

While regional cooperation per se is desirable, it is a mistake to assume that any regional association of states can evolve on the lines of the EU or can achieve results similar to those of the EU. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the challenges and the potential of regional organizations vary according to their economic circumstances, cultural and

Portions of this chapter previously appeared in Javid Husain, “Pakistan’s Option: SAARC or ECO?” *Criterion Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (2013) at http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/pakistans-option-saarc-or-eco/#_ftn1.

historical background, geographical location, intraregional political relations, world outlook, and vision of the future.

Pakistan, therefore, must take a careful look at all the relevant political, strategic, economic, and cultural factors in assessing its options for regional cooperation. Keeping in view Pakistan's geographical location, ECO and SAARC are its obvious options for regional cooperation. Pakistan is located at the intersection of South Asia, Central Asia, and West Asia. It is geographically in South Asia, but its history, culture, political orientation, and worldview set it apart from India, the biggest and most dominant country in the subcontinent. In fact, Pakistan for historical, cultural, political, and economic reasons is closely linked to countries in West Asia including Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics, and Azerbaijan. Over the past three millennia, on several occasions the areas now constituting Pakistan were part of the empires with capitals in Iran, Afghanistan, or Central Asia. For instance, the empire of Cyrus the Great included a large part of what is now Pakistan. Unfortunately, during the colonial era the close links among these countries were interrupted while the colonial powers pursued well-calculated strategies to tie them instead with their colonial masters. Now when the colonial era is behind us, time has come to resume and strengthen cooperation among these countries in various fields, both bilaterally and at the regional level.

Despite its strong differences with India in political, strategic, cultural, and security fields, SAARC offers to Pakistan useful opportunities for cooperation in economic, commercial, and other fields at the regional level. Links and contacts established through SAARC can also help in defusing tensions between the member states. It is in our interest to take advantage of these opportunities while safeguarding our political independence, economic autonomy, cultural identity, and national security. However, before we weigh the relative advantages and weaknesses of ECO and SAARC, it is important to understand the rationale for regional cooperation.

RATIONALE FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

There are several reasons why countries opt for regional cooperation. From the point of view of economic analysis, regional cooperation through free trade among the member states on the basis of comparative advantage leads to increased gross domestic product (GDP) of all the member states as a result of a more efficient allocation of resources to various sectors. That is to say, the total size of the cake becomes bigger than the sum of its parts. Increased competition at the regional level also helps in enhancing economic

efficiency. Free trade by allowing the import of cheaper products from other member states lowers price levels to the advantage of both the consumers and the producers by making available to them cheaper goods and inputs.

Another benefit of regional economic cooperation is realized through economies of large-scale production because of the larger size of the market, again leading to increased productivity and lower prices. The larger market created through regional economic cooperation also acts as a magnet for increased inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology, thus making a valuable contribution to the productive capacity of the member states.

From the political point of view, regional cooperation helps in strengthening peace and stability in the region by defusing tensions, discouraging confrontational policies, and building up linkages among the member states in various fields.

Finally, the united voice of the member states of a regional organization enhances the influence of the region as a whole in international political and economic forums.

The evolution of the EU over the past six decades is perhaps the best example of the advantages that the member states of a regional organization can reap through cooperation in economic, commercial, political, and security fields. Its member states generally have achieved phenomenal economic growth and prosperity. In a marked contrast with the historical experience of Europe over the past several centuries marred by wars causing massive material destruction and huge loss of human lives as witnessed during World Wars I and II, West European states have enjoyed a remarkable era of peace, stability, and progress in the region since the Second World War. Other regional organizations have been less successful than the EU because they lack one or the other prerequisite for reaping fully the benefits of regional cooperation.

PREREQUISITES FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

The ability of a regional organization to reap fully the economic and political benefits of regional cooperation is determined by the following prerequisites of its success:

- **Community of interests:** There must be a feeling of a common destiny and a shared vision of the future (shared goals and aspirations) among the member states. The absence of such a feeling is likely to pull the member states in different directions politically,

economically, and culturally, making the complicated task of regional cooperation difficult. SAARC is a prime example of a regional organization whose members lack this community of interests. India is more interested in establishing its hegemony in the region than in promoting regional cooperation on an equitable basis. While India looks at China as a rival in Asia, Pakistan considers it an important strategic partner. Pakistan also has legitimate security concerns relating to India, which dismembered it in 1971. It is not surprising, therefore, that SAARC has failed to take off so far. On the other hand, member states of the EU have the advantage of a shared vision of the future, that is to say, they have common goals and aspirations. For instance, having learned lessons from their bitter experience in the past, all of them are interested in preserving regional peace and stability and in promoting regional economic progress. This feeling of community of interests has provided a solid foundation for building an impressive superstructure of regional cooperation in the EU. As for Pakistan, it is closer to the member states of the ECO in terms of future goals and aspirations than to the member states of SAARC because of historical and cultural links with the former going back more than 1000 years and shared views on regional and global issues as exemplified by their membership of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

- Economic complementarities: The economic benefits of regional cooperation will be determined largely by complementarities among the economies of the member states. The greater the economic complementarities, the more the possibilities and benefits for the member states of regional economic and commercial cooperation. ECO has an obvious advantage over SAARC from this point of view, as in many cases its member states produce and export what the other member states need. Just to give an example, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan are oil/gas exporting countries while Turkey and Pakistan badly need them to meet their rapidly growing energy requirements. Further, Turkey and Pakistan can also act as transit countries for the export of oil and gas from ECO member states to the rest of the world. Pakistan and Turkey are textile-exporting countries, whereas Iran and several members of the Central Asian Republics are net textile-importing countries. Similarly, Tajikistan and Iran are in a position to export electricity while Pakistan needs to import electricity to meet the demand of its

economy. On the other hand, in the case of SAARC, the economies of the member states are more in competition with each other instead of being complementary. For example, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are all in competition with one another in exporting textiles. Similarly, both Pakistan and India are rice-exporting countries. Both also suffer from shortage of electricity. These factors restrict the possibilities of expanding intraregional trade in SAARC compared with ECO. Further, the competition for export markets for the same commodities such as textiles and rice has negative repercussions on incentives for regional cooperation among the member states of SAARC.

- Geographical proximity: Obviously, the ability of member states to trade and cooperate with one another will be facilitated if they are located in close proximity geographically. Distance acts as a barrier, though not an insurmountable one, in the promotion of regional economic and commercial cooperation. From this point of view, both SAARC and ECO offer more or less equal advantages to Pakistan as a vehicle for regional cooperation.
- Cultural affinities: This factor again facilitates regional cooperation by promoting a feeling of common identity among the member states. It is a major factor for the success of regional cooperation within the EU as all of its current members trace their cultural roots to Greco-Roman-Christian civilization. It also explains the EU's reluctance to admit Turkey, a major Muslim country, into its fold. The absence of cultural affinities among the SAARC member states is a major obstacle in the promotion of regional cooperation among them. After all, the cultural divide between the Muslims and the Hindus was an important factor leading to the demand for and the establishment of Pakistan. The ECO member states, on the other hand, enjoy cultural affinities because all of them belong to the Islamic civilization, which has brought about marked similarities in their way of life and in their cultural traditions and practices.
- Absence of serious disputes: The presence of serious disputes among the member states, such as the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, can act as a major obstacle in the progress of regional cooperation. The mistrust, tensions, and even hostility that such disputes can generate do not provide a propitious climate for regional cooperation. Conversely, the absence of such disputes or at least the ability of the member states to resolve them or assign

low priority to them facilitates regional cooperation as in the case of the ASEAN. Similarly, the EU has the advantage of the absence of serious territorial disputes and strategic contradictions, which gives it an inherent advantage in promoting regional cooperation among its member states.

- Nonexistence of hegemonic designs: As shown by the example of the SAARC, the fear of hegemonic designs of a member state (India in the case of the SAARC) also blocks progress in regional cooperation. Member states are constantly on their guard in assessing planned projects for regional cooperation because of their apprehensions that those proposals may become the vehicles for regional domination by the member state seeking hegemony. The quest for regional hegemony also engenders disputes and generates tensions among the member states of the regional organization. It is unrealistic to expect that a climate of fear and tension would help the cause of regional cooperation. The absence of such apprehensions, on the other hand, promotes regional cooperation as has been the experience of the EU.

EVOLUTIONARY PATH OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

As the process of regional economic cooperation evolves from programs of cooperation in the various economic fields to the establishment of a free trade area and then to the creation of a customs union leading to an economic union, the economies of the member states are gradually integrated resulting in the establishment of a single market, where goods, capital, and workers can move freely and in the harmonization of economic and monetary policies. The EU to a large extent has already reached this stage, although it still needs to take additional steps for the full realization of the goal of a single fully integrated market.

Further, since economic issues cannot be totally separated from political and security issues as they affect them and are in turn affected by them, progress toward economic integration also generates pressures for the coordination of the foreign and security policies of the member states. These factors underscore the importance of the community of interests and a shared vision of the future as prerequisites for the long-term success and progress of any scheme of regional economic cooperation. The close connection of economic and political issues was recently brought home

by the turmoil in Ukraine and the overthrow of its government after it rejected an association agreement with the EU in November 2013 and instead opted for close economic cooperation with Russia. The strong negative reaction of the West to this decision by the Ukrainian government of that time also underlined this close connection.

Both Russia and the EU supported by the USA were fully aware that the signing of the association agreement by Ukraine with the EU would gradually take it into the Western orbit by not only making it a member of the EU but, in due course, also of NATO. Since this was not acceptable to Russia, Putin reacted by taking Crimea and supporting the elements sympathetic to Moscow in Ukraine after its pro-Russian government was overthrown. The Ukraine crisis will continue to generate tensions between the West and Russia since on 27 June 2014, the new Ukrainian government signed the economic agreement with the EU that the previous Ukrainian government headed by President Yanukovich had rejected a year earlier. Further, the NATO foreign ministers in their meeting held in June 2014 agreed that the alliance would remain open to new members, thus signaling the possibility of Ukraine's joining the alliance at a later stage.¹

Figure 5.1 (see the next page) tries to encapsulate the evolutionary path of a regional economic organization under favorable circumstances. The basis for regional economic cooperation is provided by cultural affinities reflecting a common outlook on life and a shared vision of the future. The process of economic and commercial cooperation in due course leads to economic integration in the form of a single market for goods, labor and capital, and common economic and monetary policies. At the next stage in this evolutionary process, the member states enhance political and security cooperation resulting in common foreign and security policies. The evolutionary path may or may not lead to a confederation or federation of the member states. This will depend upon the extent and depth of commonalities among the member states. The pyramid shape of the figure is meant to show that each successive stage is more limited and difficult than the earlier one.

The evolutionary path of regional economic cooperation, described above, leads to several important consequences. The economic integration of the member states leads to a more efficient reallocation of their resources in various sectors in accordance with the dictates of comparative advantage. Industries in member states enjoying comparative advantage get a boost through trade diversion and trade creation effects of a customs union while others wither away under the force of increased competition.




Fig. 5.1 Evolutionary path of a regional economic organisation (Source: Created by author)

Second, the economically advanced member states tend to benefit more from the process of economic integration as compared with the less developed members and/or geographical areas if the matters are left to the market forces alone, in accordance with the principle of social and cumulative causation propounded by the famous Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal.² The likelihood of this development calls for special measures by the regional organization for the development of less developed member states and/or geographical areas so that they are not left behind others in the race for economic growth.

Third, the decision-making powers on issues of common interest would be gradually transferred from national capitals to the headquarters of the regional organization as the process of regional integration takes place.

Fourth, the more powerful state or states tend to dominate the decision-making process of the regional organization. Even if there are checks and balances to counter this tendency, it is likely that the more powerful state or states because of their political and economic clout would ultimately dominate the region and the regional policies. This is already happening in the EU where Germany has acquired a pre-eminent position in the economic decision-making process because of the weight of its economy.

It is in recognition of these strategic consequences of the process of regional economic integration besides its obvious economic advantages that the USA has taken the initiatives of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The US expectation, obviously, is that TPP and TTIP would put the USA in the driver's seat of the two trading blocks that collectively account for more than 70 percent of the global trade and help in countering the growing Chinese power.³ The weekly *Economist*, looking at the negotiations for TTP, recently observed that the impression one gets is that the USA may be interested in an order wherein it "not only sets the rules, but twists them when they get in the way."⁴ For the same reasons, rising powers are "investing in regional organizations, in a bid to institutionalize" their increasing influence. India is also using SAARC for these purposes.⁵

Fifth, there is an inevitable contradiction between the process of regional integration, whose contours will be defined primarily by the dominant member state(s), and the maintenance of national identities and the protection of the national interests of the smaller states. These likely consequences explain, partly at least, the opposition of several Latin American states to the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) advocated by the USA.

POTENTIAL AND LIMITATIONS OF THE SAARC

It is in the backdrop of the foregoing that we must examine the potential and limitations of the SAARC. Even a cursory glance at the history and the ground realities in South Asia shows that the SAARC does not fulfill most of the conditions essential for its successful evolution toward an economic union or even a customs union. The overwhelming majority of the peoples of South Asia belongs to two different civilizations, that is, Islam and Hinduism, whose outlooks on life and about life are widely divergent. Islam establishes a society based on the principles of human brotherhood and social equality whereas Hinduism establishes an oppressive

system that divides the society into castes precluding vertical mobility.⁶ The Muslims and the Hindus are, therefore, culturally far apart. This was the main rationale for the Pakistan movement. The following quotation from the reply of the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, to Mahatama Gandhi's denial of the Muslim nationhood, though already given in the preceding chapter, can bear repetition to establish the cultural divergence between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and a Hindu-dominated India:

We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions. In short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law, we are a nation.⁷

The cultural and political divergences between India and Pakistan are likely to get aggravated following the landslide victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a right-wing Hindu nationalist party, under the leadership of Narendra Modi in the general elections in India held in 2014. BJP is allied with the hardline Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Both of these organizations are wedded to the concept of Hindutva, which was defined by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his pamphlet, "Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu?" published in 1923. According to him, Hindutva requires love for Hindu civilization and values. It seeks to define the Indian culture exclusively in terms of Hindu values. What it implies for the Muslims and other minorities in India can be gauged from the following quotation from the 1938 work of Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, the second RSS supreme leader, entitled *We, or Our Nationhood Defined*:

The non-Hindu people of Hindustan must either adopt Hindu culture and language, must learn and respect and hold in reverence the Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but of those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture....In a word, they must cease to be foreigners, or may stay in the country wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment—not even citizens' rights.⁸

The demand for Pakistan as a separate homeland to enable the Muslims of the subcontinent to lead their lives in accordance with the tenets of Islam and their distinct cultural values was their legitimate response to such bigotry that was responsible for the communalization of politics in South Asia rather than the other way round. RSS, after all, was established by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar in 1925 much before the Muslims of the subcontinent voiced the demand for Pakistan. Narendra Modi has been a member of RSS since 1971 and is fully committed to its Hindutva ideology. The principles of this ideology were on display in the large-scale massacres of the Muslims in Gujrat in 2002 when Modi was its chief minister. His anti-Pakistan bias has been revealed in the hardline approach that his government has adopted in dealing with Pakistan since the assumption of the office of the prime minister of India. Modi's rise to power, thus, reflects an emphatic rightward shift in the Indian body politic and does not bode well for Pakistan-India relations. The emerging scenario makes the goal of economic integration within the framework of SAARC even more unattractive and unappealing for Pakistan than would be the case otherwise.

Second, there are serious disputes between the member states of the SAARC, the most important being the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, which has bedeviled the relations between the two countries since 1947 and hindered the progress in regional cooperation. An example of the adverse effect of the Kashmir dispute on Pakistan-India relations and on the prospects of SAARC was the decision by the Indian government to cancel the meeting of the foreign secretaries of the two countries, which had been scheduled in August 2014 to discuss the resumption of a structured bilateral dialogue, after the Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi had met the Kashmiri leaders. The reality, therefore, is that disputes such as Kashmir and Siachin will continue to act as a serious hindrance in the development and growth of SAARC as a regional organization.

Third, as established in the preceding chapter, there is little doubt that India entertains hegemonic ambitions in South Asia. This is borne out by the writings of the Indian scholars,⁹ comments of foreign experts,¹⁰ and observations of reputable international security analysts.¹¹ Any doubts about India's quest for hegemony in South Asia would be removed by an examination of India's past conduct in dealing with its South Asian neighbors, especially Pakistan. India's quest for hegemony in South Asia will remain an enduring cause for tensions and disputes with Pakistan, which is unlikely to bow before India's hegemonic designs. A tension-ridden

climate is certainly not conducive to close economic integration in South Asia region.

Because of cultural divergences rather than affinities, the presence of serious disputes among the member states of the SAARC, and India's hegemonic designs, South Asian states lack a feeling of common destiny and a shared vision of the future. A pertinent example mentioned earlier is the way India and Pakistan look at China. For India, China is a rival for power and influence in Asia. On the other hand, Pakistan views its relationship with China as a vital strategic partnership for safeguarding its security. While the SAARC member states do have the advantage of geographical proximity, their economic complementarities are weaker than those in the ECO region as pointed out earlier. Little wonder that the intraregional trade as a percentage of the total trade is higher in the case of the ECO region than in the SAARC region. In 2012, intraregional trade in the ECO region amounted to \$83 billion, which was about 10% of the region's world trade.¹² By way of comparison, intraregional trade in the SAARC region amounted to only 4.3% in 2011.¹³

The move toward a South Asian Customs Union and more so toward a South Asian Economic Union would unleash economic and political forces that would result in decisions about Pakistan's economy and ultimately even its foreign policy, as the two cannot be separated, being taken at some regional forum dominated by India because of the sheer weight of its huge size. Thus, regional integration within the framework of the SAARC would negate the very rationale for the creation of Pakistan because the process of regional integration would subsume Pakistan's national identity in the bigger and dominant Indian identity. India would, thus, have achieved through the process of regional integration what it has failed to achieve through coercive means so far.

This is not to deny that from Pakistan's point of view, SAARC can play a useful role by increasing regional trade on a level playing field and with due safeguards for the health of its economy. It can facilitate regional cooperation in such areas as river water management, environment, transportation, communication, cross-border crimes, communicable diseases, and drug trafficking. SAARC's existence and the opportunity that it provides to the leaders to meet and exchange views helps in defusing tensions. Thus, SAARC also has a valuable role to play in strengthening peace and stability in South Asia.

These are not minor advantages and must be kept in view in any assessment of the future potential of SAARC. However, because of the various

drawbacks and limitations from which it suffers, it is not an organization of choice for Pakistan for establishing a customs union or an economic union. If Pakistan makes the mistake of relying on SAARC for these purposes, it would either be frustrated in the achievement of these objectives or it would gradually lose its separate national identity in the huge Indian mass. Neither of these scenarios would be in Pakistan's national interest keeping in view its distinct cultural heritage, its different political and strategic outlook, and the compulsions of its sovereignty and national security. A more realistic approach, which takes into account both the potential and the weaknesses of the SAARC, would be the advisable course for Pakistan.

COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE ECO

For Pakistan, it is the ECO that meets all the prerequisites of regional cooperation leading to regional economic integration. The ECO was established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey as the successor organization to the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). In 1992, the organization was expanded to include seven new member states, namely, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The ECO region covers a vast area of eight million square kilometers with the population of over 460 million approximately. It is endowed with huge mineral, oil, and gas resources. The ECO has a vast potential for the strengthening of regional cooperation as it is based on the solid foundation of economic complementarities, common cultural heritage, geographical proximity, and the absence of serious disputes and hegemonic designs among its members. These factors also provide the basis for a community of interests, that is, the feeling of a common destiny and a shared vision of the future among the member states of the ECO. Economic complementarities hold the promise of an enormous expansion of intraregional trade and cooperation within the framework of the ECO to the benefit of all the member states.

As pointed out earlier, some of the member states of the ECO such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are major oil and/or gas exporters while Pakistan and Turkey need to import oil and gas in large quantities. Pakistan by now has signed agreements with both Iran and Turkmenistan for the import of gas through pipelines. Once the Western sanctions against Iran are lifted, it will be possible to implement the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project. Pakistan used to import a substantial quan-

tity of oil from Iran until it had to cut down these imports under the threat of the US sanctions because of Tehran's nuclear program. Pakistan and Turkey are textile exporters, whereas Iran and other ECO member states are textile importers. Pakistan is a major rice exporter while Iran imports rice in large quantities. By way of contrast, in all these areas the economies of Pakistan and India are competitive rather than complementary. Thus, the possibilities of increased trade and economic cooperation among the ECO member states are immense and far greater than those available within the framework of the SAARC.

A paper published by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics in October 2011 pointed out that trade in the ECO region, which amounted to \$40 billion in 2008–09, could increase by a factor of eight if the free trade agreement among the ECO countries were fully implemented. According to it, Pakistan had the potential to export to other ECO member states a broad range of commodities covering about 30 productive sectors including cotton and textile products, leather products, sports articles, cereals, carpets, staple fibers, apparel and clothing, vegetables, and fish products.¹⁴

The ECO Vision 2015, which was finalized by an *ECO Group of Eminent Persons* including this writer in early 2005 and was adopted later the same year by the ECO Council of Ministers, called for the dismantling of tariff and nontariff barriers among the member states so as to increase the intraregional trade to 20 % of their total trade by 2015, besides other targets for the strengthening of regional cooperation in diverse fields such as energy, transport and communications, industry, and agriculture. The member states must continue their efforts toward closer economic integration even though they failed to realize most of these targets by the deadline of 2015.

Pakistan, for its part, must pay greater attention to the ECO than it has in the past to reap fully the economic and commercial benefits of regional cooperation that this organization offers. The ECO member states must redouble their efforts for the establishment of a free trade area comprising all of them. Above all, Pakistan must develop together with other ECO member states a regional outlook in dealing with the various economic issues rather than limiting its thinking to narrow and often short-sighted considerations that are not in its long-term and enlightened self-interest.

Unfortunately, during this writer's tenure as the Pakistan Permanent Representative to ECO from 1997 to 2003 when I also served as the Pakistan Ambassador to Iran, I noticed that regional cooperation within

the framework of the ECO had suffered due partly to the sheer ignorance or lack of comprehension of its vast potential on the part of the senior officials and the lack of vision of the leaders of the member states. It is, therefore, necessary to educate Pakistan's senior officials and policy makers as well as the public about the advantages of regional cooperation within the framework of the ECO. The armed conflict in Afghanistan continuing since the days of the Soviet occupation has also acted as a serious obstacle in the achievement of ECO's goals and objectives. Consequently, the restoration of durable peace and stability in Afghanistan is an indispensable condition for the full realization of the ECO's potential.

The strained US-Iran relations and the Western sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program also had a negative effect on the evolution of the ECO as an effective regional cooperation organization. The signing of the agreement between Iran and P5 plus one on Iran's nuclear program in July 2015 and its implementation should lead to the lifting of these sanctions against Iran. Consequently, the obstacles posed by the Western sanctions against Iran would be removed, thus, opening the way for the development of all-round regional cooperation within the framework of the ECO.

The ECO member states have already laid down an impressive institutional infrastructure including, *inter alia*, the ECO Trade Agreement (ECOTA) to lower trade barriers among the member states, ECO Transit and Transport Framework Agreement (TTFA) to facilitate ECO-wide transportation, and ECO Trade and Development Bank to support trade and developmental activities within the ECO region. It is now for the leaders of the ECO member states to concert their efforts for the promotion of economic integration within the framework of this promising regional organization. History will not forgive them if they squander this once-in-a-century opportunity for regional cooperation, which is in the best interest of all the member states.

NOTES

1. For a fuller discussion of the strategic motivations and implications of the Ukraine crisis, see John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault—The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin," *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2014 issue, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault>.

2. Gunnar Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1957) and Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (New York, NY: Twentieth Century Fund, 1968).
3. Bruce Jones, *Still Ours to Lead* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2014), p. 32.
4. “The 70-Year Itch,” *The Economist*, 8–14 August 2015, p. 23.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 45–46.
6. Wendy Doniger, *On Hinduism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) and its review by Ananya Vajpeyi, “The Triumph of the Hindu Right,” *Foreign Affairs*, September–October 2014 issue, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/triumph-hindu-right>.
7. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Sindh, Pakistan: University of Karachi, 1965), p. 216.
8. M.S. Golwalkar, *We, or Our Nationhood Defined* (Nagpur, India: Bharat Publications, 1939).
9. C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, July–August 2006 issue, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-07-01/india-and-balance-power>.
10. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision—America and the Crisis of Global Power* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2012), p. 85.
11. John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2001), p. 34.
12. “Statement by President Hassan Rouhani of Iran at the ECO Meeting in Tehran,” *The Daily Dawn*, 27 November, 2013.
13. Asia Regional Integration Center (ARIC), *Integration Indicators Database*, at <https://aric.adb.org/integrationindicators>.
14. Musleh ud Din and Ejaz Ghani, “Strengthening Intra-Regional Trade and Investment in the ECO Region,” *PIDE Viewpoint*, October 2011, at <http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/viewp.pdf>.

Post-2014 Afghanistan

Afghanistan, besides being Pakistan's next door neighbor, is linked to it through close historical, cultural, ethnic, and economic ties. Major developments affecting peace and stability in Afghanistan, therefore, have direct consequences for Pakistan. This is particularly so in the case of armed conflicts in Afghanistan, which inevitably have their spillover effects on Pakistan. Pakistan, therefore, cannot remain indifferent to such developments, especially when they involve foreign military intervention in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's irredentist claims against Pakistan by questioning the validity of the Durand Line or the internationally recognized boundary between the two countries are another factor requiring a close watch by Pakistan on developments in Afghanistan.¹

Unfortunately, Afghanistan has been the scene of incessant fighting since December 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded it to install the Babrak Karmal regime in pursuance of its strategic goals in the region. Thanks, however, to the tenacity of the armed resistance of the Afghan people supported by most of the Muslim world, especially Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the West, the Soviet Union was forced to withdraw its troops in February 1989 following the signing of the Geneva Accords, leaving behind a puppet government under the leadership of Najibullah as the president.² As director (Afghanistan) in the Pakistan Foreign Office from 1978 to 1980 and later as director in charge of the Pakistan Foreign Secretary's Office from 1980 to December 1981, I had the opportunity to observe from close quarters the developments in Afghanistan subsequent

to the Saur revolution of April 1978, which overthrew the government of President Daoud and installed in its place the Taraki government, and Moscow's growing entanglement in the Afghanistan quagmire.

PAKISTAN AND THE SAUR REVOLUTION

In my position as director (Afghanistan), I was required to attend the meetings of the Afghan Cell, the highest policy-making body of the government of Pakistan concerning Afghanistan at the time, which was presided over personally by President Zia-ul-Haq. Zia and his close advisers had reached the conclusion, soon after the Saur revolution, that the PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) government led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, was communist in character with close connections to the Soviet Union, an ally of India that had dismembered Pakistan in 1971 through blatant military aggression. The stabilization of a government with communist leanings and the consolidation of the Soviet power in Afghanistan would have presented Pakistan with the nightmare two-front scenario. A decision was taken, therefore, by the Pakistan government at the highest level soon after the Saur revolution to do everything possible to prevent that from happening. The widespread internal opposition to the PDPA government, because of its communist leanings and its reformist socialist and cultural policies against the background of the tribal, extremely conservative, and deeply religious character of the Afghan society, offered opportunities to the Pakistan government to keep the PDPA government off balance. Thousands of Afghan refugees fleeing into Pakistan's tribal areas from the reign of terror let loose by the PDPA government burdened it economically besides causing social and political strains. But they also provided the leadership and manpower for keeping the PDPA government off balance.

THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

The difficulties of the PDPA government were aggravated because of the serious mistakes made by it in handling the internal situation, the rivalries between the Khalq and Parcham factions of PDPA, and finally the confrontation between President Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, his prime minister. The situation came to a head with Taraki's overthrow in September 1979 and his subsequent assassination by Hafizullah Amin in the teeth of the opposition by the top Soviet leadership. The December 25–28

1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which resulted in the overthrow and death of Hafizullah Amin and the installation of Babrak Karmal, a Parchami leader, as the president, was meant to bring the unraveling situation in Afghanistan under Moscow's control, especially in the face of the open defiance by Hafizullah Amin. It is obvious that the leadership in Moscow did not fully take into account the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan, the extent of the alienation of the PDPA government from the Afghan people, the implications of the freedom-loving character of the Afghans, and the readiness of the rest of the world to extend support to the Afghan *jihad* or the national liberation struggle of the Afghan people.

The Soviet invasion and the subsequent Afghan *jihad* forced millions of Afghan refugees to seek shelter in neighboring Pakistan and Iran, an equally large number of Afghans were displaced within Afghanistan, and hundreds of thousands of Afghans had to lay down their lives in their war of liberation. Above all, the Saur revolution and the Soviet invasion destabilized Afghanistan internally and plunged it into an unending armed conflict from which it continues to suffer. The main credit for forcing the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan must go to the tenacity of its freedom-loving people in fighting against the Soviet occupation. However, the external support provided by Pakistan and other Muslim countries as well as by the West played an extremely important role in increasing the cost for Moscow of its military adventure into Afghanistan. The Soviet debacle in Afghanistan proved once again that it is easier to conquer Afghanistan than to consolidate and maintain the military occupation of this land of fiercely independent people. It was with good reason that the British prime minister, Harold McMillan, had given the advice that the first rule of politics is "Don't invade Afghanistan."³ Unfortunately, this advice and the historical experience were again ignored by the USA in 2001 when it invaded Afghanistan in retaliation for the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The results of the US invasion were only slightly less unsatisfactory than those achieved by the Soviet Union in 1980s.

FIGHTING AMONGST THE AFGHAN FACTIONS

The Soviet military withdrawal in February 1989 did not restore peace in Afghanistan or put an end to the misery of its people. The various groups of the Afghan Mujahideen continued their military struggle against the Najibullah regime leading ultimately to its overthrow in April 1992 and the installation of an interim Afghan Mujahideen government

for a transitional period in accordance with the provisions of the Peshawar Accord of 24 April 1992.⁴ Unfortunately, the goal of durable peace in Afghanistan still remained elusive as soon differences developed and the fighting started amongst the Afghan Mujahideen groups, mainly because Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was not a party to the Peshawar Accord, refused to honor it. Another attempt for peace and a power-sharing agreement was made through the Islamabad Accord signed on 7 March 1993.⁵ However, even this agreement, which had been signed by all the major Afghan Mujahideen groups, failed to restore peace, and the fighting among the various Afghan parties was resumed.

The Afghan parties were divided mainly on ethnic grounds between the Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. The Afghan Pashtuns were initially led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other Pashtun Commanders until the Taliban, supported mostly by the Pashtuns, emerged at the end of 1994 as a new potent factor in the struggle for the domination of Afghanistan.⁶ The non-Pashtuns consisting of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmens, and other Afghan communities organized themselves under the Northern Alliance led by President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud.⁷

PAKISTAN-IRAN PROXY WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

The Taliban, starting from Kandahar in 1994, were able to extend their rule gradually to most of Afghanistan after inflicting several military defeats on the Northern Alliance, which was restricted to Badakhshan province by August 1998. In this tussle for power, Pakistan supported the Taliban whereas Iran, India, and Russia extended support to the Northern Alliance. This proxy war between Pakistan and Iran not only prolonged the civil war in Afghanistan but also had an extremely damaging effect on Pakistan-Iran relations. India took full advantage of this estrangement between the two neighboring Muslim countries with the objective of neutralizing Iran's traditional support to Pakistan in the event of tensions or outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan. In 2000, when I had the privilege of serving as the Pakistan ambassador to Iran, it was conveyed to me by a highly placed and reliable source that a visiting Indian foreign secretary had bragged in a private conversation during his visit to Tehran about India's intention to isolate Pakistan strategically in the region by widening the gulf between Islamabad and Tehran.

Some half-hearted attempts were made by Pakistan and Iran to bring about reconciliation between the opposing factions in Afghanistan but

without any success. Unfortunately, both Iran and Pakistan showed lamentable lack of foresight and comprehension of the realities in Afghanistan in pursuit of their aim of enhancing their influence in the country. The reality was that in the Afghanistan of 1990s, in contrast with the situation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries or even in most of the twentieth century, the Pashtuns, constituting almost half of the population of Afghanistan, alone were not in a position to rule the country in conditions of durable peace and stability. This conclusion applied with even greater force to the possibility of the non-Pashtuns alone ruling Afghanistan. The only viable option for the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, therefore, was to develop mutual understanding on a power-sharing formula for governing Afghanistan.

Regrettably, during the period from 1993 to 1996 when the Northern Alliance was in power in Kabul, Iran ignored overtures by Pakistan for encouraging national reconciliation and a political settlement between the opposing Afghan factions. After 1996, when the tables were turned and the Taliban gained control of Kabul and most of Afghanistan, it was Pakistan that cold-shouldered proposals from Iran for encouraging a political settlement and the establishment of a broad-based government in Afghanistan. The resultant fighting and the power vacuum in Afghanistan enabled Al Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden to entrench itself in the country, leading ultimately to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

In the tussle for influence in Afghanistan between Tehran and Islamabad, the control on the formulation and execution of the operational Afghanistan policies in Iran and Pakistan was lost by their political leaders to their security and intelligence agencies. These agencies because of their very nature believed in overinsuring their perceived national interests instead of pursuing policies of mutual understanding and accommodation in settling their differences with the other side. Consequently, an attempt by Islamabad and Tehran in July 1998 to encourage and facilitate a settlement between the Afghan Taliban and the Northern Alliance came to naught because of bad faith by the Afghan Taliban who launched a surprise military offensive against the Northern Alliance soon thereafter, capturing most of Afghanistan excepting parts of the Badakhshan province.

The killing of the Iranian Consulate officials in Mazar-e-Sharif after its capture by the Taliban in August 1998, despite earlier assurances for their security extended by the Taliban in response to a formal request from Tehran conveyed through Islamabad, brought Iran and Afghanistan to the brink of an armed conflict. In the case of an Iran-Afghanistan armed

conflict at that time, the possibility of Pakistan being sucked into it could not be totally ruled out. Such a development would have led to cataclysmic consequences for regional peace and endangered the security of both Pakistan and Iran. Fortunately wiser counsel prevailed in Tehran. The Iranian government instead of launching an attack against Afghanistan for which it had mobilized a large force on the border with Afghanistan, remained content with protests against both the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan. The Iranian side, besides complaining about the bad faith shown by the Taliban and holding them responsible for the killing of Iranian officials in Mazar-e-Sharif, alleged that the Taliban had launched their military offensive in July 1998 with support from Pakistan. Pakistan's categorical denials of these allegations did not fall on receptive ears in Iran. These developments brought Pakistan-Iran relations to their nadir. (For a more detailed narration of the Taliban military offensive of 1998, see the next chapter on Iran.)

The need of the hour at that time was for bold thinking to rise above narrow national interests and to take a broader and long-term view of Pakistan-Iran relations and the situation in Afghanistan. The situation demanded the coordination of the policies of Pakistan and Iran in the interest of durable peace and stability in Afghanistan. Pakistan wasted a valuable opportunity to make a move in that direction when it summarily shot down an Iranian offer to reach an agreement with Pakistan on the coordination of the Afghanistan policies of the two countries during the visit of Hassan Rouhani, the incumbent president who was the secretary general of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council at that time, to Pakistan in April 2001. The acceptance by Islamabad of the Iranian proposal for the coordination of their Afghanistan policies could possibly have led to the restoration of durable peace and stability in that country and avoided 9/11 and its disastrous consequences for Pakistan.⁸

COST OF PAKISTAN'S PRO-TALIBAN POLICY

Pakistan paid a heavy price for its pro-Taliban policy of the 1990s over and above the severe damage it caused to Pakistan-Iran relations. It was isolated internationally as only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan besides Islamabad. Even a close friend and strategic partner such as China refused to recognize the Taliban government. Pakistan's support to the Taliban, who espoused a retrogressive and obscurantist interpretation of Islam,

tarnished its image throughout the world. Within Afghanistan, its pro-Taliban policy alienated it from most of the non-Pashtuns. Further, this policy encouraged religious extremism and *klashnikov* culture in Pakistan from the aftereffects of which it is still suffering.

A policy that isolated Pakistan regionally and internationally besides alienating it from almost half of the population of Afghanistan was simply unsustainable in the long run. It was likely to crumble in the face of the slightest adverse turn of events. This is precisely what happened after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Overnight, under Pervez Musharraf's rule, Pakistan ceased to be an ardent supporter of the Afghan Taliban and instead became their opponent in alliance with the USA. While this may have saved Pakistan from the American wrath, it alienated it from the Afghan Taliban and many among the Pashtuns.

Thus, while Pakistan's pro-Taliban policy of 1990s cost it the sympathy and support of the non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan, its U-turn after 9/11 made it lose the friendship of many of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan leaving it with few friends in that country. Not only that, Pakistan's willingness in compliance with the US demands to take action, which was never enough from the American point of view, against its own Pashtun tribesmen to prevent them from going to the aid of their tribal brethren across the Durand line in the fight against International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops in accordance with their age-old tribal traditions, made them redirect their fury through terrorist attacks against targets all over Pakistan. This development ultimately gave birth to the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) or the movement of the Pakistani Taliban, which has been responsible for innumerable acts of terrorism in Pakistan. According to the official announcements of the government of Pakistan, more than 50,000 civilians and military personnel have laid down their lives in the fight against TTP. In the process, Pakistan's economy has also suffered enormous damage amounting to over \$100 billion, according to some estimates.⁹

After negotiations with the TTP, which were initiated by the Nawaz Sharif government in early 2014, failed to produce satisfactory results, Pakistan's military with the approval of the government launched a military operation under the name *Zarb-e-Azb* to defeat TTP and end its terrorist activities in the country. The resolve of the civilian and military leadership and the people of Pakistan at large to fight TTP and other terrorist/militant organizations in the country was strengthened by the tragic terrorist attack on an army public school in Peshawar on 16 December 2014, resulting in the loss of 149 lives including 133 students. The shock of this

tragedy unified Pakistan's civilian and military leadership, which joined hands to launch a comprehensive action plan to eradicate the cancer of terrorism from Pakistan's body politic. It was decided that concerted action would be taken against all terrorist and militant organizations without any exception. Military courts were established to ensure speedy disposal of cases against terrorists.

Considerable success was achieved in destroying the sanctuaries of the terrorists and in foiling their planned acts of terrorism. However, it appears from the terrorist attacks that have taken place subsequently that the battle against terrorism would be a long and arduous one requiring sustained focus and attention on the part of the nation and the government for quite some time. Further, terrorism would be defeated in the country through a judicious combination of force and dialogue; that is to say, while force is being used, the door of negotiations within the framework of Pakistan's constitution and law will have to be kept open. Similarly, the terrorists must know even during negotiations that the government has the option of the use of force in case they make unreasonable demands. Concerted efforts need to be made to promote religious moderation and tolerance in the country. This is particularly important because of the sectarian character of several terrorist attacks that took place in Pakistan in early 2015. Finally, the need for socioeconomic development to eradicate poverty and lower the level of unemployment cannot be overemphasized so that the Pakistani youth are employed in productive activities rather than in antisocial actions.

US RETREAT FROM AFGHANISTAN

When history is written, Pakistan's Afghanistan policies covering the second half of 1990s will be judged to be among its worst foreign policy blunders. It is imperative that the people and the government of Pakistan draw the right lessons from their past experience and the experience of others in Afghanistan for their future guidance. This is particularly important in the aftermath of the end of the combat mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan and the completion of their military withdrawal from the country at the end of 2014 barring a residual force of about 13,000 troops, including 10,800 American troops, to "train, advise and assist Afghan forces and to conduct counter-terrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda" as pointed out by President Obama in his statement of 28 December 2014 marking the end of the ISAF combat mission in Afghanistan.¹⁰

It is crystal clear by now that the USA is retreating from Afghanistan with its original mission half accomplished, contrary to the claims sometimes made by its leaders and spokesmen. The original aims of the US invasion of Afghanistan basically were threefold: (a) to defeat and dismantle Al Qaeda, which had launched the 9/11 attacks, (b) to impose a government of Washington's choice on the Afghan people in place of the Taliban government, which had provided sanctuary to Al Qaeda, and (c) to rebuild Afghanistan with a stable government and as "a better place in which to live."¹¹ America has achieved considerable success in degrading and defeating Al Qaeda. It was also able to replace, with relative ease, the Taliban government with a government of its choice after the Bonn Conference. However, the Afghan government that the USA is leaving behind is far from stable because of the challenge posed by the growing Taliban insurgency. Similarly, its efforts to impose on Afghanistan its cultural preferences and values have fallen short of their goal. The same is true about the goal of rebuilding Afghanistan as "a better place to live in" primarily because of the continuing Taliban insurgency, but also because of lack of economic progress and inadequate educational and health facilities.

The US retreat from Afghanistan is not surprising. Under the Bonn Agreement, the USA established a government in Kabul that was dominated by the elements of the Northern Alliance, thus alienating not only the Taliban but also most of the Pashtuns. Sherard Cowper-Coles, the British ambassador to Afghanistan from 2007 to 2009 recognized "that the Bonn settlement that had followed (the Taliban defeat) had been a victors' peace from which the vanquished had been excluded; and that the constitution resulting from that settlement could last as long as the West was prepared to stay in Afghanistan to prop up the present disposition."¹² Well-known American scholar Vali Nasr points out, "Southern Pashtuns felt excluded from Karzai's government. They viewed the December 2001 Bonn Agreement—the result of an internationally sponsored conference to decide the shape of Afghanistan's constitution and government—as having favored their enemies, the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras of the Northern Alliance. They felt that Karzai, though a Pashtun of the Durrani tribe himself, had never done much to address their concerns. Feeling disenfranchised, many had thrown their lot in with the Taliban."¹³ It was, therefore, just a matter of time before the Taliban would regroup and pose a serious challenge to the US-imposed political dispensation in Afghanistan.

The fundamental strategic blunder committed by the USA in Afghanistan was its failure to distinguish in practical terms between Al Qaeda, which was an international terrorist organization, and the Afghan Taliban, which despite its retrogressive and obscurantist ideology, was and remains an important political party, representative of a large number of the Pashtuns, in the Afghan political spectrum. It is only more recently that the American authorities have started saying that the Afghan Taliban is an “armed insurgency,” not a terrorist group. In a press briefing in January 2015, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest confirmed this description of the Afghan Taliban and further emphasized that it was “important to draw a distinction between the Taliban and Al Qaeda.”¹⁴ Unfortunately, for a long time in the period after 9/11, the treatment meted out to the Afghan Taliban by the USA was no different from that given to Al Qaeda. In a meeting that I had with the senior officials of the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow in September 2011, they also pointed out that this was the fundamental flaw in the American strategy in post-9/11 Afghanistan.

The Americans in the formulation of their strategy also failed to realize that tribal and ethnic loyalties outweighed national loyalties in Afghanistan. An Afghan’s identity is determined first and foremost by the tribe to which he belongs and then by the ethnic community (for example, Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, or Uzbeks) of which his tribe is a part. If the Americans had taken cognizance of these realities, they would have realized that a government in Afghanistan from which the Pashtuns, constituting about half of its population, felt alienated would not be sustainable in the long run.

Washington also made the mistake of relying too heavily on the military dimension of its strategy to the neglect of the political dimension. Had it given adequate attention to the political dimension, keeping in view the realities of the Afghan political life, it would have initiated a dialogue with the Afghan Taliban long ago in the interest of a political settlement and durable peace in Afghanistan. Instead it relied on the use of brute force to bludgeon the Afghan Taliban into submission. In this effort, Washington miserably failed. This was not because America’s foreign friends did not advise it to go for a political settlement in Afghanistan. Vali Nasr notes that America’s friends in the Middle East advised it not to pursue a military solution in Afghanistan.¹⁵ General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, in a meeting in the White House in October 2010, told President Obama: “You are not going to win the war, and you are not going to transform Afghanistan. This place has devoured empires before you; it will defy you as well. Stop your grandiose plans and let’s get

practical, sit down, and discuss how you will leave and what is an end state we can both live with.”¹⁶

According to Vali Nasr, Holbrooke also wanted President Obama to consider the option of a political settlement in Afghanistan during the review that the latter ordered in 2009. “During the review, there was no discussion of diplomacy and a political settlement at all. A commitment to finding a political settlement to the war would have put diplomacy front and center and organized military and intelligence operations in Afghanistan to support it. Holbrooke wanted the president to consider this option, but the White House was not buying. The military wanted to stay in charge, and going against the military would make the president look weak.”¹⁷

As pointed out above, it is only more recently that Washington has started recognizing the realities of the Afghan politics. It was not until February 2011 that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, on behalf of the US administration, was able to endorse publicly the diplomatic route for a settlement in Afghanistan in her speech to the Asia Society. But, unfortunately, this recognition came too late to have any material effect on the course of events preceding the end of the ISAF combat mission in Afghanistan. The efforts for the commencement of a dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban in 2012 failed to take off mainly because of the US failure, under the congressional pressure, to release five Taliban detainees at Guantanamo Bay in return for Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl who was in the Taliban custody, as had been originally agreed to.¹⁸ By the time this exchange of prisoners took place in May 2014 with the good offices of the Qatari government, it was too late to help in the commencement of a dialogue with the Afghan Taliban before the end of the NATO combat mission. Following the end of the NATO combat mission in Afghanistan, renewed efforts for the commencement of an intra-Afghan dialogue would be required. It is encouraging to note, therefore, that Afghan President Ashraf Ghani expressed interest in reconciliation talks with the Afghan Taliban as officially reported after his state visit to Pakistan in November, 2014.¹⁹

The American problems in Afghanistan were aggravated by the hubris caused by the easy overthrow of the Taliban government in Kabul following the tragic events of 9/11. Consequently, the Americans shifted their attention and resources mostly to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and its aftermath, allowing the Afghan Taliban to regroup and pose a serious challenge to the political dispensation propped up by Washington

in Afghanistan. The Taliban resistance to the American occupation of Afghanistan gathered strength also because of Washington's attempt to impose Western liberal values on the extremely conservative and religious Afghan society. In this, the Americans repeated the mistake of the PDPA and the Soviet policy makers who had tried to transform "Afghanistan from a tribal to a communist society ruled by a well-disciplined communist party."²⁰ This clash of values alienated many Afghans who otherwise might have kept aloof from the Taliban-led resistance.

The conduct of the American forces in their military operations, which in many cases hurt the Afghan social and cultural sensitivities, further undermined the American cause. This was particularly the effect in the case of the night raids of Afghan homes. Finally, the indiscriminate use of force by the US-led NATO forces, which caused huge collateral damage to civilian properties and loss of lives of innocent civilians including women and children and forced the Karzai government to lodge protests from time to time, contributed to the intensification of the Afghan insurgency against the American occupation. These factors also led to increasing cases of the Afghan soldiers firing on American and other ISAF troops.

POST-2014 AFGHAN SCENARIO

All the indications are that after the American military withdrawal at the end of 2014 excepting the residual force, the present governmental structure in Afghanistan will face a serious challenge from opposing forces led by the Taliban. Even the Afghan nationalists not part of the Taliban movement might be inclined to withhold support to a government that would carry the stigma of having been established through foreign occupation. After all, the Afghan history is replete with instances of the overthrow of rulers who had assumed power with foreign support, Najibullah being the last example. It is also illogical to expect that a system of government which could not be stabilized by about 130,000 Western troops at their peak would be able to face the challenge of the growing Taliban-led Afghan insurgency with the support of only about 13,000 Western troops. This is particularly so because of the high desertion rate of the Afghan forces built up with the Western support, the high cost of their maintenance running into billions of dollars, the inability of the Afghan government to sustain them on its own, and the low level of their efficiency because of inadequate training and motivation.

Professor Stephen Biddle in his article “Ending the War in Afghanistan” reached similar conclusions:

Should current trends continue, U.S. combat troops are likely to leave behind a grinding stalemate between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The Afghan National Security Forces can probably sustain this deadlock, but only as long as the U.S. Congress pays the multibillion-dollar annual bills needed to keep them fighting. The war will thus become a contest in stamina between Congress and the Taliban. Unless Congress proves more patient than the Taliban under Mullah Umar, funding for ANSF will eventually shrink until Afghan forces can no longer hold their ground, and at that point, the country could easily descend into chaos. If it does, the war will be lost and U.S. aims forfeited.²¹

Professor Biddle, therefore, recommended that Washington should get serious about a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, which preserved all parties’ vital interests even if no one’s ideal aims were achieved. The essential elements of such a settlement as recommended by Professor Biddle could be on the following lines:

- To be legally considered a political party as well as to see foreign forces withdrawn from the country, the Taliban must break its ties with Al Qaeda, renounce violence, and accept a mutually agreed constitutional setup.
- For its part in a settlement, the Afghan government must accept the changes in the constitution and create a role for the Taliban in a coalition government. This would allow the government “to preserve the basic blueprint of today’s state, and it would surely command the votes needed to lead a governing coalition, at least in the near term.”
- Pakistan must abandon its ambition for “an Afghan puppet state under Taliban domination” in favor of stable borders and enough influence to prevent an anti-Pakistan Afghan-India axis.
- The USA would need to accept the Taliban as a legal political actor and forfeit “any significant base structure for conducting counterterrorist operations from Afghan soil.”²²

In view of the serious challenges that the West is facing to its supremacy from Russia in Ukraine and from China in the Far East and the problem of the war weariness of the American people, Washington would be loath

to reverse the current trend and increase the commitment of its troops to Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. It would like to rely instead on financial assistance to the government of President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani and the presence of its residual force to sustain the Afghan government in Kabul in power. However, as noted by Professor Biddle, there is a big question mark on the success of this approach in stabilizing the present US-supported political dispensation in Afghanistan in the absence of a political settlement between the Kabul government and the Afghan Taliban.

The possibility of this scenario in the post-2014 Afghanistan is the main reason why the Americans have been supporting more recently the commencement of a dialogue between the Kabul government and the Afghan Taliban in the interest of a political settlement. It is also encouraging that China is also behind the efforts for national reconciliation in Afghanistan as, of course, Pakistan is. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the media on 12 February 2015 during his official visit to Pakistan that China “will support the Afghan government in realizing reconciliation with various political factions including Taliban.”²³ Ideally, this goal of national reconciliation and a political settlement should have been achieved before the end of 2014. Unfortunately, the efforts for reaching such a settlement have not succeeded so far. The delegations of the Afghan government and the Taliban did hold Pakistan-brokered direct talks in Pakistan in early July 2015 in the presence of the representatives of US and Chinese officials.²⁴ However, the second round of talks, which was to take place again in Pakistan on July 31, had to be postponed because of the news about the death of the Taliban supreme leader, Mullah Omar.²⁵ In view of the reports about divisions within the ranks of the Taliban after Mullah Omar’s death, it will take some time before the dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban can be resumed.

Keeping in view Afghanistan’s history and the proclivity of the Afghan protagonists to reach for the gun instead of entering into a dialogue, the prospects for national reconciliation and a political settlement in Afghanistan are not very bright. In the absence of a political settlement and an agreed power-sharing formula, one should expect a full-blown Afghan Taliban-led insurgency posing a serious threat to the survival of the present Afghan government and to regional peace and stability. Such a civil war will further destabilize Afghanistan besides inflicting huge human and material losses on the Afghan people even if it does not result in the immediate overthrow of the US-installed government in Afghanistan.

There is also the risk of the involvement of Afghanistan's neighbors in the civil war, thus destabilizing the whole region as was the case in 1990s. Insecurity and instability in Afghanistan would have devastating consequences for both Pakistan and Iran. Even the rest of the international community would not remain immune from the damaging consequences of the civil war in Afghanistan as the past experience clearly indicates.

Therefore, national reconciliation and a political settlement in Afghanistan, freely negotiated among the Afghan parties, are a must for durable peace and stability in the country. A political settlement is not only in the interest of the people of Afghanistan but also an essential prerequisite for regional peace and stability. The regional countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran that have long borders with Afghanistan besides having close historical, economic, and cultural links with it, and major powers must do their best to encourage the Afghan parties to resume intra-Afghan dialogue in pursuit of a political settlement. While doing so, they must refrain from interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

PAKISTAN AND POST-2014 AFGHANISTAN

The past experience clearly shows that durable peace in Afghanistan would remain elusive without the support of the regional countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran, to the goal of a political settlement between the Taliban and the non-Taliban forces. This would necessitate close cooperation and coordination between Pakistan and Iran in managing their relations with the post-2014 Afghanistan. It goes without saying that this settlement should also enjoy the support of major powers particularly the USA, Russia, and China. A neutral status for Afghanistan would be helpful in securing such regional and international support.

The question, however, is whether the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban are prepared to show the necessary flexibility for reaching such a political settlement. From the Afghan government side, this would require its willingness to accept necessary changes in the Afghan constitution to accommodate the reasonable demands of the Afghan Taliban. At the same time, the Afghan Taliban would have to recognize that they alone are in no position to rule over Afghanistan and that they would have to share power with other forces and parties in Afghanistan in the form of a coalition. Because of the Taliban's obscurantist ideology, their exclusive rule in Afghanistan is neither in the interest of that country nor in the interest of Pakistan, which is likely to suffer from its negative fallout.

Hopefully, Pakistan's political and military leadership has learned that lesson from its experience of the 1990s. It appears from the counterterrorism operation launched throughout Pakistan, based on national consensus developed in the wake of the tragedy that befell the army public school in Peshawar on 16 December, 2014, that in fact is the case.

The scourge of terrorism from which Pakistan has been suffering over the past decade is largely an offshoot of the armed conflict and instability in Afghanistan. As mentioned earlier, because of ethnic and tribal links across the Durand line and the porous Pakistan-Afghanistan border, our tribesmen in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) inevitably got involved in the fighting in Afghanistan on the side of the Taliban in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Taliban government in Kabul. The military operations launched by Pervez Musharraf and his successors at the behest of the Americans to stop our tribesmen from crossing the Afghan border in support of their tribal brethren fighting the ISAF troops redirected their fury against Pakistan leading to a spate of terrorist attacks all over the country. The solution of the problem of TTP-related terrorism in Pakistan, therefore, also lies, partly at least, in national reconciliation and a political settlement in Afghanistan.

For durable peace in Afghanistan, for regional peace and stability, and for strengthening Pakistan-Afghanistan friendship, we need to adjust our Afghanistan policy to suit the requirements of the post-2014 scenario. First, we should follow a policy of noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs allowing the Afghans to decide their own destiny. The lesson of history is that no foreign power has single-handedly been able to establish its control over Afghanistan on a long-term basis. We should learn from our own experience of the 1990s and avoid jumping into the fray in case, as is possible, the civil war in Afghanistan is intensified after 2014. It goes without saying that we should have close consultations and coordination with Iran so that both countries refrain from interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

Second, we must remember that neither the Pashtuns nor the non-Pashtuns alone can rule Afghanistan in conditions of durable peace and stability. Therefore, we should focus on encouraging and facilitating an intra-Afghan dialogue, free of foreign interference and aimed at national reconciliation and the establishment of a broad-based Afghan government in cooperation with Iran, Turkey, and other regional countries. A neutral Afghanistan would facilitate a political settlement on these lines. The government of Pakistan has already expressed its readiness on a number of occasions to facilitate the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. The spokesperson

of the Pakistan Foreign Office told the media on 20 February 2015, “We believe it is for the Afghan government to lead the efforts for reconciliation in Afghanistan. Any reconciliation process has to be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. Pakistan, as a neighbor and as a country that has vital stakes in peace and stability in Afghanistan, is ready to provide whatever assistance we can. We are ready to facilitate the reconciliation process to the extent possible.”²⁶ Similar views were expressed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a joint media conference with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani during his official visit to Kabul on 12 May 2015.²⁷ The first round of the talks between the representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban, held in Pakistan in July 2015, reflected the seriousness of the Pakistan government in facilitating dialogue between the two sides. Pakistan must continue its efforts to encourage and facilitate this dialogue while scrupulously avoiding any interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

Third, under our changed Afghanistan policy, we should tell any Afghans such as the Haqqani network or others, who may be on our soil, that now that the American combat mission in Afghanistan has ended, there is no justification for them, moral or political, to continue staying on Pakistani territory. In other words, any Afghans involved in the fighting in Afghanistan should be forcefully denied any sanctuary on the Pakistan soil. In line with this recommendation, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif pledged action against any Taliban sanctuaries found on Pakistani territory after his meeting with President Ashraf Ghani in Kabul on 12 May 2015.²⁸ In return, the Afghan government must not provide sanctuaries on its territory to terrorist elements working against Pakistan whether they are fugitives from Pakistan or agents of some foreign power.

Fourth, Pakistan should extend support and assistance to the Afghan government and people in rebuilding their damaged infrastructure and broken state institutions. We should also develop mutually beneficial cooperation with Afghanistan in economic, commercial, cultural, and security fields. In this regard, we should build on the positive outcome of President Ashraf Ghani’s visit to Pakistan in November 2014. It seemed for a while after the visit that Pakistan-Afghanistan relations were moving in the right direction. In a statement issued on 20 February 2015 from Kabul, President Ashraf Ghani appreciated “Pakistan’s recent efforts in paving the ground for peace and reconciliation” in Afghanistan.²⁹ However, the intensification of the Taliban attacks in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the report about Mullah Omar’s death vitiated the atmosphere, forcing President Ashraf Ghani to launch a diatribe against Pakistan at a press

conference in Kabul on 10 August 2015.³⁰ These developments once again brought home the latent tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the fragile character of the dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban, and the many pitfalls that can derail it.

Fifth, Pakistan must reach out to Afghan groups and personalities belonging to different ethnicities, tribes, and regions with gestures and sentiments of friendship to overcome the bitterness of the past and cement friendly relations with Afghanistan at the people-to-people level. Obviously, this will not be an easy task. However, the difficulties of the task should not be allowed to discourage Pakistan from undertaking this highly desirable initiative to promote mutual understanding between the two countries.

Finally, it must be recognized that the Durand Line issue will continue to cast its shadow over Pakistan-Afghanistan relations for quite some time to come even under the best of circumstances. On this issue, Pakistan must maintain its principled position, which is recognized by the international community. However, in view of the history of this problem, it is unlikely that any Afghan government would accept Pakistan's position on it in the near future. Therefore, it would be in the best interest of the two countries to develop their economic and commercial relations to such an extent bilaterally and within the framework of the ECO as to make the differences about the Durand Line irrelevant. This scenario may materialize if ECO is able to realize its full potential on the lines of what has happened in the EU.

In view of the critically important role that Tehran can play in encouraging and facilitating an intra-Afghan dialogue and Iran's close linkage to Pakistan's security and economic well-being, it is now time to look at the current state of Pakistan-Iran relations in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. For the background of the Durand Line issue, see Mujtaba Rizvi, *The Frontiers of Pakistan* (Karachi: National Publishing House Ltd., 1971), pp. 143–165. For a more detailed treatment of the subject, see Azmat Kayat Khan, *The Durand Line and Its Geostrategic Importance*, ed. by M.Y. Effedni (Peshawar, Pakistan: University of Peshawar, 2000).
2. For a detailed account of the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan, see Peter Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan* (New York: Public Affairs, 2013), especially Chaps. 7, 8, 9, and 10.
3. Sherard Cowper-Coles, *Cables from Kabul* (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), p. xx.

4. “Peshawar Accord,” International Conflict Research Institute (INCORE), 24 April 1992, as cited by UN Department of Political Affairs, *UN Peacemaker*, at http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/AF_920424_PESHAWAR%20ACCORD.pdf.
5. “Afghan Peace Accord (Islamabad Accord),” International Conflict Research (INCORE), 7 March 1993, at <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/afgan1.pdf>.
6. For background information on the genesis and growth of the Afghan Taliban, see Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon—Afghanistan 1994–97* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) and Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban—Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).
7. “Who Are the Northern Alliance?” *BBC News*, 13 November 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1652187.stm.
8. The narration of the events relating to Afghanistan between 1997 and 2003 is based in many cases on the personal experiences of the author who was serving as the Pakistan ambassador to Iran during that period.
9. See statement made by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif while addressing the Balochistan Development Forum in Islamabad on 19 January 2015: Mehtab Haider, “Foreign Hand in Terror Activities Won’t Be Tolerated: PM,” *The News*, 20 January 2015, at <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-35358-Foreign-hand-in-terror-activities-wont-be-tolerated-PM>.
10. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President [Barack Obama] on the End of the Combat Mission in Afghanistan,” press statement, 28 December 2014, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/28/statement-president-end-combat-mission-afghanistan>.
11. James Dao, “A Nation Challenged: President Bush Sets Role for US in Afghan Rebuilding,” *The New York Times*, 18 April 2002, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/18/world/a-nation-challenged-the-president-bush-sets-role-for-us-in-afghan-rebuilding.html>.
12. Sherard Cowper-oles, *Cables from Kabu* (New York: HarperCollins, 2011), p. xxii.
13. Vali Nasr, *The Dispensable Nation—American Foreign Policy in Retreat* (New York: Anchor, 2014), p. 20.
14. Anwar Iqbal, “Afghan Taliban Armed Insurgents, Not Terrorists, Says White House,” *The Dawn*, 31 January 2015, at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1160617>.
15. Nasr, *The Dispensable Nation*, pp. 8–10.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

18. Stephen Biddle, "Ending the War in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2013 issue, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2013-08-12/ending-war-afghanistan>.
19. Associated Press, "Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Meet in Attempt to Repair Ties," *The Daily News*, 16 November 2014, at <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/pakistan-pm-sharif-afghan-prez-ghani-meet-repair-ties-article-1.2012596>.
20. Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, p. 129.
21. Biddle, "Ending the War in Afghanistan".
22. Ibid.
23. Mateen Haider, "China Ready to Support Kabul-Taliban Reconciliation," *The Dawn*, 12 February 2015, at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1163118>.
24. "Pakistan Lauded for Hosting Afghan Peace Talks," *The Dawn*, 9 July 2015, at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1193363>.
25. Javid Husain, "Afghanistan After Mullah Omar," *The Nation*, 18 August 2015, at <http://nation.com.pk/columns/18-Aug-2015/afghanistan-after-mullah-omar>.
26. Mariana Baabar, "Pakistan Ready for Mediation between Kabul, Taliban: FO," *The News*, 21 February 2015, at <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-35998-Pakistan-ready-for-mediation-between-Kabul-Taliban-FO>.
27. Mateen Haider and Irfan Haider, "Nawaz Sharif Pledges Support in Afghan Fight Against Taliban," *The Dawn*, 12 May 2015, at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1181502>.
28. Ibid.
29. AFP, "Pakistan's Role in Peace Talks Deserves Credit: Ghani," *The Dawn*, 21 February 2015, at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1164977>.
30. "Ghani's Remarks," *The Dawn*, 11 August 2015, at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1199889>.

Iran: An Estranged Friend

It was the end of September 1997 when I flew into Tehran from Seoul to assume charge as the ambassador of Pakistan to Iran. Pakistan-Iran relations were virtually on fire at the time. Just about two weeks earlier, five Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) cadets who were in Pakistan on a training mission under the protection of the Pakistan army had been murdered in an ambush in Rawalpindi. Earlier in the year, Mr. Rahimi, the director of the Iranian Culture Centre in Multan, had been assassinated. On top of that, Pakistan and Iran were engaged in a proxy war in Afghanistan with Iran supporting the Northern Alliance and Pakistan extending its support to the Taliban government in Kabul. It was not surprising, therefore, that I received a cool reception from the Iranian government and Foreign Office. I was made to wait for more than a month before I was allowed to present my credentials to the newly elected President Muhammad Khatami. A few months earlier, the new Indian ambassador was able to present his credentials within two weeks after his arrival at Tehran.

PAKISTAN-IRAN RELATIONS DURING PRE-ISLAMIC REVOLUTION ERA

It was clear to me, therefore, that I had before me an uphill task. I fully realized the strategic significance of Pakistan's friendship with Iran and the need to safeguard this vital relationship. It was my firm belief that

Pakistan-Iran friendship was in the best interests of the two countries as their security and economic well-being were closely linked. In the face of the enduring security threat posed by India, it was a strategic imperative for Pakistan to strengthen friendly relations and wide-ranging cooperation with Iran. Conversely, Iran needed Pakistan's friendship for strengthening its own security. Enormous possibilities of mutually beneficial economic and commercial cooperation, cultural affinities, and historical linkages provided the underpinning for a robust friendly relationship between the two countries. Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan after its emergence as an independent state in 1947.¹ It stood by Pakistan in the past in its times of crisis, especially in the 1965 Pakistan-India war and later during the 1971 war. Similarly, during the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), Pakistan, under General Zia-ul-Haq, tilted in favor of Iran despite its declared posture of neutrality and despite the pressure that it had to face from Saudi Arabia and other friendly Arab countries for persuading it to adopt a pro-Iraq policy.² My task, therefore, was to salvage and rebuild this relationship that had been given severe body blows over the preceding decade or so.

Pakistan-Iran relations during the pre-Iranian Islamic Revolution days were extremely close marked by strategic convergence, as both the countries were on the side of the Western bloc led by the USA in the Cold War against the Soviet Union and its allies. Both of them were members of the Baghdad Pact, which was later transformed into the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy. There was close cooperation between the two countries in the military field. Common cultural heritage and bilateral economic and commercial cooperation provided further strength to this relationship. Frequent exchange of visits of the leaders and senior officials promoted mutual understanding and cooperation between Pakistan and Iran. The Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) provided a regional forum for promoting economic and commercial cooperation among Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.³

IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND PAKISTAN

The advent of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 brought about a radical change in Pakistan-Iran relations.⁴ Iran quit the Western bloc, leading to the demise of CENTO. Its relations with the USA changed from close friendship to mutual animosity. The US embassy hostage crisis in Tehran (1979–81) further soured Iran-US relations.⁵ The support extended by

the USA and some other Western countries to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88) exacerbated the animosity between Iran and the USA.⁶ Iran's opposition to American strategic goals in the Middle East, US sanctions on Iran, and their differences on the Iranian nuclear program further aggravated the problems between the two countries. Pakistan, on the other hand, remained a supporter of the Western bloc and an ally of the USA till the end of the Cold War. Pakistan-US cooperation in supporting the Afghan *jihad* for liberation from the Soviet occupation was a reflection of this alliance. Even after the USA imposed sanctions on Pakistan in 1990 because of its nuclear program following, conveniently, the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan generally maintained friendly relations with the USA despite occasional difficulties. This strategic divergence naturally pulled Iran and Pakistan in opposite directions, straining their relations.

Besides strategic divergence, the sectarian factor became another irritant in Pakistan relations in the post-Islamic Revolution era. After the fall of the Shah's government, Iran became a Shia theocracy based on the doctrine of *Velayat-e-Faqih* or the Guardianship of the Jurist propounded by Ayatollah Khomeini.⁷ On the other hand, Zia-ul-Haq promoted religious extremism of the Sunni variety for consolidating his dictatorial rule in Pakistan and for supporting the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation. Iran for about two decades after the Islamic Revolution allegedly provided funds, weapons, and training to Pakistani Shia radicals through covert means. On the other hand, some Arab countries of the Persian Gulf region reportedly extended covert support to radical Pakistani Sunni organizations, thus fighting a proxy war with Iran on the Pakistani soil. Acts of sectarian terrorism started in the late 1980s, and the problem assumed alarming proportions in the 1990s. The tragic killing of several Iranian officials on Pakistani soil, starting with the murder of Sadegh Ganji, the director of the Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore, in 1990, was the direct outcome of the sectarian terrorism that reached its peak in the 1990s.

As mentioned earlier, six more Iranian officials were killed in 1997 through acts of terrorism followed by two Iranian engineers who were killed in Karachi in February 1998. By the end of 2000, the Iranian side realized the damage that its covert support to Shia radical organizations had caused to the Shia cause in Pakistan and to Pakistan-Iran relations. I as the Pakistan ambassador in Tehran received informally several hints around this time indicating that the Iranian authorities had decided to change their past policy and terminate any covert assistance to Shia radical

organizations. Pakistan also took steps to punish those responsible for the killing of the Iranian officials, notably the hanging of Haq Nawaz, the assassin of Sadegh Ganji, in February 2001. These developments led subsequently to a marked decline in acts of sectarian terrorism in Pakistan. The importance of the sectarian divide as an irritant in Pakistan-Iran relations, therefore, has diminished. However, because of the spread of Sunni religious extremism in Pakistan and because of Iran's political system being a Shia theocracy, this factor remains a possible source of discord between the two countries. Both Pakistan and Iran, therefore, need to be on their guard so that sectarian differences are not exploited by their enemies to damage their friendly relations.

It was, however, the proxy war between Pakistan and Iran in Afghanistan after the fall of the Najibullah government in April 1992 that inflicted the most serious damage on Pakistan-Iran relations. Pakistan and Iran had earlier cooperated with each other in supporting the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation. The situation changed after the Mujahideen overthrew the Najibullah government and captured Kabul in April 1992. As narrated in the preceding chapter, Pakistan basically supported the Pashtuns whereas Iran extended its support to the Northern Alliance led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud in the civil war that subsequently ensued. Pakistan initially supported Gulbadin Hikmatyar and later switched its support to the Taliban in this civil war. Iran continued its support to the Northern Alliance even after its forces had been driven out of Kabul in 1996.

Both Iran and Pakistan committed blunders in the handling of the situation in Afghanistan. During the period from 1992 to 1996, when the Northern Alliance government led by Burhanuddin Rabbani was in power in Kabul, Iran rejected proposals from Pakistan for widening the Kabul government's political base by accommodating the opposition Afghan groups mostly representing the Pashtuns in Afghanistan. After the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 and gradually extended its control in Afghanistan, Pakistan did not pursue vigorously proposals from the Iranian side for a political settlement and a broad-based government in Afghanistan until the 9/11 terrorist attacks radically transformed the whole scenario in the country.

I tried my best through several dispatches, sent from time to time after my arrival in Tehran as the Pakistan ambassador, to convince the authorities in Islamabad that our operational pro-Taliban Afghanistan strategy was untenable because it lacked the support of about half of the population of

Afghanistan, had isolated us at regional and global levels, had tarnished our image internationally, and had ominous implications for our internal social and political stability as it was stoking the fires of religious extremism and terrorism. Such a policy was likely to crumble in the face of even the slightest unfavorable turn of events as it happened after 9/11.

Unfortunately, my pleas fell on deaf ears and Pakistan continued headlong with its unwise pro-Taliban policy in Afghanistan till 9/11 brought it to the precipice of a disaster. Since then, Pakistan has been trying to recover, with limited success, from the wreckage and the disastrous after-effects of our pro-Taliban policy of the 1990s. Iran, despite the overthrow of the Taliban government, secured only marginal gains because of the subsequent heavy presence of the US military in Afghanistan and the speech by President Bush calling Iran part of the “axis of evil.” Even the current reduced US military presence may be a source of some concern to Tehran. Hopefully, both Iran and Pakistan have learned the lesson that short-sighted tactical cleverness is not a good substitute for a sound long-term strategy.

THE TALIBAN MILITARY OFFENSIVE OF 1998

The Taliban military offensive of July-August 1998 against the Northern Alliance forces led to the capture of Mazar-e-Sharif and most of Afghanistan by the Taliban. The Northern Alliance forces were restricted mainly to Badakhshan province. Tragically, nine Iranian Consulate officials were killed in Mazar-e-Sharif when the Taliban wrested control of the city from the Northern Alliance. Both Pakistan and Iran continued their support to the opposing camps in Afghanistan till 9/11 when Pakistan was forced to bring about a U-turn under the threat of an American ultimatum. The proxy war between Pakistan and Iran in Afghanistan could not but have extremely damaging effects on Pakistan-Iran relations sapping mutual trust, sowing suspicions of each other’s intentions, and generally degrading Pakistan-Iran friendship and cooperation. It also had the effect of pushing Iran closer to India and Russia to counter Pakistan’s alleged expansionist aims in Afghanistan.

The Taliban military offensive and the death of the Iranian Consulate officials in Mazar-e-Sharif brought Pakistan-Iran relations to their nadir. Iran felt that it had been deceived by both Pakistan and the Taliban. This feeling was not entirely surprising considering the specific background against which the Taliban military offensive had taken place. Iranian

Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi paid a visit to Islamabad at the beginning of June 1998 to show solidarity with Pakistan after its nuclear explosions, carried out in response to Indian nuclear explosions of May 1998 to restore strategic balance. During the visit, both countries agreed to launch shuttle diplomacy to bring about reconciliation between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. In fact, a joint delegation of Pakistani and Iranian officials flew from Tehran to Mazar-e-Sharif on 30 June and then to Kandahar on 1 July 1998 in an Iranian aircraft to undertake the Pakistan-Iran joint peace mission on Afghanistan. Within a few days after the return of the Pakistani officials from Iran, however, the Taliban military offensive was launched against the Northern Alliance forces.

Pakistan claimed that it had no prior inkling of this military offensive. On the other hand, Iran not only accused the Taliban of bad faith in launching the attack against the Northern Alliance. It also alleged that the military offensive had been launched with Pakistan's covert support, a charge that Pakistan categorically denied. The Iranian authorities and media, however, found it difficult to believe that the Taliban could have launched such a major and well-planned military offensive without the knowledge, advice, and covert support of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which allegedly had very close links with the latter. They accused Pakistan (and, of course, the Taliban) of pursuing a military solution instead of a political settlement in Afghanistan.

As the Taliban offensive progressed, inflicting defeats on the Northern Alliance forces, it was obvious to Iranian authorities by the beginning of August 1998 that Mazar-e-Sharif would soon fall into the hands of the Taliban. The Iranian deputy foreign minister in charge of Afghanistan, Allauddin Broujerdi, called me for a meeting on 5 August 1998. He mentioned the Iranian assessment that Mazar-e-Sharif would be soon captured by the Taliban and requested me to convey through Islamabad a request to Mullah Umar for ensuring the security of the Iranian Consulate officials in the city in that eventuality in accordance with international conventions. The message was immediately conveyed by me to the foreign ministry in Islamabad for an urgent response as requested by Allauddin Broujerdi. On 7 August, the response from Islamabad was received conveying an assurance on behalf of Mullah Umar about the security of the Iranian Consulate officials in Mazar-e-Sharif in the event of its capture by the Taliban. It was duly conveyed by me to the Iranian foreign ministry.

Mazar-e-Sharif was captured by the Taliban on 8 August and soon thereafter the Iranian foreign ministry lost contact with its consulate

there. Allauddin Broujerdi met me the same day and asked me to convey a request to Islamabad for ascertaining the welfare of the Iranian Consulate officials through its contacts with the Taliban. Unfortunately, Islamabad, despite its enquiries, was not able to provide a clear answer after contacting the Taliban beyond saying that probably the consulate officials, some of whom unsurprisingly were members of the Iranian intelligence agencies, had fled the city in panic after the Taliban victory and would hopefully soon reach Iran.

This response failed to satisfy the Iranian authorities or the families of the Iranian Consulate officials. As days passed, the Iranian fears that the worst may have happened to those officials grew in strength, raising tensions in Pakistan-Iran relations because of Pakistan's close links with the Taliban. The agonizing uncertainty came to an end in the beginning of September 1998 when the Taliban announced that the bodies of the Iranian Consulate officials had been found in a mass grave in Mazar-e-Sharif. The Taliban claimed that they had nothing to do with the killing of Iranian officials who, according to them, perhaps had been killed in the prevailing confusion after the Northern Alliance forces had evacuated Mazar-e-Sharif and before the Taliban had established their control over the city.

The Iranian government, media, and the people were not willing to accept this explanation. They held the Taliban directly responsible for the killing of the Iranian Consulate officials. They also blamed Pakistan for the tragedy. According to an eye-witness account given by an Iranian Consulate official, Allah-Dad Shamsavan Ghareh Hosseini, who somehow was able to escape from Mazar-e-Sharif and reach Tehran a few weeks after the tragedy, the Iranian officials were herded together in a room of the consulate by the Taliban soldiers after the city fell in their hands and killed through point-blank firing.

The news of the killing of the Iranian Consulate officials was received with extreme anger and grief by the Iranian government, media, and the people at large. Despite Pakistan government's expression of grief over and categorical denials of any involvement in this tragic episode, the Iranian side held Islamabad partly responsible for the tragedy. Besides lodging protests in the strongest possible terms, the Iranian authorities organized demonstrations in front of the Pakistani Chancery, which was subjected to stoning by the demonstrators. According to some credible reports, the Iranian supreme leader also ordered the mobilization of about 200,000 Iranian troops on the Afghanistan border for launching an attack against

the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan if the Taliban failed to apologize and punish the culprits responsible for the Mazar-e-Sharif tragedy.

Such an attack would not only have involved Iran once again in a major regional conflict after the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), which had ended a decade earlier, but probably would also have sucked in Pakistan in an attempt to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan. In the process, both Iran and Pakistan would have suffered grievously in blood and treasure. The possibility, howsoever remote, could not be ruled out that the whole scenario had been carefully choreographed by some external powers to involve Iran and Pakistan in a major armed conflict to punish the former for its opposition to their strategic goals in the Persian Gulf region and the latter for its nuclear explosions carried out a few months earlier.

Fortunately, the Iranian supreme leader was persuaded by President Khatami and the powerful Iranian leader, Rafsanjani, not to fall into the trap laid down by Iran's enemies, especially as Iran was just recovering from the destruction caused by the eight-year long Iran-Iraq war. While the danger of the outbreak of a major regional armed conflict was avoided, the Mazar-e-Sharif tragedy left deep scars on the Pakistan-Iran relationship. The need was for active and well-calculated steps to defuse tensions in Pakistan-Iran relations, rebuild mutual trust, and develop once again cooperation and enduring friendship between the two countries.

Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz paid a brief visit to Tehran later in September 1998 on a fire-fighting mission. He received a cool welcome from the Iranian government. In contrast with the past practice in which visiting Pakistani foreign ministers and even foreign secretaries were received by the Iranian president, Sartaj Aziz could only call on Iranian Vice President Hasan Habibi besides having a meeting with Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi. Both the Iranian dignitaries conveyed to him their displeasure in the strongest possible terms. Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, while reiterating Pakistan's grief over and noninvolvement in the Mazar-e-Sharif tragedy, maintained his cool. The visit did help in lowering the temperature somewhat in bilateral relations. But the goal of mutual understanding and close cooperation, especially concerning Afghanistan, remained elusive.

ATTEMPTS TO REVIVE PAKISTAN-IRAN RELATIONS

Following the overthrow of the Nawaz Sharif government in October 1999 by General Pervez Musharraf, another effort was made to improve Pakistan-Iran relations. General Pervez Musharraf paid a visit to Tehran

in December 1999 for an exchange of views with the Iranian leadership followed by another visit to Tehran in June 2000 to attend the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) summit. While these visits did help in defusing tensions, the Pakistan-Iran relationship lacked the warmth of the earlier times. Further, to the disquiet of the leaders and senior officials in Islamabad, there was a visible warming-up of relations between Iran and India. Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Tehran in April 2001 contributed further to the cementing of Iran-India ties.

There was obviously an urgent need for a major initiative to put Pakistan-Iran relations back on track. Fortunately, there was a growing feeling among the Iranian authorities by the end of 2000 that Iran's past covert support to Pakistani Shia organizations had damaged both the Shia cause in Pakistan and Pakistan-Iran relations. In Pakistan also, some efforts were being made to encourage greater religious tolerance and to bring to justice the culprits responsible for the killing of Iranian officials in the country in the 1990s. In fact, as noted earlier, Haq Nawaz, who had assassinated Sadegh Ganji, was finally hanged by our authorities in February 2001 after the conclusion of the judicial proceedings. From the Iranian point of view, the hopeless situation of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan at the beginning of 2001 called for steps to reach some kind of understanding with Pakistan with regard to its Afghanistan policies.

Such an understanding would not only have removed a major irritant in Pakistan-Iran relations but would have also helped in putting an end to the civil war in Afghanistan through the establishment of a broad-based government in Kabul instead of the purely Taliban government in place at that time. Thus, it would have been a positive development even from Pakistan's point of view since the Taliban would have remained in a controlling situation in such a broad-based government. In any case, the restoration of traditional warmth in Pakistan-Iran relations, promotion of mutual understanding on regional and global issues, and the strengthening of mutually beneficial cooperation would have worked to the advantage of the two countries. So the climate was propitious for a new initiative.

For such an initiative to have any chance of success, it had to have the blessings of the highest organs of state both in Iran and Pakistan. In Iran, the Supreme National Security Council, presided over by President Khatami and having representatives of all important national security and foreign policy-related state institutions as its members, was the most appropriate state organ for such a role. Pakistan, at that time, was ruled by General Pervez Musharraf as a military dictator, and it was the top brass

of the Pakistan army that called the shots on critically important foreign policy and national security issues such as Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the role of the Pakistan Foreign Office in foreign policy making had been considerably reduced since the days of General Zia-ul-Haq, another military dictator, particularly on such foreign policy issues as Kashmir, Afghanistan, and relations with Iran. The position remained unchanged even during the civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s when the top brass of the Pakistan army and ISI virtually controlled the Kashmir and Afghanistan policies with the role of the Foreign Office reduced to the issuance of declaratory statements in support of whatever was decided by the military establishment on these and other important foreign policy issues.

HASSAN ROUHANI'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN

Keeping in view the foregoing, I proposed to Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar toward the end of 2000 to extend a formal invitation to Mr. Hassan Rouhani, the secretary general of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, to pay a visit to Pakistan. Hassan Rouhani, the current Iranian president, who was also the representative of the Iranian supreme leader in the Supreme National Security Council, held an extremely important position in that high policy-making body. From the protocol point of view, he was equated with the Iranian foreign minister. Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar promptly responded to the proposal by extending the invitation that was forwarded by me to the Iranian side.

At the end of December 2000, I received a telephone call from Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the head of the foreign policy committee of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, for a meeting. The first meeting between the two of us took place shortly thereafter. I found to my pleasant surprise that in contrast with the senior officials of the Iranian foreign ministry, who were more focused on mundane day-to-day tactical issues relating to Pakistan-Iran relations, Hossein Mousavian showed a marked and a refreshing grasp of the strategic issues relating to Pakistan-Iran relations and to the developments in the region. He told me that Hassan Rouhani, after having studied the subject in depth, had been greatly dismayed to see the serious damage that had been caused to Pakistan-Iran relations. He assured me that the Iranian side was ready to take necessary steps to strengthen Pakistan-Iran relations. For this purpose, Hassan Rouhani was willing to undertake a visit to Islamabad after

necessary preparatory work. Hossein Mousavian told me that the preparatory work for the visit could start immediately in my meetings with him.

This development was conveyed by me to the Pakistan Foreign Office, which authorized me to proceed with the meetings with Hossein Mousavian for completing the necessary preparatory work. Over the next few months, I had a series of one-to-one meetings with Hossein Mousavian in which the parameters of Hassan Rouhani's proposed visit to Pakistan were carefully worked out between the two of us in the light of the instructions that were received by me from time to time from Islamabad. It was quite clear to me that the Iranian side was keen to restore the traditional warmth in Pakistan-Iran relations and strengthen bilateral cooperation in political, security, economic, commercial, technical, and cultural fields. According to my information, the Supreme National Security Council had devoted several meetings to the consideration of the current status of Pakistan-Iran relations with the aim of taking specific steps to strengthen them.

In February 2001, Hossein Mousavian even made an offer to me, obviously with the clearance of his superiors, to reach an understanding with Pakistan for promoting national reconciliation in Afghanistan so as to put an end to the civil war in that country. Under the proposal, the Northern Alliance would have been given some symbolic share in power in the government in Kabul, which was controlled by the Taliban at that time. This was an extremely welcome development considering the damage that the clash of the Afghanistan policies of Pakistan and Iran had inflicted upon their bilateral relations and the way it had served to prolong the Afghan civil war. I, therefore, promptly conveyed the proposal to Islamabad, which unfortunately shot it down on the ground that since Afghanistan was an independent country, Pakistan and Iran had no justification for discussing its internal affairs.

This was, of course, a lame excuse at best considering the way in which both Pakistan and Iran (with the support of India and Russia) had covertly supported the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, respectively, in the past and were continuing to do. In fact, it reflected the assessment in Islamabad that since the Taliban were in control of most of Afghanistan barring primarily the province of Badakhshan, it was just a matter of time before they would consolidate their rule over the whole of Afghanistan after subduing completely the Northern Alliance through military means. This assessment ignored the fundamental political reality that the Taliban government did not enjoy the whole-hearted support of almost the half of the Afghan population consisting of non-Pashtuns. The lesson of the

recent history of Afghanistan was that neither the Pashtuns nor the non-Pashtuns alone could rule over Afghanistan, which needed a broad-based government for durable peace and stability in the country. So an exclusively Taliban government in Afghanistan was likely to prove extremely fragile and unsustainable in the long run.

This was likely to be the case, particularly if one had taken into account the isolation of the Afghan Taliban government at the regional and international levels. Besides Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), no other country, not even China, a close strategic partner of Pakistan, had recognized the Taliban government. In the UN, it was the Burhanuddin Rabbani government rather than the Taliban government that represented Afghanistan. Considering the Taliban government's internal weaknesses and external isolation, any serious challenge to the Taliban government was likely to bring it down.

But in March 2001, none of these considerations mattered to the powers that be in Pakistan, particularly to its military establishment. Of course, nobody, certainly not Pakistan's military establishment, could foresee the terrorist attacks of 9/11 a few months later and their catastrophic effects that would transform the global scenario besides causing the defeat and overthrow of the Taliban government in Kabul. Had Islamabad responded positively to the proposal concerning Afghanistan put forward by Hassan Rouhani's office, it was possible that it would have led to the establishment of a broad-based government in Afghanistan with internal peace and a relatively moderate approach to internal and international affairs, thus ending its regional and international isolation. It might even have led to the expulsion of Al Qaeda from Afghanistan and the avoidance of the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

In light of the negative response from Islamabad, I had no choice but to convey to Hossein Mousavian that more preparatory work was needed for reaching a conclusive Pakistan-Iran understanding on Afghanistan and that hopefully Hassan Rouhani's visit would help advance that objective. Even this did not dampen the Iranian side's enthusiasm for strengthening Pakistan-Iran relations. In March 2001, after an exhaustive exchange of views and considerable preparatory work, it was agreed between Hossein Mousavian and me that a memorandum of understanding be signed during Hassan Rouhani's visit to Islamabad to put Pakistan-Iran relations back on track, promote mutual cooperation in various fields, and organize the exchange of ministerial visits leading to President Khatami's visit to Pakistan. Hossein Mousavian even authorized me to draft the proposed

memorandum, saying that whatever I drafted would be acceptable to the Iranian side.

I was, of course, greatly encouraged by this show of confidence on the part of the Iranian side. Immediately after my meeting with Hossein Mousavian, I reported the suggestion regarding the signing of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) to the Pakistan Foreign Office at a senior level, which, to my utter surprise, reacted negatively even to such a benign proposal. This negative response reflected the extent to which the mindset of even senior level officers in the Foreign Office had been adversely affected by the tensions and strains in Pakistan-Iran relations. (Unfortunately, the situation in the Iranian Foreign Office was not much different.) I had, therefore, no choice but to refer the matter directly to the foreign secretary. Fortunately, the foreign secretary's response was totally positive. He asked me to draft the proposed MOU and fax it to him directly for his approval.

I prepared the draft the same day and faxed it to the foreign secretary who immediately conveyed his approval to me. The next day I handed over a copy of the draft MOU to Hossein Mousavian who a day later conveyed the approval of the Iranian side verbally to me without any change whatsoever. He assured me that the draft would be soon formally approved by the Iranian government for signing by Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar during the former's visit to Pakistan from 24 to 27 April 2001. This is precisely what happened a few days later. The MOU, which constituted a roadmap for the improvement of Pakistan-Iran relations and the strengthening of bilateral cooperation in various fields, was signed by the two dignitaries in Islamabad. It initiated a process of meetings and exchange of ministerial visits that culminated in President Khatami's visit to Pakistan and the issuance of a joint communique in December 2002 recognizing the convergence of the strategic interests of the two countries and calling for the strengthening of the bilateral relations and cooperation in various fields.

9/11 AND PAKISTAN-IRAN RELATIONS

Thus, Hassan Rouhani's visit to Pakistan did help in arresting the deterioration in Pakistan-Iran relations and setting in motion instead a process of gradual improvement. However, due to Pakistan's unwillingness to compromise on the Afghanistan issue, the fundamental cause for mistrust and discord in Pakistan-Iran relations could not be removed immediately.

The tragic events of 9/11, which led to the overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and American military occupation of the country with the help of the Northern Alliance and Iran, radically transformed the ground situation. There was now greater alignment between the Afghanistan policies of Iran and Pakistan as the latter was forced to bring about a U-turn in its past pro-Taliban policy under the threat of the American ultimatum. But Iran failed to reap any direct benefit from its support to the American invasion of Afghanistan spearheaded by the Northern Alliance besides the overthrow of the Taliban government.

In fact, the US military presence in Afghanistan became another source of concern for Iran, especially after the speech by President Bush in January 2002 in which he declared that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq constituted “an axis of evil.”⁸ The strengthening of Pakistan-US relations and cooperation, following President Pervez Musharraf’s decision to fall in line with the US demands concerning the Afghan Taliban, also became a hindrance in the development of friendly relations between Islamabad and Tehran against the background of the increasing animosity between the USA and Iran, especially after the disclosures about the latter’s secret uranium enrichment program. American opposition to the implementation of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project was reflective of the negative effects of Pakistan-US friendship on Pakistan-Iran relations.

An example of the continued Pakistan-Iran mistrust was the statement by President Ahmadinejad of Iran in early March 2007 on the eve of his visit to Saudi Arabia expressing his concern over the meeting of the foreign ministers of Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey hosted by Pakistan on 25 February 2007. The Iranian president remarked that he had “lots of questions....and apprehensions” about the meeting, which called for “explicit answers.” That the situation had come to such a pretty pass that the Head of State of a friendly country, which had stood by Pakistan in its difficult times, had to complain publicly about our foreign policy initiative of direct relevance to it spoke volumes about the prevailing state of Pakistan-Iran relations. It was, of course, strange that Iran and Syria were excluded from the meeting of the foreign ministers of seven Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries that was expected to discuss important issues of the Middle East region including Palestine, the crises in Iraq and Lebanon, and Iran’s nuclear program. It was like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark!

The foreign ministers’ meeting in Islamabad was the result of the trips undertaken by President Musharraf to the capitals of a number of Muslim

countries in January and February 2007. The nation was told by the Pakistan government that Musharraf's move was aimed at taking "new and forceful" initiatives on important issues of the Middle East region and strengthening harmony within the Muslim world. The visits covered Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, UAE, Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, and Turkey.

The meeting of the seven OIC foreign ministers held on 25 February 2007 issued a joint statement reflecting the OIC's well-known positions on the Middle Eastern issues. As for the Iranian nuclear issue, the foreign ministers stressed that all issues must be resolved through diplomacy and there must be no resort to use of force. The foreign ministers' ideas, which did not contain any surprises, were to be presented to a special OIC summit to be held in Makkah.

The meeting was preceded by media reports in the Arab world that President Musharraf was working for the establishment of a Sunni alliance to confront the rising influence of Iran in the region. This was vehemently denied by the spokesperson of the Pakistan foreign ministry. However, the net result of President Musharraf's initiative, which was supposed to promote harmony in the Islamic world, was increased misgivings and mistrust among the Muslim countries as reflected by the Iranian president's expression of concern over the foreign ministers' meeting held in Islamabad. It should have been clear to even a novice in diplomacy that the establishment of a new group of like-minded countries within the OIC would aggravate divisions within the Islamic world, at least between its members and those outside, instead of promoting unity and harmony within the Muslim world.⁹

Misgivings were also bound to arise when one realized that the participants of the Islamabad meeting included mostly the representatives of pro-West Muslim countries, thus giving rise to rumors that Musharraf's initiative was meant to serve some hidden US agenda. The argument that only those countries, which supported the two-state solution, land for peace formula, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Golan Heights, had been invited to the meeting as our Foreign Office wanted the people to believe, lacked any basis. After all, Syria had supported the plan adopted by the Arab summit at Beirut in March 2002, which was based precisely on these elements. It certainly would not have opposed the Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights!¹⁰

As for Iran, despite the rhetoric of its leaders, it has in the past adopted a pragmatic approach at the OIC meetings and routinely gone along with the resolutions on Palestine that were based on the Arab consensus. One

should also not forget that Iran successfully hosted the OIC summit in December 1997 and did not allow its national views on Palestine to come in the way of the adoption of resolutions on this issue that enjoyed broad support in the Arab and the Muslim world.¹¹

Iran's omission from the countries that attended the Islamabad meeting, therefore, defied any logic, especially as the Iranian nuclear program was one of the important items on its agenda. It was like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark! The Iranians must have felt the same way as Pakistan would have if a regional country had taken the initiative of organizing a meeting on Kashmir from which Pakistan was excluded.¹²

A grave threat facing the Islamic world at this stage is the danger of strife between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Unfortunately, the Islamabad meeting by excluding Iran, the most powerful Shia state in the world, sent the wrong signal on this issue also. One of the main objectives of the foreign ministers' meeting at Islamabad should have been to provide a healing touch on the issue that was tearing apart Iraq and could lead to deep divisions, instability, and strife in the Muslim world as is now happening in Syria. By excluding Iran from the meeting, that opportunity was lost.¹³

This episode in Pakistan-Iran relations just showed that all was not well between the two countries. Terrorist attacks in Iranian Balochistan earlier by Jundullah and more recently by Jaish-ul Adal have been another cause of serious concern on the part of the Iranian authorities who have alleged that these groups have been operating from the Pakistani territory with the covert support of the Western intelligence agencies. The Iranian side attaches so much importance to the issue that the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, in his meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Tehran on 12 May 2014 specifically raised this issue while complaining about the subversive activities of third parties to spoil Pakistan-Iran relations.¹⁴

COOL PAKISTAN-IRAN RELATIONS

As mentioned earlier, a number of factors are responsible for the cooling of relations between Pakistan and Iran. During the 1990s, the clash of the Afghanistan policies of the two countries and the sectarian issue caused severe damage to Pakistan-Iran relations. Fortunately, the sectarian issue has subsided now although the possibility of its revival cannot be totally ruled out. The change of our Afghanistan policy after 9/11 provided an opportunity to Pakistan and Iran to coordinate their Afghanistan policies. Unfortunately, that opportunity was not grasped by them because of lack

of vision on the part of their leaders and because of the differences in the relations of Pakistan and Iran with the USA.

It is well-known that Iran currently faces a serious threat to its security from the USA primarily because Washington sees Iran as an obstacle in the realization of its strategic objectives in the Middle East, that is, control over the oil and gas resources of the region, security of Israel as a US outpost in the Middle East, and reorientation of the political outlook of the region to suit American interests. Until the signing of the deal between the world powers and Iran on the latter's nuclear program in July 2015, this issue was also a source of serious strains in Iran-US relations. Iran looks at Pakistan with suspicion and mistrust because of its close relations with the USA and the latter's animosity toward Iran, particularly its refusal to rule out the use of force in dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. President Obama in his State of the Union address on 20 January 2015, while reiterating support for a negotiated settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue, once again stressed that he had not ruled out any option in dealing with it.¹⁵ The situation will remain unchanged unless and until the agreement between Iran and P5+1 on the former's nuclear program, concluded in early July 2015, is duly implemented by all the sides concerned.

It is imperative that both Pakistan and Iran should learn the lesson from their past experience that their security is closely linked. Both of them have suffered when they worked at cross-purposes on important regional security issues as, for example, in Afghanistan during the 1990s. Both of them would have been better off if they had instead followed the policy of mutual understanding and accommodation in Afghanistan during that period. Their security and economic interests are both complementary and competitive. It is particularly important that they should not turn their competition into confrontation but should rather manage it within the limits of mutual tolerance and in accordance with the requirement of mutual accommodation.

The end of the combat mission of American and other ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 provides another opportunity for Pakistan and Iran to come to an understanding on the Afghanistan issue. The lesson of the recent history is that Pakistan-Iran cooperation is an indispensable condition for durable peace and stability in Afghanistan. This cooperation must be based on the resolve of the two countries to refrain from interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs while encouraging and facilitating an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process in the country.

Our friendship with the USA should not be at the expense of our friendship with Iran, which is an important friend and neighbor of Pakistan. We should, therefore, develop friendly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with Iran in various fields while keeping our overall interests in mind. Following the Western economic and financial sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program, the annual bilateral trade between Pakistan and Iran declined from the earlier level of \$1.3 billion in 2008 to 2009 to the paltry sum of \$200 million in 2013 to 2014. In the wake of the signing of the Iran nuclear deal and the expected lifting of economic and financial sanctions against Iran, we should devise innovative ways to increase trade with Iran. However, mere declaratory statements such as, for example, the one made during the Pakistan commerce minister's visit to Tehran on 22 April 2015 that the two countries would raise their bilateral trade to \$5 billion per annum within a period of five years are not enough.¹⁶ Declaratory statements, unless accompanied by concrete measures for achieving the targets set by them, are likely to remain mere pious intentions on paper.

The implementation of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, which is in the mutual interest of the two countries, should remain our high priority goal, especially now that the nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions against Iran have been lifted. The current plan of the Pakistan government to lay down a gas pipeline from Gawadar to Nawabshah, for the time being, as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to be connected later to the gas pipeline in Iran seems to be a step in the right direction. It would also help in integrating Iran more closely with China-Pakistan economic cooperation projects to the advantage of all the three countries. As for the terrorist activities of illegal groups allegedly operating from the Pakistan territory, we should take all possible steps to eliminate them and their nefarious activities. The promotion of religious moderation in both Pakistan and Iran would also serve to strengthen their friendly relations.

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Jawad Zarif's visit to Pakistan on 13 August 2015 should serve to strengthen Pakistan-Iran relations and cooperation in various fields. While calling for the development of bilateral relations and cooperation, Jawad Zarif assured his hosts that Iran's "relations with India will not harm those with Pakistan." Significantly, he also called for trilateral cooperation among Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan on security-related issues.¹⁷ Pakistan should take advantage of this proposal to engage Iran in mutual consultations on facilitating the Afghan peace process.

On the Iranian nuclear issue, the government of Pakistan in the past expressed its resolute opposition to the use of force in dealing with this issue because of its destabilizing repercussions for the region and Pakistan and because such use of force without any sanction by the UN Security Council would be a grave violation of the UN Charter and international law. Pakistan called for all possible efforts to find a final peaceful and negotiated solution of this issue in accordance with the provisions of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Hopefully, the conclusion and signing of the detailed agreement in July 2015 has finally resolved this issue.

Finally, we must not take sides in the disputes between Iran and the Arab states. Instead we should offer our good offices, within the limits of our constraints and subject to the willingness of both sides, for promoting friendship and amity between Iran and these states. For such efforts to have any chance of success, both Iran and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf region will have to review their attitudes and policies toward each other. The starting point for both sides should be the promotion of sectarian moderation and political pluralism combined with strict adherence to the policy of noninterference in each other's internal affairs. Each country must be allowed to evolve politically at its own pace and rhythm without being subjected to external pressures or notions of export of revolutionary ideology.

A regional forum should be established in the Persian Gulf region to enable the member states to exchange views on security issues and facilitate peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes. Iran would have to learn to reconcile its Persian and Islamic identities in dealing with its Arab neighbors who would resist strongly any attempt on its part to dominate the region as is quite clear from the recent crisis in Yemen. The Pakistan government has rightly taken the decision to stand by Saudi Arabia in the defense of its sovereignty and territorial integrity while declining the invitation to intervene militarily in Yemen's internal affairs as part of the Saudi-led coalition and calling for a political settlement of its internal problems. Islamabad has also expressed its resolve to implement the UN Security Council resolutions on the subject in accordance with its obligations under the UN Charter.

While Iran must resist the temptation to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab states of the Gulf region, these Arab states would have to overcome their internal insecurities by evolving participatory forms of government and promoting economic and social development and egalitarianism. Instead of relying on nonregional powers for their external security, they

would be well-advised to enter into a program of cooperation with Iran, which historically had made its own glorious contribution to the Islamic civilization, for strengthening regional security.

NOTES

1. Mujtaba Rizvi, *The Frontiers of Pakistan* (Karachi: National Publishing House Ltd., 1971), p. 203.
2. This chapter is based mostly on the author's personal experiences as the Pakistan ambassador to Iran (1997–2003) and as a Pakistani diplomat from 1967 to 2004. Where required, other sources of information have been quoted.
3. For background information on Pakistan-Iran relations, see Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000); S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Jay Friedel, "Iran-Pakistan Relations" [blog post], *Jafriedel*, 11 September 2013, at <https://jafriedel.wordpress.com/2013/09/11/iran-pakistan-relations>.
4. For a concise description of the factors that led to the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, see Sandra Mackey, *The Iranians—Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation* (New York: Plume, 1998), especially Chaps. 8, 9, 10, and 11. In brief, the revolution symbolized the revolt of the people of Iran against despotism, excessive "Westernization" ("Gharbzadegi" in the words of the famous Iranian scholar Jalal Al-e Ahmad) as against Islam and the Iranian culture, intrusive Western, especially American, influence over Iran's internal affairs hurting Iranian nationalist sensitivities, and extreme inequalities of income and wealth under Muhammad Reza Shah's rule.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 293–300.
6. *Ibid.* (See Chap. 12), pp. 301–333.
7. *Ibid.* (See Chap. 11), pp. 286–293. Also see Michael Axworthy, *A History of Iran* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), pp. 243–267. For a discussion of ideological trends in Iran, see Mehdi Noorbaksh, "Religion, Politics, and Ideological Trends in Contemporary Iran," in *Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability*, ed. Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (New York: I.B. Taurius, 1997).
8. "Text of President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address," *Washington Post*, 29 January 2002, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm>.
9. Javid Husain, "Iran: An Estranged Friend," *The Dawn*, 26 March 2007, at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1069954>. Re-used with the permission of *The Dawn*.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*

12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Javid Husain, "Nawaz Sharif's Visit to Iran", *The Nation*, 13 May 2014, at <http://nation.com.pk/columns/13-May-2014/nawaz-sharif-s-visit-to-iran> and APP, "US Creating Pakistan-Iran Fift: Khamenei," *The Nation*, 13 May 2014, at <http://nation.com.pk/national/13-May-2014/us-creating-pakistan-iran-rift-khamenei>.
15. Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, 20 January 2015, as cited by "Full Text: President Obama's 2015 State of the Union Address," *Forbes*, 20 January 2015, at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2015/01/20/full-text-president-obamas-2015-state-of-the-union-address>.
16. Mubarak Zeb Khan, "Pakistan, Iran Eye Trade at \$5 Billion," *The Dawn*, 23 April 2015, at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1177635>.
17. Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Iran Wants Expanded Relations with Pakistan: Zarif," *The Dawn*, 14 August 2015, at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1200373>.

Islamophobia and the West

Since the advent of Islam over 1400 years ago, there has been intense interaction between the Muslims and the Christians in various forms. Historically speaking, there have been wars as well as periods of peace between the Muslim world and Christianity. The rise of Islam saw the expansion of the Muslim rule in many areas that were previously governed by the Christians. The tide turned against the Muslim world with the Renaissance and the scientific and industrial revolution in the West, which was followed by the expansion of colonial rule in many of the Muslim countries. The interaction between the followers of these two great religions, however, was not limited to wars and political struggles. It also took the form of cultural interaction in which each community influenced and learned from the other. The role played by the long Muslim rule in Spain as a bridge between the two cultures is well-known. The two sides also engaged each other extensively in trade and other economic pursuits.

It was inevitable that the prolonged periods of war and armed conflicts spanning over several centuries would create misunderstandings between the Muslims and the Christians. Unfortunately, some of those misunderstandings about Islam continue to influence even in modern times the thinking of the politicians, scholars, and the people at large in the West who, by and large, are adherents of the Greco-Roman-Christian civilization. It is important to understand those misunderstandings, particularly as they affect the mindset and policies of the West in dealing with the Muslims and the Muslim countries. Pakistan, being a country with

Muslim majority, must carry out a dispassionate analysis of the perceptions of the West about Islam and the Muslims to understand their impact on its attitudes and policies in its dealings with the world of Islam. This is all the more important since the policies of the West play a preponderant role in determining the contours of the prevailing global security environment within which Pakistan must learn to safeguard its national interests. This chapter is a modest attempt to carry out such an analysis. But before we do so, it is necessary to outline the salient features of Islam.

ISLAM AS A RELIGION OF PEACE, MODERATION, ENLIGHTENMENT, AND PROGRESS

Islam, which means submission to the Will of Allah as revealed in the Holy Quran and as preached and practiced by Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him!), is a religion of peace, moderation, and tolerance. It enjoins its followers to practice the principles of social equality and human brotherhood in their dealings with one another and with non-Muslims. It teaches the Muslims to value human life. Contrary to the misperception in the minds of many in the West about the concept of *jihad*, Islam does not permit wars of aggression. It requires its followers to take up arms only in self-defense.

Jihad means struggling in the way of Allah for a noble cause. It does include fighting in self-defense if that becomes necessary, but is not limited to it. One can wage jihad also through speech and the use of pen. The comprehensive nature of jihad is illustrated by a famous saying of the Prophet of Islam that to speak the word of justice in front of an oppressive ruler is the best form of jihad. There are numerous other sayings of Prophet Muhammad that assign high value to the use of the pen in propagating the righteous path or the message of Islam.

Islam strictly forbids the use of force in spreading the message of Islam. The Quran categorically rules out compulsion in matters of faith. Therefore, as far as the teachings of the Quran and Prophet Muhammad are concerned, spreading Islam through wars is totally forbidden. Not only that, Islam also lays down that people belonging to other beliefs and faiths must be fairly treated and must enjoy religious freedom, that is to say, they must be allowed to practice their religious rituals and follow their religious beliefs in total freedom.

In view of the sanctity attached to human life in Islam, terrorism or the use of indiscriminate force against innocent civilians or noncombatants is

in sheer violation of its fundamental teachings and its message of peace. It is true that several Islamic radical groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS have resorted to terrorist acts. But there is consensus among the Muslim scholars that their activities amount to a clear violation of the teachings of Islam and have resulted in tarnishing its fair image. In short, terrorism is totally proscribed in Islam, which enjoins its followers, even in the case of a war, not to hurt in any way the old, women, children, and noncombatants.

Islam rules out discrimination on the basis of race, color, or tribal and family connections. It lays down categorically that one's stature in society should be judged by one's character and conduct rather than the accident of birth. There is no bar to vertical mobility in a Muslim society. It urges fair treatment to women who were subjected to all sorts of injustices in olden times at the advent of Islam. It gave them the right of inheritance 1400 years ago, whereas this right was granted to women in the West much more recently.

As far as the form of government is concerned, the Quran laid down the foundation of a participatory or democratic form of government by requiring 1400 years ago that governmental affairs should be conducted through consultation. However, it left the precise form of government to be practiced in a Muslim society at a particular time in history to the discretion of the Muslims as long as the principle of consultation was duly implemented in running governmental affairs. A democratic form of government in modern times, therefore, is totally in accordance with the spirit and teachings of Islam. Islam also lays down a great deal of emphasis on the rule of law and the provision of justice in an Islamic state. Equality before law is one of the fundamental principles of an Islamic form of government. Finally, social and economic justice is an essential element for the organization of an Islamic state.

Islam was a revolutionary religion that discarded prejudices and practices based on ignorance and injustice, and instead introduced progressive ideals of social justice and human brotherhood for the organization of the society. It called upon its followers to use reason and study nature, thus laying the foundation of modern science. It urged its followers to seek knowledge in the interest of intellectual enlightenment and progress. A famous saying of Prophet Muhammad enjoins the Muslims to go as far as China if necessary in search of knowledge.

Thus, Islamic teachings are fully compatible with the requirements of the modern knowledge-based world. Far from discouraging its followers from learning modern sciences and technologies, it encourages them to

seek knowledge wherever it is available. From the political point of view, it is in favor of participatory or democratic forms of government. It is liberal in its outlook in terms of the treatment of religious or other minorities and women. It encourages moderation and tolerance in dealing with the challenges of life and in the treatment of people belonging to different faiths and beliefs. It, therefore, supports social and political pluralism. Its emphasis on social and economic justice and on a welfare state is similar to the modern thinking on the obligations of a state. Its emphasis on *Ijtihad* or the principle of evolution in Islamic jurisprudence highlights its dynamic and progressive nature. Looked at in this way, Islam is quite capable of providing answers to the challenges of the modern times. It will now depend on the dynamism of the Muslims and the vitality of the Islamic civilization in coming to grips with these challenges whether or not they are able to rise up to the occasion.

REFERENCES FROM THE HOLY QURAN AND THE LIFE OF PROPHET MUHAMMAD

There are numerous references in the Quran and from the sayings and life of Prophet Muhammad that substantiate the essential features of Islam as given above. A few examples would suffice to prove this point. The Quran says, “You are indeed the best community that has ever been brought forth for (the good of) mankind: you enjoy the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong, and you believe in God.”¹ The focus of Islam, therefore, is on the welfare and betterment of mankind.

Islam also lays the utmost emphasis on the sanctity of life. The Quran clearly says, “Nor take life—which God has made sacred—except for just cause.” At another place, the Quran ordains, “If anyone slays a human being—unless it be (in punishment) for murder or for spreading corruption on earth—it shall be as though he had slain all mankind; whereas, if anyone saves a life, it shall be as though he had saved the lives of all mankind.”²

In another verse of the Quran it is stated, “Verily, those who have attained to faith (in this divine writ), as well as those who follow the Jewish faith, and the Christians, and the Sabians—all who believe in God, and the Last Day and do righteous deeds—shall have their reward with their Sustainer; and no fear need they have, and neither shall they grieve.”³ Muhammad Asad in his commentary on the Holy Quran points out, “With a breadth of vision unparalleled in any other religious faith, the idea

of 'salvation' is here made conditional upon three elements only: belief in God, belief in the Day of Judgment, and the righteous action in life."⁴

The Quran categorically rejects coercion in matters of faith.⁵ So any attempt to forcibly convert nonbelievers is prohibited in Islam. In another verse, wars of aggression are prohibited while wars are permitted only in self-defense.⁶ Abdallah Yousuf Ali in his commentary on verse 20 in Surah Tauba in the Quran writes, "Here is a good description of *Jihad*. It may require fighting in God's cause, as a form of self-sacrifice. But its essence consists in (1) a true and sincere Faith, which so fixes its gaze on God that all selfish or worldly motives seem paltry and fade away, and (2) an earnest and ceaseless activity involving the sacrifice (if need be) of life, person, or property, in the service of God. Mere brutal fighting is opposed to the whole spirit of *Jihad*, while the sincere scholar's pen or preacher's voice or wealthy man's contributions may be the most valuable forms of *Jihad*."⁷

The Quran in verse 143 in Surah Al-Baqarah enjoins moderation: "And thus have We willed you to be a community of the middle way so that (with your lives) you might bear witness to the truth before all mankind, and that the Apostle might bear witness to it before you."⁸ Muhammad Asad in his commentary on this verse elaborates the concept of the community of the middle way as follows:

[A] community that keeps an equitable balance between extremes and is realistic in its appreciation of man's nature and possibilities, rejecting both licentiousness and exaggerated asceticism. In tune with its oft-repeated call to moderation in every aspect of life, the Quran exhorts the believers not to place too great an emphasis on the physical and material aspects of their lives, but postulates, at the same time, that man's urges and desires relating to this life of flesh are God-willed and, therefore, legitimate. On further analysis, the expression 'a community of the middle way' might be said to summarize, as it were, the Islamic attitude towards the problem of man's existence as such: a denial of the view that there is an inherent conflict between the spirit and the flesh, and a bold affirmation of the natural, God-willed unity in this twofold aspect of human life. This balanced attitude, peculiar to Islam, flows directly from the concept of God's oneness and, hence, of the unity of purpose underlying all His creations.⁹

Besides ordaining that there shall be no coercion in matters of faith, Islam teaches tolerance and fair treatment to the followers of different faiths and beliefs. The life of Prophet Muhammad is full of instances in which he practiced the principle of tolerance and fair treatment in dealing with

the followers of other religions. Syed Ameer Ali notes that “the Prophet granted to the monks of the monastery of St. Catherine, near Mount Sinai, and to all Christians, a Charter which has been justly designated as one of the noblest monuments of enlightened tolerance that the history of the world can produce.”¹⁰ Displaying a remarkable breadth of view and tolerance of spirit, this document allowed the Christians and their monks to practice their faith in total freedom. They and their churches were to be fully protected. The Christians were not to be unfairly taxed or to be forced to change their religion.

Prophet Muhammad in his Covenant with the Christians of Najran in the southern Arabian peninsula gave them guarantees of protection of lives and property as well as of religious freedom. Their rights and privileges were not to be changed to their detriment in any way. Their priests were to continue to enjoy all the facilities and privileges that they had benefited from in the past.¹¹

The Prophet of Islam would often say, “The ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr”; and repeatedly impress on his disciples the necessity of seeking knowledge “even unto China.”¹² There are numerous verses in the Quran inviting mankind to study nature and its laws, which carry the “signs” of God and provide a route to understanding the Creator. In one verse, God advises man to “Go all over the earth and behold how (wondrously) He has created (man) in the first instance and thus, too, will God bring into being your second life—for, verily, God has the power to will anything.”¹³ According to another verse, “Verily, in the creation of the heavens and the earth, and in the succession of night and day, there are indeed messages (signs) for all who are endowed with insight.”¹⁴

It was because of this emphasis on education and acquisition of knowledge that the Islamic civilization at its peak produced great scientists, mathematicians, astronomers, architects, medical doctors, and scholars in various fields, who made valuable contributions to the advancement of knowledge. Baghdad, Cairo, and Spain during the Muslim rule became great centers of learning. Great Muslim scientists and scholars such as Ibn Sina, al-Razi, Al-Farabi, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Khaldun, Al-Bayruni, Ibn al-Haytham, Al-Khwarzimi, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, and Ibn al-Nafis have left their mark in different branches of knowledge.¹⁵ The limited space of this chapter does not allow an exhaustive discussion of the decline of the Islamic civilization as the European civilization took off after the Renaissance. In brief, however, it can be stated that the main causes for the

decline of the Islamic civilization were the loss of interest in intellectual enquiry and acquisition of knowledge, and the abdication of the principle of Ijtihad or evolution in the Islamic civilization, which robbed it of the element of dynamism and condemned it to stagnation.

As for the organization of the state, the Quran lays down the principle of consultation in running the affairs of the state: “—and whose rule (in all matters of common concern) is consultation among themselves.”¹⁶ Most modern Muslim scholars have expressed the view that this verse ordains that the Executive and the Legislature in an Islamic state should come into existence through direct or indirect elections. The state would be based on the rule of law; that is, decisions would be taken in accordance with laws, and citizens would be equal in the eyes of law. There is a famous saying of Prophet Muhammad that even if his most favorite daughter Fatimah committed a crime, she would be dealt with in accordance with law. The purpose of an Islamic state would be to establish a just system in which the citizens would be assured of the security of life and property, freedom of religion and association, and social and economic welfare.¹⁷

MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT ISLAM IN THE WEST

There is no doubt that, historically speaking, Muslims, barring the rule of the four “rightly guided” Caliphs, have generally failed to live up fully to the high ideals of Islam. Still, in the early centuries after the advent of Islam, there were revolutionary changes in the way the society was organized and the state functioned under the Muslim rule as compared with the preceding times. Consequently, countries under the Muslim rule witnessed internal peace, flourishing trade, and phenomenal economic progress. Muslim rulers encouraged and supported the growth of knowledge and patronized scholars and scientists. Baghdad, Cairo, Samarqand, Bokhara, and Cordova became great centers of learning where scholars from all over the world flocked. There was increased emphasis on social and economic welfare under the Muslim rule in different parts of the world. The rights of minorities were duly protected. For instance, Jews enjoyed greater protection under the Muslim rule in Spain than under the subsequent Christian rule after the fall of Granada in 1492. Barring some interruptions such as the Mongol invasion of the Muslim world in the thirteenth century, Islam reigned supreme in the Middle East, Persia, Central Asia, India, North Africa, and a large part of the Eastern Europe till the end of the seventeenth century. During roughly the period from

the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, three great Muslim empires, that is, the Safavid Empire, the Moghul Empire, and the Ottoman Empire, maintained the Muslim rule in these vast areas.¹⁸

During the eighteenth century, all of these three Muslim Empires were in a state of decline as the Western European states buoyed by the advancement of knowledge, discovery of new lands and trade routes, scientific and technological progress, and new inventions were on the trajectory of rapid progress. They would soon overtake and far surpass the Muslims in different branches of knowledge and in the various spheres of life. The age of Europe began as the Muslim decline set in leading to the subjugation of the Muslim lands by the European colonial powers. By the second half of the nineteenth century, Europe and other Western powers were virtually ruling the world.

Several factors played a role in bringing about the decline of the Muslims. Perhaps the most important of them was the loss of the spirit of intellectual enquiry and dynamism leading to the stagnation and decline of the Islamic civilization. The Muslim mind, after the glorious age of the Islamic civilization was over, was under the influence of out of date concepts and views that had no relevance to the challenges of the emerging modern world where the advancement of science and technology played the dominant role both within the nations and in the international arena. Contrary to the teachings of Islam, which laid emphasis on consultations in running the affairs of state and on social equality in organizing the society, Muslim rulers became absolute monarchs interested only in their personal or dynastic interests rather the progress and welfare of their subjects. Instead of encouraging egalitarianism, Muslim societies became stratified into classes, thus losing internal social cohesion. Political divisions rather than solidarity became the hallmark of Muslim countries. It was inevitable that these declining and decadent Muslim states, when confronted with the dynamism and technological strength of the Western countries, would collapse. This is precisely what happened in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.¹⁹

The rapid collapse of the Muslim states and their backwardness generated several misperceptions about Islam in the popular mind in the West. Due to the backwardness of the Muslim societies in terms of science and technology when they came into contact with the fast-developing Western countries, Islam became synonymous with ignorance and lack of enlightenment despite its emphasis on learning and gaining knowledge and despite its glorious past. The lack of economic progress and intellectual stagnation

in the Muslim countries led to the conclusion that Islam somehow was against development and modernity. The arbitrary way in which Muslim rulers in these countries governed their subjects created the misperception that the rule of law had no place in Islam. The absolutism of these rulers resulted in the impression that Islam and democracy were incompatible. Contrary to the stress in Islam on the protection of minorities and political pluralism, Islam became associated with extremism and religious bigotry in the Western view. Muslims were and are viewed as prone to violence despite the fact that Islam places so much emphasis on peace and wars only in self-defense. Admittedly, the rise of Islamic extremism and militancy in the form of Al Qaeda and ISIS has worsened these misperceptions and aggravated Islamophobia in the West.

Even some Western scholars have come under the influence of such misperceptions about Islam. Let us see what Samuel Huntington had to say about Islam: “First, the argument is made that Islam has from the start been a religion of sword and that it glorifies military virtues.... The Koran and other statements of Muslim beliefs contain few prohibitions on violence, and a concept of nonviolence is absent from Muslim doctrine and practice.”²⁰ As mentioned earlier, this conclusion is at variance with the essential teachings of Islam.

Huntington also claims, in disregard of the injunctions of the Quran and the practice of Prophet Muhammad referred to above, and the past history when Muslims, Christians, and Jews lived peacefully together under the Muslim rule, that Muslims have problems with non-Muslim minorities.²¹ He clearly implies that social and political pluralism and Islam do not go together.

At another place, Huntington stresses that there has been deep-seated antagonism between Islam and Christianity since the advent of the former. To prove his point, he quotes John Esposito who stressed that historically speaking, Islam and Christianity had been at times locked in deadly combat for power, land, and souls.²² Huntington goes on to stress that the causes of the conflict between the two civilizations lay in their very nature and fundamental beliefs.²³

Huntington approvingly quotes Barry Buzan who takes note of the emerging “societal cold war” between Islam and the West as follows: “This development is partly to do with secular versus religious values, partly to do with the historical rivalry between Christendom and Islam, partly to do with jealousy of the Western power, partly to do with resentments over Western domination of the postcolonial political structuring of the Middle

East, and partly to do with the bitterness and humiliation of the invidious comparison between the accomplishments of Islamic and Western civilizations in the last two centuries.”²⁴

Bernard Lewis was perhaps the first Western scholar to popularize the term “clash of civilizations.” He wrote in his widely quoted article “The Roots of Muslim Rage” that “It should now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—that perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.”²⁵

Emran Qureshi and Michael Sells, in an excellent analysis of the alleged antagonism between Islam and the West, question the basic premises of the theory of clash of civilizations that in essence there is antipathy between Islam and the core values of the West and that Islam is inherently violent in character.²⁶ They further warn of the danger of the theory of clash of civilizations, which holds that no peace is possible between Islam and the West, turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy.²⁷ They go on to assert that the claim of a clash of civilizations has grave consequences. According to them, even though the hypothesis is mistaken, it is influencing the mindset of extremists on both sides, who find in it a vindication of their bigotry and intolerance toward the other civilization.²⁸

ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE WEST

Based on his assessment of an inherent clash between Islam and the West, Huntington recommended that the West should cooperate with those civilizations that were less inimical to it. But it should treat Islam as an enemy because of its inherently hostile character. It should (a) “limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states,” (b) “exploit the differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states,” and (c) “maintain economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to other civilizations.”²⁹ A similar advice was given by him in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*.³⁰

In reality, the claim that Christianity/West and Islam are mutually incompatible and that there is an inherent clash between them is based on flawed analysis. To begin with, the misperceptions about Islam in the West are baseless as explained at the beginning of this chapter. Islam in essence teaches moderation and tolerance in dealings with the followers of other

religions, especially Christians and Jews. Historically speaking, Christians and Jews lived in peace and security under the Muslim rule at the various times in history and in different countries. Perhaps the best example to support this claim is the conditions of peace and security under which Jews and Christians lived in Spain under the Muslim rule. Further, contrary to the prevailing misperception in the West, Islam as a religion of peace authorizes war only in self-defense. It is wrong to suggest, therefore, that Islam encourages or supports violence or wars of aggression. The emphasis in Islam on acquisition of knowledge and the principle of Ijtihad or evolution in Islamic jurisprudence highlight its progressive and enlightening character. Further, the principles of consultation in public affairs and rule of law in Islam are quite compatible with Western democratic institutions and practices.

The proponents of Islamophobia in the West have also been guilty of other gross factual inaccuracies. For instance, it is historically incorrect to claim that post-Enlightenment Christian civilization is less violent than Islamic civilization. Emran Qureshi and Michael Sells point out, “Among the children of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment Christianity, however, are the colonial conquest and enslavement of much of the world, two world wars, a nuclear arms race that brought the world to the brink of destruction, massive environmental damage, and the Holocaust.”³¹ To complete the picture, one can add to the preceding list the crusades, the Inquisition following the defeat of the Muslims in Spain, the European wars up to the nineteenth century, the war in Vietnam, the bloody war by France in Algeria to maintain its colonial rule, the genocide committed by the Croats and the Serbs against Bosnian Muslims from 1992 to 1995, the US-led invasions of Iraq in 2003, and of Afghanistan in 2001. This is not to deny that Muslim rulers also waged wars among themselves and against non-Muslims, but to stress that both Christians and Muslims were equally guilty of fighting wars for political, security, and economic considerations, many a time in violation of the principles of Christianity and Islam, respectively. Neither side can claim moral superiority over the other as being nonviolent.

Taking note of the European reluctance to admit Turkey into the European Union (EU), Mastnak remarks, “Although European politicians have been arguing for a multicultural Europe since the Nazis, men who run European political business in our own times are perfectly clear that this multiculturalism is for Europeans’ consumption only. Turkey, one of them explained, cannot be regarded as a candidate for becoming an EU

member because ‘we are creating a European Union. This is a European project.’”³² In a conversation with me several years ago, a senior Turkish diplomat opined that, because of the foregoing reasons, Turkey would never be admitted into the EU.

It is not a secret that Britain and France under Prime Minister Major and President Mitterrand, respectively, felt open contempt and animus toward the Bosnian Muslims who were subjected to genocide by the Serbs. As narrated by Mujeeb R. Khan in his essay “Islamic and Western Worlds,” a French diplomat told John Newhouse of *The New Yorker* at the time that the Europeans “want to prevent a wider war or the emergence of a rump Muslim state in southeastern Europe.... Our interests are much closer to the Serbs than you think. We worry more about the Muslims than about the Serbs.”³³

The anti-Islam bias is vividly reflected in Samuel P. Huntington’s thesis of clash of civilizations mentioned earlier. Huntington stresses that

The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the US Department of Defense. It is the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world. These are the basic ingredients that fuel the conflict between Islam and the West.³⁴

He goes on to claim that Muslim bellicosity and violence are “undeniable late-twentieth-century facts which neither Muslims nor non-Muslims can deny.”³⁵ This assertion coming from the representative of a civilization that in the span of a century spawned two World Wars, perhaps the two most destructive wars in human history, besides numerous other wars on a smaller scale and innumerable acts of violence and atrocities against other peoples struggling for liberation from the colonial yoke, is amazing to say the least.

President Obama told a high-profile National Prayer Breakfast on 5 February 2015 that violence rooted in religion was not exclusive to Islam, but has been carried out by Christians as well. He pointed out, “Unless we get on our high horse and think this unique to some other place, remember that during the Crusades and the Inquisition, people committed terrible crimes in the name of Christ.” Obama, at the same time, also condemned ISIS for betraying Islam.³⁶ As if to prove that violence was not unique to

any single religious community, Craig Stephen Hicks, a North Carolina man, shot dead three Muslim students including a married couple in the university town of Chapel Hill on 11 February 2015.

There is also plenty of empirical evidence to show that Muslims aren't more violent than non-Muslims and that the overwhelming majority of Muslims believe terrorism to be an abomination.³⁷ According to FBI data compiled by Princeton University's Loon Watch, Islamist extremists were responsible for just 6% of terrorist attacks between 1980 and 2005—falling behind Latino groups, extreme left-wing groups, and Jewish extremists.³⁸ Charles Kurzman, a sociology professor at the University of North Carolina, in a report stated that the USA suffered approximately 14,000 murders in 2014 out of which seven were caused by four terrorism-related incidents involving Muslim Americans. According to him, since 9/11 till the end of 2014 Muslim American terrorism had claimed 50 lives in the USA, out of more than 200,000 murders during this period.³⁹

President Obama, while addressing the White House Summit on “Countering Violent Extremism” on 19 February 2015, emphasized that military action and law enforcement alone could not defeat terrorism. He reiterated his stance that Islam was not the cause of terrorism and that extremists did not represent Islam. He rejected the notion that the West generally was at war with Islam. He also called upon the international community to address the grievances that terrorists exploited including economic and political issues. However, many Republican lawmakers and media representatives criticized Obama for “going out of his way to please Muslims.”⁴⁰

NEED FOR MODERATION, MUTUAL TOLERANCE AND DIALOGUE

The response of the Islamic world to such provocations as the printing of offensive cartoons about Prophet Muhammad has to be a measured one keeping in view the principles of peace, moderation, and tolerance enjoined by Islam and the teachings and life of the Prophet of Islam. The Muslims, of course, have the right to protest and demonstrate peacefully against the provocative cartoons to make known their views. However, the teachings of Islam do not allow them individually to take the law in their own hand, or indulge in the destruction of property and attacks on innocent individuals. The governments of Muslim countries should censure such activities as the printing of provocative cartoons with sobriety and convey their views on the issue peacefully to the international community in an

effective manner. This can be done by them individually in interaction with the countries concerned and collectively in multilateral institutions.

In dealing with issues of interfaith relations, both the West and the Islamic world must act responsibly in the interest of international peace and understanding while avoiding extremism and bigotry, if the thesis of clash of civilizations does not have to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Both sides need to recognize that they have their share of extremists who must not be allowed to dictate the international agenda or the rules of interstate behavior. It is the duty of moderate and enlightened elements both in the West and the Islamic world to work for the promotion of interfaith harmony through dialogue. The West, being the stronger side currently, should, in particular, take steps in political, security, and economic fields to remove the legitimate grievances of the Muslims. A just settlement of the Palestinian issue must be a part of these steps. Terrorism should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization, or ethnic group. Further, any manifestation of religious-based discrimination must be avoided.

In general, the Islamic world needs to evolve within the framework of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) a carefully balanced strategy avoiding the extremes of confrontation and capitulation in the face of Islamophobia of the West. The Muslims must project Islam as a religion of peace, tolerance, moderation, and enlightenment as indeed it is while standing firm on principles and safeguarding their enlightened interests. But this would require the revamping of the Muslim societies to put them on the path to progress instead of stagnation, enlightenment instead of obscurantism, and the exercise of their intellectual faculties in finding solutions to the challenges of the modern world instead of closing the doors of Ijtihad. This, however, will not be possible if the Muslims continue to accord low priority to education in this knowledge-based world and if their political institutions, instead of being representative in character and responsive to the wishes of their people at large, continue to serve the vested interests of the elite few only. The need of the hour is a radical reform of the Islamic civilization to enable it to come to grips with the challenges of modernity on the basis of the progressive and enlightening teachings of Islam.

NOTES

1. *The Quran*, Surah Al-i-Imran, verse 110.
2. *The Quran*, Surah Al-Isra, verse 33 and Surah Al-Ma'idah, verse 32.
3. *Ibid.*, Surah Al Baqarah, verse 62.

4. Muhammad Asad, *The Message of the Qu'ran* (London: Book Foundation, 2003), p. 14.
5. *The Quran* in Surah Al Baqarah, verse 256, categorically declares that "There Shall Be No Coercion in Matters of Faith."
6. *The Quran*, Surah Al Baqarah, verse 190, ordains, "And Fight in God's Cause Against Those Who Wage War Against You, But Do Not Commit Aggression—For Verily, God Does Not Love Aggressors."
7. Abullah Yusuf Ali, trans., *The Glorious Quran* (Lahore, India: Sh. Muhammad Ashaf Publishers, 1934), note 1270, p. 444.
8. Asad, *The Message of Quran*, p. 30.
9. *Ibid.*, note 118, p. 30.
10. Syed Ameer Ali, *The Spirit of Islam* (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2003), pp. 84–85.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 361.
13. Asad, *The Message of the Quran*, Surah Al-Ankabut, verse 20, p. 609.
14. *Ibid.*, Surah Al-i-Imran, verse 190, p. 97.
15. For a detailed description of the valuable contributions made by Muslim scientists and scholars to the advancement of knowledge prior to Renaissance in Europe, see Ameer Ali, *The Spirit of Islam*, especially chapters IX and X; N.A. Baloch, *Great Books of Islamic Civilization* (New Delhi, India: Kitab Bhavan, 1997); and Jalaluddin Khilji, ed., *Muslim Celebrities of Central Asia* (Peshawar: University of Peshawar, Area Study Centre for Central Asia, 1989).
16. Asad, *The Message of the Quran*, Surah Ash-Shura, verse 38, p. 746.
17. *Ibid.*, Surah An-Nisa, verse 58 (*whenever you judge between people, do it with justice*), p. 115; Surah Adh-Dhariyat, verse 19 (*and in their wealth and possessions, there is the right of the needy and those suffering privation*), p. 803. There is a great deal of emphasis in the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet on *Zakat* to be collected by the state for social and economic welfare, and on charity.
18. For a short history of Islam, see Karen Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History* (New York: Modern Library, 2000). Also see Reza Aslan, *No God but God: The Origins, Evolution and Future of Islam* (New York: Random House, 2005).
19. For a detailed discussion of the challenges faced by the Islamic Civilization currently, see Ali A. Allawi, *The Crisis of Islamic Civilization* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).
20. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), p. 263.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 264.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

23. Ibid., p. 210.
24. Ibid., p. 212. The quotation is from Barry Buzan, “New Patterns,” *International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (1991): pp. 448–449.
25. Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified,” *Atlantic Monthly*, September 1990.
26. Emran Qureshi and Michael Sells, eds., *The New Crusades—Constructing the Muslim Enemy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 2.
27. Ibid., p. 2.
28. Ibid., pp. 2–3.
29. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993 issue, p. 49.
30. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996), p. 312.
31. Qureshi and Sells, *The New Crusades*, p. 7.
32. Ibid., pp. 230–231.
33. Ibid., p. 191.
34. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996), pp. 217–218.
35. Ibid., p. 258.
36. “Obama Blasts Extremists Who Seek to ‘Hijack Religion,’” *The Nation*, 6 February 2015, at <http://nation.com.pk/national/06-Feb-2015/obama-blasts-extremists-who-seek-to-hijack-religion>.
37. Mohammad Elmasry, “Chapel Hill Shooting and Western Media Bigotry,” *The Nation*, 13 February 2015, at <http://nation.com.pk/international/13-Feb-2015/chapel-hill-shooting-and-western-media-bigotry>.
38. Beenish Ahmed, “Less Than 2 Percent of Terrorist Attacks in the E.U. Are Religiously Motivated,” *ThinkProgress*, 8 January 2015, at <http://think-progression.org/world/2015/01/08/3609796/islamist-terrorism-europe/>.
39. Kurzman, Charles. “Muslim-American terrorism,” *Charles Kurzman*, February 9, 2015, at <http://kurzman.unc.edu/muslim-american-terrorism>.
40. Anwar Iqbal, “Obama Calls for Addressing Grievances that Terrorists Exploit,” *The Dawn*, 20 February 2015, at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1164742>.

Evaluation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy

Pakistan was born in extremely difficult circumstances faced as it was with the traumatic experience of the Partition of the Indian subcontinent and the burden of looking after millions of refugees from a hostile India.¹ This was over and above the urgent task of setting up and running the administrative machinery of the central government of a new country with virtually nonexistent financial and administrative resources. These were not easy tasks for the country's political leadership, which in general lacked the necessary experience for coming to grips with the huge and unprecedented demands of the times. The unjust provisions of the Radcliffe Award, which by giving Gurdaspur to India laid the foundation of the Kashmir dispute, aggravated Pakistan's security problems.² Pakistan was thus faced with a very difficult and hostile security environment as it started its journey as an independent country. Its foreign policy makers had to contend with difficult choices in safeguarding Pakistan's independence, security, territorial integrity, and economic well-being. The question that needs to be examined carefully is whether and to what extent Pakistan's leadership succeeded in making the right choices in handling crucial foreign policy issues.

In examining this question, an analytical approach rather than a purely descriptive presentation of Pakistan's foreign policy in chronological order, on which several books are already available, would be more advisable in understanding both its achievements and failures in securing the country's national interests. Such an analytical approach would also be useful in drawing lessons for the guidance of its leaders and practitioners of the art of

foreign policy in handling future challenges. In pursuance of this approach, we must deal with a number of crucial issues. To start with, we must have a clear understanding of Pakistan's national interests and their implications. Second, we must have a set of criteria by which to judge its foreign policy. In other words, we must know the characteristics or the tests of a sound foreign policy. Third, based on the foregoing, we must examine the historical record to evaluate the actual performance of our foreign policy.

PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL INTERESTS

Like other countries, Pakistan's national interests include the safeguarding of the country's independence and territorial integrity, maintenance of a high rate of economic growth and development, and the strengthening of internal political stability and harmony. To these must be added the safeguarding of the nation's cultural identity and values, especially because of the ideological character of the state. In the case of Pakistan, each of these elements has special characteristics whose implications must be fully comprehended before one can proceed further.

Pakistan came into existence amid a peculiar set of circumstances that made the safeguarding of the country's independence and territorial integrity a particularly challenging task. The leadership of the Indian National Congress under the force of the Muslim demand for a separate homeland grudgingly accepted the partition of the British India, but only in the hope that at some indeterminate time in the future, Pakistan would rejoin India as part of a federation or a confederation. Jaswant Singh, India's former foreign minister, considers the Partition and the creation of Pakistan as a blow to India's security.³ Nehru, India's first prime minister, in response to a letter from the Nawab of Bhopal questioning the partitioning of the British India, wrote on 9 July 1948, "Ultimately, I have no doubt that India and Pakistan will come close together...some kind of federal link.... There is no other way to peace. The alternatives...war."⁴ According to Jaswant Singh, Nehru's comments identify both "the challenge to (India's) security that the Partition created, and a possible route to peace," clearly implying that whereas Pakistan constituted a security problem for India, a federal link between the two would be the solution of this problem.⁵ One can quote numerous other instances in which Indian leaders have lamented the Partition and expressed the hope that Pakistan would cease to exist as a separate independent and sovereign country and rejoin India as part of a federation.

Pakistan, therefore, had to face a serious threat to its security from a hostile India from the very beginning of its existence. India's hostility reflected itself in several ways soon after the Partition: its reluctance to share cash balances and military stores with Pakistan equitably and expeditiously, the stoppage of the flow of river waters into Pakistan through its control on river headworks located in India, and the trade dispute because of Pakistan's refusal to follow India's decision to devalue its currency.⁶ But above all, this hostility reflected itself in the moves by India to prevent the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan in violation of the recognized principle that princely states would accede to India or Pakistan keeping in view the wishes of the majority of their people. In the case of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the majority was not only Muslim but also keen on acceding to Pakistan. Thus was laid the groundwork for the Kashmir dispute that continues to bedevil Pakistan-India relations and has been the cause of several wars and armed conflicts between them.⁷

Another security challenge, made the worse because of India's hostility, was the division of Pakistan into two parts: West Pakistan, which had the capital and the headquarters of the armed forces and most of the territory, and East Pakistan, with the majority of the population at the time of the Partition. The two parts were separated by a hostile India, making the defense of East Pakistan that much more difficult. India took full advantage of Pakistan's vulnerability because of its division into two parts leading ultimately to the Indian invasion of East Pakistan in 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh. Of course, Pakistan's internal political instability and the mismanagement of the situation in East Pakistan, particularly under the military regime of General Yahya Khan, played no small role in this debacle.⁸

Against the background of the foregoing, India's hegemonic designs in South Asia, to which a reference has been made earlier in Chap. 4, assume even more threatening proportions for Pakistan. In short, Pakistan from the very beginning of its existence was confronted with a very challenging security environment on its eastern front. Its security challenges were aggravated by the irredentist claims of Afghanistan on its western borders in the form of the slogan of Pakhtunistan. It is worth recalling that the Afghan Permanent Representative was the only one to oppose, unsuccessfully, Pakistan's admission into the UN soon after Pakistan came into being.⁹

The serious security threats faced by Pakistan forced it to allocate a high proportion of its resources to the defense sector. This had several unfortunate consequences. Pakistan was destabilized internally because of the heavy weight of the defense sector resulting in repeated military

takeovers. Its economic growth slowed down because the proportion of resources allocated to the task of economic development consequentially had to be lower than what would have been possible in the absence of serious threats to its security. Its dependence on foreign loans and military assistance increased because of the compulsion to borrow to meet the massive demands of the defense sector, provide resources for economic development, and meet the requirements of growing budgetary deficits.

Pakistan's creation owed a lot to the inimitable leadership of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. His demise in 1948 soon after Pakistan's birth as an independent country unfortunately created a vacuum in Pakistan's politics that his successors could not fill. An example was the inordinate delay in the framing of the country's constitution for which primarily the leadership of the Muslim League, particularly Liaquat Ali Khan who as the prime minister held a pivotal position, must be held responsible. These developments and the ineptitude of the political leaders of the new country in general in the management of the affairs of the country laid the foundation for political instability in the country. The result was repeated military takeovers; stunted growth of democratic institutions; a severe blow to the rule of law, which is an indispensable condition for good governance; and a culture of greed and sleaze involving Pakistan's elite including its military establishment, senior echelons of the civilian bureaucracy, and politicians. The slowing down of the growth rate of the economy combined with grinding poverty and increasing inequalities of income and wealth made the situation explosive, further feeding political instability in the country, which has been the lot of the country through most of its history.

Pakistan's emergence and existence as an independent and sovereign country are inextricably linked with its ideological character. The country was founded on the belief that the Muslims because of their distinct beliefs, civilization, and culture constituted a nation separate from the Hindus. They, therefore, deserved a separate homeland where they would be able to lead their lives according to their cultural values. From a practical point of view, this was possible only if the Muslims in areas where they constituted a majority in the subcontinent were allowed to opt for this separate homeland.¹⁰ Pakistan thus came into existence through the democratic process of vote and, unlike Israel, not through war and occupation. It is imperative, therefore, that Pakistan safeguards its ideological character and cultural identity if it wishes to remain an independent and sovereign country capable of taking decisions about its own destiny in accordance with its distinct value system. It has been India's consistent policy to question the need for

the creation of Pakistan and to undermine its separate cultural identity in the hope of weakening Pakistan's internal cohesion and achieving its own objectives of reversing the partition of the British India and establishing its hegemony in South Asia.

There are, unfortunately, some among the so-called liberals in Pakistan who do not consider it important to safeguard Pakistan's ideological character and cultural identity. They tend to ignore the fact that it is the cultural values that define a people and its identity and way of life. Historically speaking, nations have gone to war not only for safeguarding their security but also their cultural values and way of life. Besides geopolitical factors, the ideological divide between capitalism and communism played an important role in the genesis and the conduct of the Cold War. The promotion of democracy, individualism, and the free market system, which define the West, still remains an important guiding principle of the foreign policies of the USA and other Western countries. Thus, it is perfectly legitimate for Pakistan's leadership, policy makers, and the people at large to try to protect their own cultural values and way of life.

Most of the people of Pakistan, who are Muslims, trace their fundamental cultural values to the beliefs and principles of Islam. Hindus, who constitute the majority in India, on the other hand, are culturally defined by the fundamental beliefs of Hinduism. The recent rightward shift in the Indian politics toward the revival of Hindutva or Hindu nationalism under the influence of such parties as RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) and BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) is an important indicator of the future political trends in India. As pointed out earlier in Chap. 4, Islam and Hinduism fundamentally differ from each other in their attitudes and opinions about life and of life. Whereas Islam preaches social equality, economic egalitarianism, and human brotherhood, Hinduism divides the society into castes and classes barring social equality and vertical mobility. The value systems of Islam and Hinduism, therefore, are the antithesis of each other. So there is no justification for the spurious argument that culturally speaking, Pakistan and India are the same despite some superficial cultural similarities here and there.

TESTS OF A SOUND FOREIGN POLICY

How do we judge whether and to what extent Pakistan's policy makers have succeeded in pursuing a foreign policy that served its best national interests? In other words, what are the characteristics or the tests of a sound foreign policy. It is to this question that we must now turn.

To begin with, foreign policy must be synchronized with the national security and economic policies so as to form an integrated whole in the form of the national grand strategy. The role of grand strategy is “to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation...towards the attainment of the political object.”¹¹ A foreign policy that works at cross-purposes with the country’s military and economic policies or is divorced from the domestic political realities can only come to grief. Similarly military strategy, which is “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy” in the words of Liddell Hart,¹² cannot be formulated in a vacuum. It must be worked out taking into account domestic political realities, economic compulsions, and the demands of international politics. As the example of that Kargil misadventure of 1999 by General Pervez Musharraf shows, a military strategy that ignores these factors will produce disastrous results. The nation’s economic policy again must be an integral part of its grand strategy to have any chance of success. It is the job of the political leadership of the country to give a final shape to the grand strategy based on inputs from the relevant organs of the state, both military and civilian.

Second, a sound foreign policy must reflect the relative importance or priorities of the nation’s internal and external objectives that it is expected to support or achieve. If the supreme national objective is economic development, the pursuit of other national objectives must be subordinated to it. Political leaders and policy makers must understand clearly that paying equal attention to all national objectives would spread the national resources so thinly as to lead to a failure in achieving satisfactorily any one of them. It is the job of the leadership to fix the relative priorities of the various national objectives so that the nation’s resources are concentrated on a few well-selected areas leading to the desired breakthrough. China under its paramount leader Deng Xiaoping decided at the end of 1978 to assign the highest priority to the goal of economic development and to subordinate everything else to this supreme goal. China adjusted its internal and external policies to the pursuit of this overarching goal. In the management of external affairs, China adopted a low-risk foreign policy to avoid costly wars. In pursuance of this policy of avoiding costly wars, China entered into border negotiations with the Soviet Union and India to defuse tensions in its relations with them. These moves enabled China to gradually reduce its military expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and enhance the allocation of resources to the task of economic development. The policy of reforms and opening to

the outside world raised the productivity of the Chinese economy. The result was China's astonishingly high rate of economic growth over the next three decades, catapulting it to the position of the second-biggest economy in the world in nominal dollar terms. (For details, see Chap. 3). China having achieved this breakthrough is now in a stronger position to pursue a more ambitious national security and foreign policy agenda than would have been the case if it had continued to fritter away its resources over a wide range of goals.

Third, foreign policy must strike the right balance between the attainment of short-term and long-term national objectives. As a nation must learn to prioritize its goals, it must also have a clear idea about what is attainable in the short term and what is to be aimed at in the long run. Further, it must establish the right balance between the two, which would suit its peculiar internal and external circumstances, support the achievement of its supreme national objective, and fit into the nation's grand strategy. The pursuit of short-term objectives must be dovetailed with the nation's long-term goals so that the former supports the realization of the latter. Pakistan's short-term objectives, therefore, should not be pursued at cross-purposes with the attainment of long-term goals even though in some cases there may be a degree of tension between the two.

It is generally recognized that in the long run it is a nation's economic and technological strength that provides the foundation for its military strength and determines its relative power position in the comity of nations. One cannot build a heavy superstructure of military strength over a weak economic and technological foundation. This point was elaborated by Paul Kennedy in his widely acclaimed book, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, based on extensive historical evidence. Kennedy concluded,

...economic prosperity does not always and immediately translate into military effectiveness, for that depends upon many other factors, from geography and national morale to generalship and tactical competence. Nevertheless, the fact remains that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balances have followed alterations in the productive balances; and further, that rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources.¹³

An economically weak and technologically backward country cannot hope to achieve the Great Power status or even to safeguard its security in the long run in the face of serious threats. The historical experience

shows that in modern times, nations that attained powerful positions in the international community did so by building up their economic and technological strength followed by the strengthening of their military muscle. In the initial phase, when they were in the process of building up their economic strength, they generally followed a low-risk foreign policy and avoided ambitious foreign policy agendas that could have involved them in costly wars. Consequently, they were able to concentrate their resources and attention on the important task of building up their economic strength and thus lay the foundation for increasing their military power. Nations that lost to their competitors the race for economic and technological development gradually weakened militarily also, leading to their overall decline. In recent times, the fate of the Soviet Union provides a telling example of a country that collapsed, despite its vast conventional and nuclear forces and weaponry, primarily because of its economic and technological weakness. On the other hand, the rapid economic growth and technological progress of the USA in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries enabled it to build up its military strength and assume the position of the most powerful nation in the world.

So ideally a country, at the initial stages, must concentrate on building up its economic strength and technical prowess before it goes after the development of its military power and the pursuit of ambitious foreign policy goals. But in this anarchic world where power rather than the rule of law plays the decisive role, it is not always safe to neglect the military sector totally for the sake of strengthening a country economically. The reality is that countries do need a certain minimum level of military power to act as a deterrent against potential aggressors, while strengthening themselves economically and technologically. It is the familiar question of butter versus guns that leaders and policy makers face in all the countries; that is to say, how much of a nation's resources a government should allocate for defense and how much should be directed toward the task of economic and technological development, and social welfare. If a government overprovides for defense, it may strengthen the country's military security in the immediate future but at the grave risk of slowing down its economic growth, enabling its competitors to pull far ahead in the race for economic growth, and endangering its security in the long run. In this scenario, the country winning the economic race in the long run may use its economic strength not only to dominate the losing side economically, but also militarily by using its greater economic and technological resources to build up a formidable military machine. On the other

hand, the country losing the economic race in the long run may find itself increasingly at the mercy of the winning side both economically and militarily, thus exposing itself to a serious threat to its security.

It should be obvious from the foregoing that there is an inherent tension between the requirements of security in the near future, which call for an adequate level of forces and weapons now to deter aggression and safeguard national security, and the demands of long-term security, which call for economic and technological superiority in the interest of safeguarding it. Further, it is not enough for a country to grow economically. It must grow at a higher rate than its opponents and competitors if it wishes to safeguard its long-term national security. Otherwise, as pointed out above, the danger is that as it is left behind in the race for economic development, its opponents would gain an overwhelming advantage both economically and militarily. Therefore, if one errs on the side of overallocation of resources for defense in pursuance of an ambitious foreign policy agenda, one may end up endangering long-term national security by slowing economic and technological advancement. But there is also the danger of compromising the country's security in the immediate future, if one neglects the defense sector providing temptation to potential aggressors. This danger would be increased proportionately if the foreign policy goals of the goals of the country are ambitious or if the country is pursuing a high-risk foreign policy. As a matter of rule, therefore, a country at the initial stages of its development must assign the highest priority to the task of economic growth while pursuing a low-risk foreign policy to reduce the risk of exposure to serious external security threats. Obviously, the exact mix of internal and external policies or the grand strategy of a country would depend upon its peculiar internal and external circumstances.

The tension between the requirements of the short-term and the long-term security is illustrated in Fig. 9.1 (see the next page). The first assumption behind the figure is that as the allocation of resources to the defense is increased, the availability of resources for economic development would decrease, thereby lowering the GDP growth rate. The second assumption is that the long-term security of a country would be adversely affected if its average GDP growth rate falls below that of its opposing power. LL is the curve of credible deterrent at the lowest level of forces and armaments. The country with the national security curve YY is in the comfortable position in which it can match the long-term GDP growth rate of the opposing power while maintaining a credible deterrent at the lowest level of armaments and forces. It would, therefore, be reasonably assured




Fig. 9.1 Short-term vs. long-term security (Source: created by author)

of both its short-term and long-term security, other things remaining the same. The county with a higher productivity level with the national security curve Y2Y2 is in the fortunate position in which it has several viable options. It can match the GDP growth rate of the opposing power and

have a preponderant advantage over its opponent in the level of forces and armaments in the short term. Or it can maintain a credible security deterrent at the lowest level of forces and armaments while achieving a much higher GDP growth rate compared with its opponent, thereby posing a threat to the latter's long-term security. The country with the national security curve $Y1Y1$ is in the unenviable position in which even if it only maintains a credible security deterrent at the lowest level of forces and armaments, it will still fall behind its opponent in the race for economic growth, exposing itself to a grave long-term security threat.

The first conclusion that one can draw from the foregoing discussion is that in the interest of safeguarding a country's short-term and long-term security, its leadership should allocate resources to defense and economic development in such a manner as would deter a potential aggressor in the short term and ensure a faster rate of economic growth and technological progress than its competitors in the long run. The test of leadership lies in striking the right balance between the demands of short-term and long-term security. The second conclusion is that a country should, through economic reforms and better management, aim at moving its national security curve as much outward as possible. For instance, if its current national security curve is YY in Fig. 9.1, it should try to move it toward $Y2Y2$. Third, as pointed out earlier, a country should pursue a low-risk foreign policy and avoid an ambitious foreign policy agenda at the initial stages of its development when it has not yet acquired the required economic and technological strength. The time for ambitious foreign policy goals comes when a nation, having secured economic and technological strength, is also able to acquire and sustain the requisite military power.

Fourth, it is a basic principle of foreign policy that its demands must be within the reach of the resources available to the nation or, in other words, they should be within the reach of the national power. A foreign policy that aims too high is likely to result in strategic overstretch leading to strategic exhaustion. This would not only result in the failure of the country in achieving its foreign policy goals, but may also lead to economic stagnation or decline, political demoralization and instability, social unrest, the distribution of the military resources too thinly over wide-ranging target areas increasing the risk of a military defeat, and even to a national debacle. There are numerous examples in history to substantiate this point. To some extent, the Soviet defeat in the Cold War was the result of strategic overstretch. Germany's defeats in World Wars I and II were the inevitable consequences of the overwhelming strategic superiority of the Allies in economic and military terms after the USA joined forces with them. Japan

lost in World War II after it challenged the USA, because of the latter's overwhelming superiority over it in the economic and military spheres.

Fifth, a foreign policy to be viable must be based on popular support within the country. This requirement has become an essential feature of the statecraft in modern times, especially in democracies where the governments cannot afford to pursue for long a foreign policy that runs counter to or deviates by too wide a margin from popular wishes and expectations. This does not mean that foreign policy must meet the demands of public opinion, which can be volatile more often than not, on a daily basis. Sometimes leaders have to lead the way based on their assessment of all the relevant factors or on their vision of the future, which may be too hazy for an average individual to grasp. In such situations, which can be quite challenging, leaders and policy makers need to sell their policies to the public by explaining their rationale and goals. Still it is hazardous for a leader to be too far ahead of the public opinion in the formulation of foreign policy. On the other hand, a foreign policy maker who is too rigidly bound by public opinion will fail to provide the required vision and leadership to the country in the management of affairs. The statesman, therefore, must neither lose touch with his people nor act as a mere slave of the public opinion. His foreign policy must be carefully crafted to reflect the aspirations of his people while being informed by an inspiring vision of the future.

Sixth, it is axiomatic that the foreign policy of a country must be based on a realistic assessment of the regional and international environment, particularly the way in which it affects its security, political stability, economy, cultural identity, and ideological character or its way of life. While the relevance of the first three elements in any contest between major powers should be self-evident, the importance of safeguarding a nation's cultural identity and ideological character or its way of life also cannot be ignored, as pointed out earlier. By way of example, it has been and remains a matter of considerable importance for the US foreign policy makers to promote their way of life based on adherence to democracy, human liberty, and the freedom of market forces in any contest with other powers. However, coming back to the main point, a foreign policy that does not take into account adequately the regional and international realities will sooner or later come to grief because it is likely to be overwhelmed by the force of events and developments beyond its control. This to varying extents is applicable to all countries, but particularly to small and medium-size ones, which can ignore these realities only at their peril.

But it is not enough just to base the foreign policy on a static analysis of the external realities. The foreign policy must be dynamic in character; that is, it must be continuously adjusted in response to the fast-changing external environment. However, a foreign policy that is merely reacting to external developments would place the country pursuing it at the mercy of events. This would be especially so if the opposing powers knew its likely reaction to different types of developments. They could then organize a series of events to lead the policy makers of the country, who are merely reacting to events, toward a precipice and a national disaster. Ideally, therefore, the foreign policy to the extent possible must be ahead of events. This would be possible only if the policy makers take into account not only the existing external realities but also their likely future trends. Such a policy would be guided by an assessment of long-term future trends to give it a sense of strategic direction and a degree of stability. Within that framework, the policy makers should, when necessary, bring about tactical adjustments to respond to day-to-day developments while maintaining the carefully worked-out strategic direction of policy. This is not to deny that on occasions there may be such momentous developments in the external environment as would necessitate even a strategic review of foreign policy.

Finally, the foreign policy must expand and diversify the nation's options instead of restricting them in the face of external challenges so as to enhance the nation's maneuverability and flexibility in handling them. This is especially important in this anarchic world where unforeseen developments sometimes may call for radical adjustments in foreign policy. A nation that restricts or closes its options will be left with limited or a narrow range of possibilities for safeguarding its national interests in the face of unforeseen developments that sometimes may call for new alignments with foreign countries or other radical policy changes.

EVALUATION OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

We can now examine the extent to which, historically speaking, Pakistan's foreign policy has met the tests of soundness and thereby has succeeded in safeguarding adequately the country's national interests. An analysis of various milestones in the history of Pakistan's foreign policy would enable us to draw some conclusions regarding both its achievements and flaws.

Neglect of Long-Term Interests

Soon after its birth, Pakistan was faced with a tough choice whether or not to join the US-led Western bloc in its confrontation with the Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union. Pakistan obviously had the following three options: to join the Western bloc, to join the Eastern bloc, or to remain nonaligned. Ultimately, Pakistan decided to join the Western bloc in the 1950s by becoming a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact, which was later named CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) after the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq, in 1955, besides entering into bilateral security assistance agreements with the USA in 1954 and 1959. The decisions enabled the country to receive the badly needed economic and military assistance to shore up its economy and strengthen its security in the face of the threat posed by India. The decision to join the Western bloc was in line with Pakistan's colonial links with the UK. It also reflected the preference of its Western-educated elite and a recognition of the Western world's overwhelming superiority over the Eastern bloc in economic, scientific, and technological fields. Finally, it enabled Pakistan to be on the side of the victors of the Cold War.

On the negative side, Pakistan became a client state of the USA with all the attendant adverse consequences. The decision also earned it the abiding hostility of the Soviet Union as reflected by its negative votes (from Pakistan's point of view) in the UN Security Council in the consideration of the Kashmir dispute and other Pakistan-India issues, and the signing of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971, which helped India in its designs to dismember Pakistan. The US military assistance further had the negative effect of distorting Pakistan's polity by increasing the weight of the military sector to the detriment of the steady evolution of the country's political and democratic institutions. Consequently, the country has suffered from repeated military takeovers and chronic political instability since the 1950s. Above all, it has developed a dependence syndrome and a begging bowl mentality from which it continues to suffer, instead of pursuing a national policy of self-reliance and self-respect.

The availability of foreign aid, whether in the form of loans or grants, encouraged corruption among Pakistan's elite including political leadership and the higher echelons of the civilian bureaucracy and the military establishment. Worst of all, it fostered in our elite the tendency to expect foreign donor countries and institutions to fix all our problems, economic or otherwise, instead of developing a "can do" mindset. Last, by propping

up artificially Pakistan's military sector, it encouraged military adventurism among its military commanders who have ruled the country most of the time and maintained a stranglehold on its security and foreign policies.

Thus, the decision to join the Western bloc was certainly of some help to Pakistan in meeting its urgent economic and security needs. But in the long run it proved detrimental to its national interests by entailing military takeovers and destabilizing it politically, by causing the dependence syndrome in the economic field, by encouraging military adventurism as reflected by the Gibraltar Operation that led to the Pakistan-India war of 1965 and the disastrous Kargil Operation of 1999, and by fostering greed and corruption among its elite, which shook the moral foundation of the state. Therefore, with the advantage of hindsight, it would have been arguably much better from the point of view of Pakistan's long-term interests to have remained nonaligned while relying on its own resources to develop its economic potential and strengthen itself militarily. This obviously would have been a slower process in the beginning requiring a great deal of sacrifice on the part of the people of Pakistan and their leaders, but would have paid rich dividends in the long run by discouraging military adventures and fostering political stability and a "can do" mindset among its elite as has happened in China particularly after 1978. This is just one example among many in which short-term interests trumped Pakistan's long-term goals in the formulation of its foreign policy.

Neglect of Economic Development

Another and perhaps more telling example of the short-term approach overriding the long-term interests in the formulation of the country's security and foreign policies is the allocation of the lion's share of its resources to the defense sector while neglecting the requirements of economic development. This tendency has had a negative impact on Pakistan's long-term security by slowing its economic growth. This was done partly in support of an ambitious foreign policy agenda, which required a strong defense sector, and partly because the country was under the rule of the military most of the time since Ayub Khan's military takeover in 1958. The Gibraltar and Kargil operations are obvious examples of the ambitious foreign policy agenda, which the country's power and resources could not afford. The tendency to use external loans for meeting the current expenditure of the federal government including the defense was extremely damaging to the long-term health of the country's economy. Since these

loans were not used for investment in productive sectors of the economy, they have led the country into a debt trap in which the requirements of debt servicing and repayment of loans and the defense budget exceed the net revenues of the federal government.

For instance, in the financial year 2013–14 a total amount of Rs.921 billion was allocated to the defense sector including Rs.629 billion for defense affairs and services, Rs.142 billion for military pensions, and Rs.150 billion under contingencies. Debt servicing and repayment of loans claimed Rs.1450 billion. The total expenditure on defense and debt servicing amounted to Rs.2371 billion, which exceeded the net federal revenues of the federal government by Rs.188 billion. On the other hand, the development expenditure declined to Rs.425 billion against the budgetary allocation of Rs.540 billion. The situation remained the same in the financial year 2014–15. The total budgetary allocation for the defense sector was increased to Rs.1028 billion, amounting to 46% of the net revenues of the federal government. The total allocation for defense and debt servicing amounted to Rs.2486 billion, exceeding the expected net revenues of the federal government by Rs.261 billion. Further, the total allocation for the current expenditure of the federal government exceeded its expected net revenues by Rs.1238 billion in 2014–15, thereby limiting severely the availability of funds for developmental purposes.¹⁴

Obviously, this situation is unsustainable and detrimental to the national interests in the long run as illustrated in Fig. 9.1. Pakistan currently is placed in the unfortunate position of having a national security curve as in $Y1Y1$, in which it will fall behind India in the race for long-term economic growth even if it merely tries to maintain a credible deterrent at the lowest level of forces and armaments. The situation calls for urgent steps and reforms to change the situation in its favor by rapidly raising its investment and productivity levels to push its national security curve toward YY or, better still, toward $Y2Y2$. The outward push to the national security curve should be combined with foreign policy initiatives to defuse tensions in relations with India and other neighbors and build up countervailing alliances.

As a result of the allocation of the lion's share of the government's resources to the defense sector and the mismanagement of the economy over prolonged periods in the past, Pakistan's GDP growth rate generally has been far below that of India during the past two decades. Here we again see the demands of short-term security prevailing upon the requirements of long-term national interests. In a nutshell, this approach has

failed the test of a sound foreign policy that requires the policy makers to strike a reasonable balance between the short-term and long-term national objectives; that is, between the short-term objective of a credible security deterrent and the long-term goal of a high rate of economic development, which is an indispensable condition for safeguarding the nation's long-term security and other national interests, as explained earlier.

It seems that Pakistan's policy makers have not adequately taken into account the lessons of modern history. The USSR suffered the defeat in the Cold War and disintegrated not because of the shortage of conventional and nuclear weaponry. It happened primarily because its weak economy failed to provide a solid foundation for its heavy military superstructure. Pakistan in the absence of a well-thought-out grand strategy is in the process of repeating the same cardinal mistake as was done by the Soviet Union, with predictable disastrous results. It also does not appear to have learned anything from the success of China after the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping and of the post-World War II Germany in building up national power and attaining a high position in the comity of nations (and, in the case of Germany, national reunification) primarily by achieving high rates of economic growth in the first instance.

Overdependence on Foreign Assistance

Pakistan's heavy dependence on foreign countries, particularly the USA, for meeting its military and economic needs also has the disadvantage of restricting severely its area of maneuver in foreign affairs and limiting its foreign policy options. A recent example was Pakistan's inability to implement the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, which is in its best long-term interest for meeting its rapidly growing energy and gas requirements, because of the US pressure. This is the price that Pakistan had to pay for being a client state of the USA and for its heavy dependence on Washington for meeting its economic and military needs. Hopefully, the situation will change after the signing of the Iran nuclear deal in July 2015. Second, the dependence syndrome has robbed the nation of "can do" mentality, making it subservient to foreign diktat and exploitation. The spectacle of Pakistan's leaders and senior officials rushing to foreign capitals in search of solutions to its pressing economic and military problems is quite common and pathetic. If there is an energy crisis in the country, we seek a solution in Washington or Beijing instead of relying on our own efforts to overcome it. If there is a water crisis because of our failure

to build sufficient dams on our rivers, we want our foreign patrons to resolve the problem for us. Instead of improving the management of the economy and carrying out economic reforms to raise its productivity on a long-term basis, we resort to foreign loans and short-term measures to tide us over in difficult times.

Absence of a Coherent and Skillful Grand Strategy

A major source of the weakness of Pakistan's foreign policy has been that it was rarely if ever a part of a carefully worked-out national grand strategy; that is, it was generally speaking not synchronized with the national security and economic policies so as to form an integrated whole in the best interests of the country. Consequently, there were many occasions in Pakistan's short history when these three critically important arms of national policy were working at cross-purposes. The most glaring example of this lack of coordination in Pakistan's recent history was the Kargil Operation launched by the Pakistan army in 1999 to gain some tactical advantages on the Line of Control in the disputed Kashmir territory. This operation has been criticized by some military experts as having been badly planned and executed. But even if one ignores this criticism, the fact remains that it was diametrically opposed to the direction that the government of Pakistan under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had taken in the management of Pakistan-India relations earlier that year in February following parleys between the prime ministers of the two countries.

The visit of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to Lahore in February 1999 was a hugely significant event. The issuance of the Lahore Declaration, a joint statement of the two prime ministers, and a memorandum of understanding signed by the foreign secretaries of Pakistan and India defused tensions between the two countries and could have laid the foundation for durable peace between the two countries. There was even the promise of significant progress toward a settlement of the Kashmir dispute for which both the prime ministers nominated their special representatives. The path charted out by the two prime ministers deserved to be fully explored. Unfortunately, the Kargil Operation launched by General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's army chief, scuttled the whole process and with it the hopes for durable peace between Pakistan and India for a long time to come.¹⁵

Earlier, the Gibraltar Operation launched by Pakistan, which led to the 1965 Pakistan-India war, was another example of the absence of a carefully

worked-out national grand strategy and the pursuit of foreign and security policies that were out of sync with the economic and international realities. Economically, Pakistan was doing reasonably well under Ayub Khan's rule in 1965 when this operation was launched. However, Pakistan's economy was still fragile and heavily dependent on foreign assistance without which Pakistan's economic progress was likely to stall. It was certainly not in a position to bear the heavy cost of an all-out war with India, which carried the distinct possibility of derailing the process of rapid economic growth. Further, the operation was based on the questionable assumption that India would countenance a defeat in the disputed Kashmir territory without expanding the conflict and launching an attack on Pakistan across the international frontier. As the later events showed, this was an unrealistic assumption. India launched an attack in the Lahore sector on 6 September to lessen the pressure on its forces in the Indian-occupied Kashmir, thereby expanding a local conflict into an all-out Pakistan-India war.

Considering that Pakistan failed to achieve the strategic objective of gaining an upper hand in Kashmir for which the Gibraltar Operation had been launched, it must be considered as a failure from the strategic point of view. Even more importantly, the 1965 war derailed Pakistan's economy from the path of rapid progress and destabilized the country internally, created strains in Pakistan's relations with the USA, which imposed an arms embargo against Pakistan and suspended economic assistance, and intensified India's hostility leading ultimately to Pakistan's dismemberment in 1971. Thus, a clueless foreign policy based on unrealistic assumptions combined with an ill-conceived security policy and military adventurism inflicted enormous damage on Pakistan, politically, economically, and militarily.¹⁶

The mismanagement of the East Pakistan crisis in 1971 was a classic example of the total failure of the state apparatus to chart out coherent political, security, and foreign policies to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country. Admittedly, this was primarily a huge failure of Pakistan's internal political policy. The military action launched by Yahya Khan's military regime in East Pakistan in March 1971 delivered a fatal blow to the political unity of the country, making East Pakistan's secession just a matter of time. In the face of the growing crisis in East Pakistan and the increasing likelihood that India would take advantage of it through military intervention, Pakistan needed bold internal political initiatives to defuse the situation and move toward East Pakistan's autonomy combined with a sensible foreign policy based on a realistic assessment of the

regional and global security environment that was ahead of events rather than merely reacting to them.

Such an approach might have enabled Islamabad to deal with the crisis internationally with some success and dampened the secessionist sentiments somewhat, leading to a loose federation or confederation between East and West Pakistan.¹⁷ Or at least it would have allowed East Pakistan's secession in a more dignified manner without involving the military surrender at Dhaka on 16 December 1971 by Lt. General Niazi.¹⁸ As the situation aggravated to Pakistan's disadvantage, its military rulers did not take the required bold political steps to defuse the internal crisis in East Pakistan. They also did not demonstrate any sign of realism in their security and foreign policies, which were reactive in nature and always a few steps behind the events. As Kissinger later pointed out, "There simply was no blinking the fact that Pakistan's military leaders were caught up in a process beyond their comprehension.... The result was that never throughout the crisis did Pakistan manage to put forward a position on which it could take its international stand. In fact, its piecemeal concessions, though cumulatively not inconsiderable, played into India's hands."¹⁹ Consequently, Pakistan was demoralized and fatally divided internally, isolated internationally, and ultimately defeated militarily.

Absence of Strategic Dynamism and Far-Sightedness

By and large and with some notable exceptions here and there, Pakistan's foreign policy generally has been reactive to fast-moving developments on the regional and international scenes. Our foreign policy makers, more often than not, failed to assess the emerging international trends and take them into account in the process of policy formulation. We were frequently placed in the unhappy situation of catching up with the events rather than being ahead of events. The practitioners of Pakistan's foreign policy, in general, have been content with day-to-day tactical policy adjustments, neglecting the long-term strategic directions of foreign policy. Our foreign policy during the East Pakistan crisis of 1971, our Afghanistan policies of the 1990s (see Chap. 6), and the Kargil Operation of 1999 are classic examples of ignoring or misjudging emerging international trends, and of our inability to look beyond the current and the immediate issues, leading ultimately to disastrous results.

One notable exception was Pakistan's decision in the early 1960s to enter into a strategic partnership with the People's Republic of China in the face

of the US opposition. It was an example of strategic far-sightedness that has stood the test of time. It was based on an accurate analysis of the evolving regional and international security environment, particularly the growing strains in Sino-Indian relations, the unreliability of the USA as a friend and ally in the face of the Indian security threat, and the likely emergence of China as a powerful force on the international arena in the long run. Pakistan also later played an important role in facilitating contacts between Washington and Beijing, and a breakthrough in US-China relations when Henry Kissinger as President Nixon's National Security Adviser undertook a secret visit to Beijing from Islamabad in 1971. Pakistan's initiative in 1962 to develop strategic partnership with China, thus demonstrated an element of the much-needed dynamism in Pakistan's foreign policy as it accurately anticipated and took into account the likely evolution of the regional and global security environment—a plus for its foreign policy establishment. It also had the advantage of diversifying Pakistan's foreign policy options, thus expanding its maneuverability, a critical requirement of a successful foreign policy in this anarchic and unpredictable world.

*Absence of an Inspiring Vision and Well-Considered
National Priorities*

As explained earlier, the foreign policy must reflect a clear understanding of the relative importance of the nation's internal and external objectives that it is expected to support or achieve. In other words, it should be based on a clear prioritization of the various national objectives. A related consideration is that the demands of the foreign policy must be within the reach of the resources available to the nation or within the reach of the national power. Given the limitations of national power, we cannot expect to achieve all our national objectives at the same time. The danger in the absence of well-considered priorities is that we would not achieve a strategic breakthrough in any area because our resources would be stretched too thinly. A better approach would be to focus on a few well-selected objectives to achieve a strategic breakthrough so as to facilitate the realization of other objectives at a later stage.

A critical analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy reveals either a lack of prioritization of foreign policy goals or an upside-down prioritization that caused great harm to its national interests. Further, more often than not its demands were far in excess of our national resources resulting in strategic overstretch and national exhaustion. It has been a major failing of the

country's leadership that it has failed to provide to the nation a realistic and inspiring vision of its future, particularly the future role of the country at regional and global levels, and the national priorities needed to realize that vision. In the absence of such a vision and clear-cut national priorities, Pakistan's foreign policy lacked long-term strategic direction and the practitioners of foreign policy contented themselves with tactical adjustments to day-to-day developments. This flaw placed our foreign policy at the mercy of events depriving it of the strength and stability that comes with a foreign policy that is formulated in pursuance of a realistic vision of the future.

China's experience would help in elaborating this point. In December 1978, China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping set economic development as the supreme national objective to which everything else was to be subordinated. In pursuance of this goal, China embarked upon a program of economic reforms internally aimed at introducing the market forces and the element of competition to accelerate China's economic growth. Deng Xiaoping gradually reduced China's defense budget to 1.5% of its GDP or even lower to enable the allocation of most of the nation's resources to economic development. Externally, China pursued a policy of opening to the outside world to increase foreign trade and attract foreign investment and technology. In close alignment with these policies and to provide support to them, foreign policy was given the task of defusing tensions in relations with China's neighbors so as to avoid the risk of a major armed conflict. Soon thereafter, China entered into border negotiations with the Soviet Union and India to defuse tensions in relations with them. As a result of this carefully crafted grand strategy, China's economy witnessed exceptionally high economic growth rates in the next three decades propelling it to the position of the second biggest economy in the world in nominal terms by 2010. Only after China had strengthened itself economically did it embark on a long-term program of the buildup of its military power. It is now emerging as a great power to reckon with, especially in Asia. (For details, see Chap. 3). China's emergence as a great power replicates the experience of other great powers in modern history, which strengthened themselves economically before building up their military power.

Pakistan's leaders in contrast have failed to present a realistic vision of the future or to set the right priorities for the guidance of its foreign policy. Its policy makers made the mistake of overemphasizing the buildup

of the military power while neglecting the task of economic development, thus repeating the mistake made by the Soviet Union. Instead of following a policy of peaceful neighborhood on the lines of what China did allowing the diversion of resources from the military to the task of economic development, Pakistan's leadership repeatedly embarked upon military adventures, particularly in 1965 and 1999, in the management of relations with India. These short-sighted and adventurist policies failed miserably in achieving their goals and inevitably heightened tensions in relations with India to the detriment of Pakistan's security and economic development.

*Strategic Overstretch and Neglect of Regional
and Global Security Environment*

The overambitious goals and adventurist policies of the country historically have overstrained Pakistan's limited economic resources, leading to strategic overstretch and national exhaustion. Besides the Gibraltar Operation, which led to the 1965 Pakistan-India war, the Kashmir and Afghanistan policies pursued by Pakistan in 1990s are telling examples of the reckless manner in which we have pursued our security and foreign policies. Both the Kashmir and Afghanistan policies of the 1990s caused incalculable damage to Pakistan's security and economy through the waste of the country's precious resources, encouraging religious extremism and intolerance, engendering political instability, slowing Pakistan's economic growth, tarnishing the country's image and isolating it internationally, and demoralizing the whole nation. Consequently, we are now strategically overstretched and in a state of national exhaustion. This is a dangerous state of affairs that requires a change of the strategic direction. As Liddell Hart has pointed out, "The experience of history brings ample evidence that the downfall of civilized states tends to come not from the direct assaults of foes but from internal decay, combined with the consequences of exhaustion in war."²⁰

To elaborate this point further, Pakistan's Kashmir policy of 1990s underestimated India's resolve to protect its security interests in the Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK), overestimated our capacity and power to support the freedom movement in the territory, and miscalculated the international trends. India's growing economic and military stature in the comity of nations denied the Kashmir freedom movement the necessary international political and diplomatic support. Our overambitious goals

concerning Kashmir denied us even the more limited gains that we could have achieved, for instance, in ameliorating the human rights situation in the IOK. The growing Western fear of Islamic extremism and its nexus with the Israeli lobby in the USA stacked the cards further against the Kashmiri freedom fighters. The situation was aggravated to Pakistan's disadvantage following General Pervez Musharraf's ill-conceived Kargil adventure in 1999. The result of our Kashmir policy of the 1990s was that even after a huge investment of manpower and resources spread over almost a decade, we were worse off at the end of the 1990s than where we were at the end of the 1980s. Our total support to the Taliban in the 1990s alienated us from the non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan constituting about half of its population, isolated us at regional and global levels, tarnished our international image as supporters of religious obscurantism, and aggravated social and political instability in Pakistan. Both of these policies, which were out of sync with the regional and global security environment, were not sustainable.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 virtually delivered the coup de grace to our Kashmir and Afghanistan policies of the 1990s. While we were forced to reverse our pro-Taliban policy in Afghanistan immediately under the threat of the American ultimatum, we had no choice but to change also gradually but surely our Kashmir policy of the 1990s. However, the contradictions created by these policies still continue to haunt us in various forms, both internally and externally. The Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008 were just one example of those contradictions. The tidal wave of religious extremism and terrorism sweeping the country is another. The experience of these policies, as pointed out earlier, also brought home the lack of dynamism in our foreign policy as our policy makers failed to anticipate and take into account the emerging regional and international trends in their formulation.

*Strategic Justification of Pakistan's Support for the Afghan Jihad
of the 1980s and Subsequent Failings*

A few words about Pakistan's support to the liberation struggle of the people of Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion and occupation of the country in December 1979 are also called for before this chapter is concluded. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a step forward in Russia's southward march of the nineteenth century that had seen it

occupy Central Asia and brought it to the Afghan borders. If the Soviet Union had been allowed to consolidate its occupation of and control over Afghanistan, Pakistan inevitably would have been its next victim. This would have made Pakistan the target of a pincer movement by India and the USSR, posing a grave threat to its security and territorial integrity. Therefore, Pakistan's decision to support the Afghan jihad was justified and in line with its national interests. The decision elicited the support of the West led by the USA as well as most of the Muslim world including particularly Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. The fact that ultimately the Afghan people were able to drive back the Soviet forces with this external support goes to their credit as well as to the credit of their supporters in Pakistan. Predictably, India did not support the Afghan liberation movement.

Following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February 1989, a puppet government led by Najibullah was left behind in Kabul. Even this government under the pressure of attacks by the Afghan *mujahideen* forces fell in April 1992. Subsequently, both Pakistan and Iran should have cooperated with each other and encouraged the various Afghan parties to reach an internal political settlement. As elaborated in the earlier chapter on Afghanistan, this unfortunately did not happen, leading ultimately to 9/11 and its damaging consequences for Pakistan both internally and externally. Pakistan could have avoided this unhappy turn of events by pursuing a judicious Afghanistan policy focusing more on cooperation with Iran in encouraging national reconciliation and a political settlement in Afghanistan rather than on expanding its influence in the country. Unfortunately, Islamabad chose not to do so. The point that needs to be emphasized is that the negative repercussions of the decision to support the Afghan liberation movement in 1980s could have been avoided through better management of the foreign mujahideen, who had fought in the Afghan jihad, with the cooperation of their countries of origin; by taking well-considered steps to promote religious moderation within Pakistan; and by pursuing prudent Kashmir and Afghanistan policies in the 1990s. Regrettably, the post-Zia Pakistani leadership was not able to rise up to the occasion through a prudent management of the situation obtaining after the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Kashmir and Afghanistan policies that it pursued in the 1990s merely aggravated the negative fallout of the earlier correct decision to support the Afghan liberation struggle in the 1980s.

Flaws of Pakistan's Foreign Policy

In a nutshell, Pakistan's foreign policy, barring some exceptions here and there, has suffered from the following shortcomings:

- It has not been synchronized with the national security and economic policies so as to form an integrated whole in the form of a national grand strategy for the realization of a realistic and promising vision of the future.
- Short-term considerations have trumped long-term goals and objectives in the formulation of foreign policy. It has traditionally focused on tactical adjustments to day-to-day developments instead of considering the strategic directions of policy in pursuance of an inspiring vision of the future and long-term goals.
- The foreign policy has suffered because of vague and upside-down national priorities. The focus has been on short-term security considerations at the expense of the long-term security that is dependent on the country's economic development and technological strength.
- Like other national policies, Pakistan's foreign policy has also been the victim of the domination of the various state institutions by the military. Consequently, military thinking rather than the advice of the Foreign Office generally prevailed on critically important foreign policy issues such as Kashmir and Afghanistan, thereby robbing the foreign policy of the necessary elements of diplomatic flexibility and maneuverability.
- Pakistan's foreign policy has more often than not pursued an over-ambitious agenda exceeding the limits of national power and suffered from adventurism and highly risky policies, leading to strategic overstretch and national exhaustion.
- Pakistan's several foreign policy initiatives betrayed an inadequate appreciation of the regional and global security environment.
- The dynamic element has been generally missing in Pakistan's foreign policy because it failed to anticipate the likely evolution of the global and regional realities. Consequently, it has often been reactive in nature; that is, it was often overtaken by events instead of being ahead of events.
- Pakistan's excessive dependence on foreign economic and military assistance and its status as a client state of the USA have severely narrowed down the nation's foreign policy options and restricted its maneuverability in the management of foreign affairs.

In the light of these conclusions, we must now examine how Pakistan can conduct its foreign policy in its best national interests in the twenty-first century in close synchronization with its security and economic policies so as to form a coherent and well-thought-out grand strategy. The current century undoubtedly will witness momentous developments and far-reaching changes in the regional and global security environment. If we are able to anticipate with some degree of clarity the future trends and take adequate steps to safeguard and promote our national interests, a bright and promising future will await us. Our failure to do so and learn from past mistakes may consign us to the dust heap of history. It is to this task that we must now turn in the next two chapters.

NOTES

1. For a brief description of the difficult circumstances attending the birth of Pakistan and the Indian hostility towards Pakistan, see Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Sindh, Pakistan: Univesrsity of Karachi, 1965), pp. 290–319; and S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 3–46.
2. For a discussion of the factors that led to the award of three of the four *tehsils* (subdistricts) of Gurdaspur, to India by the Boundary Commission headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe despite its being a Muslim majority district, in violation of the fundamental principles of the Partition of the subcontinent, see Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990* (London, UK: Roxford Books, 1991), pp. 101–117. Alastair Lamb also explains how the Radcliffe Award laid the foundation of the Kashmir dispute. Also see Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947–2005: A Concise History* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2007), p. 22.
3. Jaswant Singh, *India at Risk* (New Delhi, India: Rupa Publications, 2013), p. 5.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
6. See note 1.
7. See note 2.
8. For a brief description of the debacle in East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh, see Burke and Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, pp. 397–411. Also see Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, pp. 112–120. For a more detailed analysis, see G.W. Choudhry, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). For an international perspective, see Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), pp. 842–918.

9. Burke and Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 73.
10. For a detailed discussion of the rationale and genesis of Pakistan, see Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Sindh, Pakistan: University of Karachi, 1965). For an authoritative description of the ideology of Pakistan, see Javid Iqbal, *Ideology of Pakistan* (Lahore, Pakistan: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2005), especially pp. 1–11.
11. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Faber & Faber, 1954, 1967), p. 322.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
13. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York, NY: Vintage Random House, 1987), p. 439.
14. S. Ejaz Wasti (Economic Advisor), *Pakistan Economic Survey 2013–14*, (Islamabad, Pakistan: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, 2014), at http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey_1314.html; Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, *Federal Budget 2014–15: Budget in Brief* (Islamabad, Pakistan: Government of Pakistan, 2014), at http://www.finance.gov.pk/budget/Budget_in_Brief_2014_15.pdf; and Javid Husain, “Long on Promises,” *The Nation*, 10 June 2014, at <http://nation.com.pk/columns/10-Jun-2014/long-on-promises>.
15. As is to be expected, there are conflicting versions and assessments of the Kargil Operation. For versions/assessments favoring the operation, see Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire* (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 87–98; and Shireen M. Mazari, *The Kargil Conflict 1999* (Islamabad, Pakistan: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003). For the Indian point of view, see General V.P. Malik, *Kargil: From Surprise to Victory* (New Delhi: HarperCollins India, 2011). An objective approach would reveal that the Kargil Operation as a tactical maneuver lacked a clear strategic aim, ignored or misjudged regional and international security environment, and suffered from lack of coordination with the political, military, and diplomatic dimensions of policy making. In the ultimate analysis, it proved to be an unmitigated disaster that damaged the Kashmir cause, destabilized Pakistan, isolated it internationally, and paved the way for another military takeover.
16. Burke and Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, pp. 318–358.
17. See note 8.
18. For the Indian perspective of the birth of Bangladesh, see Singh, *India at Risk*, pp. 100–136.
19. Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 861–62.
20. Hart, *Strategy*, p. 359.

Toward Comprehensive Security

For an independent and sovereign country, there cannot be anything more important than national security. Security, both internal and external, is a sine qua non for a people to lead their lives in peaceful, orderly, economically prosperous, and dignified conditions enabling their genius to flower and their potential to develop to its maximum. Insecurity, on the other hand, can endanger the very existence of a country through loss of independence and internal chaos and disintegration. A nation beset with external threats to its security and armed conflicts, and mired in internal disharmony can hardly hope to prosper or even survive.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The foremost task of the national policy, therefore, is to safeguard a country's security defined in a comprehensive manner. To begin with, national security has two main aspects: external and internal. External security

This chapter is partly based on the ideas elaborated by the author in his paper "The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan" published by the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) in April 2004; and a number of articles that appeared in Pakistani dailies, including the following: "National Security Redefined" (*The Dawn*, 29 April 2006), "National Security Redefined" (*The Dawn*, 26 June 2006), "Towards Comprehensive Security" (*The Nation*, 23 July 2013), and "Case for Comprehensive Security" (*The Nation*, 15 October 2013).

undoubtedly requires as its centerpiece military means—armed forces and armaments—to deter and, if the deterrent fails, to defend the country against external aggression. However, because of the changed nature of warfare in modern times, defense against external aggression requires not just military means but also the support of economic and technological strength. Generally speaking, emerging great powers have built up their military power on the foundation of a strong economic and technological base rather than the other way around, particularly in the modern era starting with the industrial revolution.

As mentioned earlier, Paul Kennedy stressed in his widely acclaimed book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* that economic and technological change had played a crucial role in the rise and fall of states. To quote him once again, "...this uneven pace of economic growth has had crucial long-term impacts upon the relative military power and strategical position of the members of the states system...economic prosperity does not *always and immediately* translate into military effectiveness, for that depends upon many other factors, from geography and national morale to generalship and tactical competence. Nevertheless, the fact remains that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balances have followed alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources."¹

Thus, military means and economic strength are essential elements of national security and defense against external aggression. As a general rule, the shorter the war effort, the more important the military means are for the purpose of national security. Conversely, the relative importance of economic strength increases corresponding to the increase in the duration of war. If one takes this argument to its logical conclusion, it can be stated emphatically that any long-term contest between two nations would be decided primarily by their relative economic strength. Nations that neglected the economic dimension of their security ultimately came to grief. The main cause for the defeat and disintegration of the Soviet Union was its economic weakness rather than any shortage of conventional and nonconventional forces. China, on the other hand, wisely concentrated its resources and energies on the task of economic development for about three decades after the initiation of economic reforms at the end of 1978 before embarking on an ambitious program of building up its military power.

The quality of generalship and military strategy, the level of training and preparedness of the armed forces, and the quantity and quality of the armaments available to them play a vital role in determining the effectiveness of the armed forces in achieving the targets given to them by the political leadership. It is possible sometimes that well-trained armed forces led by high-quality generals may succeed where poor generalship and lack of preparedness of the armed forces may fail despite the plentiful supply of high-quality armaments.

But there is a third and equally important element of national security, and that is the internal political stability, cohesion, and unity of a nation. Obviously, a country weakened by internal conflicts and dissensions is in no position to safeguard its security against external threats. Similarly, a nation beset with internal decay and loss of morale is in a poor shape to face external challenges effectively. It is primarily the responsibility of the leadership to adopt enlightened political, economic, and social policies that promote internal unity and cohesion. In the modern times, a democratic form of government in which the people at large have a feeling of participation in running their national affairs would have a much better chance of ensuring internal unity and cohesion than a dictatorial or unrepresentative government that is alienated from the people. Further, oppressive and exploitative governments would tend to invite internal opposition and dissent leading to national divisions and demoralization. On the other hand, governments that ensure law and order, provide social and economic justice, promote tolerance, and enhance the welfare and economic progress of the people will be much better placed in raising their morale and strengthening their solidarity in facing external security threats. These considerations give an automatic advantage to participatory forms of government as against dictatorial ones in modern times.

Pakistan's dismemberment in 1971 provides a classic example of internal divisions leading to a military defeat. The country had the misfortune of being ruled by a military government, which compounded the internal problems through blunders in handling the political unrest in East Pakistan, leading to a rebellion. The Indian military intervention delivered the coup de grace to the situation that was ripe for Pakistan's military defeat and dismemberment. There are numerous other examples in history of foreign powers taking advantage of internal dissensions in their adversaries to bring them down to their knees. Divide and rule has been the classic policy of all expansionist powers in subjugating their opponents. The success of the colonial powers in bringing foreign lands under their

rule was in no small measure due to the practice of the policy of divide and rule. Admittedly, the colonial powers also had the inherent advantage of industrial, technological, and military superiority over the local rulers who, in any case, were more interested in fighting among themselves rather than facing the common external threat.

Finally, one cannot overemphasize in any discussion of national security the importance of foreign policy, which is basically the art of management of external affairs in pursuit of national interests. It is with good reason that foreign policy or diplomacy is called the first line of defense of a country. It is imperative that the foreign policy be closely synchronized with the country's security, economic, and internal political policies so as to form a coherent whole in the shape of a grand strategy in the service of the national aims and interests. In short, a nation requires internal political stability and cohesion, economic strength, military muscle, and proactive diplomacy in an optimum mix to ensure national security.

It is the responsibility of the leadership to manage the various elements of national security and bring them together in an optimum mix in deterring or fighting external aggression. The quality of leadership, therefore, matters. It is the job of the leadership to maintain internal unity and cohesion, mobilize the nation, and adopt the right strategy for overcoming external threats. There are several instances in history where unwise leaders led their nations to defeats. We have already given the example of Pakistan's military ruler Yahya Khan leading the country to an ignominious military defeat in 1971. In 1967, Gamal Abdel Nasser led Egypt to a military defeat at the hands of Israel through his inept handling of the situation. On the other hand, Deng Xiaoping through his far-sightedness and inspiring leadership was able to avoid the pitfalls confronting China and guide it on to the path of rapid progress catapulting it to the position of the second biggest economy in the world in nominal dollar terms within a period of three decades.

PAKISTAN'S UNIDIMENSIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Unfortunately, as the discussion in earlier chapters has shown, Pakistan has suffered enormously in the past because of the pursuit of a flawed national security policy that focused almost exclusively on the military dimension of national security to the neglect of other ingredients. This unidimensional and military-dominated approach to national security has also been the main source of the flaws in the country's foreign policy and

the primary cause of its internal and external problems. The exaggerated role of the military in Pakistan's body politic since 1958, when General Ayub Khan assumed the reins of power, derailed the democratic process, weakened the institutions of the state, undermined the rule of law, and destabilized the country internally through a succession of martial laws. The overemphasis on the military in the allocation of national resources at the expense of economic development slowed the rate of economic growth, impoverished the country, and badly damaged the nation's social and physical infrastructure. It thus weakened the very foundation of a sound national security policy.

The subordination of the Foreign Office and diplomacy to the whims of the country's military rulers and security agencies denied the country the advantages of a coherent and dynamic foreign policy. The clout of the military establishment has been so much in the Pakistan body politic that it has dominated the nation's security and foreign policies even when elected civilian governments were in power. The present government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is no exception to this rule. Pakistan's Kashmir and Afghanistan policies of the 1990s and the Kargil Operation of 1999 are prime examples of the military-dominated unidimensional security policies that Pakistan has pursued throughout most of its history to its detriment.

NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The need of the hour in Pakistan is for a comprehensive national security policy covering adequately its political, economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions. The strengthening of the elected civilian governments is an essential condition for the adoption of national security policies in the best interest of the country through the analysis and synthesis of inputs received from various organs of state. Internal political stability, social cohesion, and security are not only indispensable conditions for national security. They must also be among the most important goals of such a policy. A divided nation suffering from political instability and internal insecurity is on the course of self-destruction. It is certainly in no position to defend itself in the face of serious external threats.

Unfortunately, neither Pakistan's military nor its politicians drew the right lessons from the tragic experience of the dismemberment of the country in 1971. Military adventurers in the persons of Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf overthrew elected civilian governments even after the debacle of 1971 caused by a military government, thus derailing the

democratic process again and again, sowing the seeds of political instability, and undermining respect for law and the constitution. Politicians, when given the chance to rule the country after Zia's air crash in 1988, were not able to rise up to the occasion either, partly because of their own failings and partly because of the shenanigans of security agencies. The politicians, when in power, embarked upon confrontational policies aggravating political instability, instead of pursuing a consensual approach in dealing with important national issues. The security agencies took full advantage of their weaknesses to keep the civilian governments destabilized and dependent upon the military for their survival. This was not a recipe for the effective rule of the elected governments or for the strengthening of national security. Instead, it aggravated political instability, engendered incompetence and corruption in running the affairs of the state, and endangered national security.

With the completion of the process of democratic transition from one elected government to the next one in 2013, hopefully the country has seen the last of military dictators. The installation of a civilian-elected government, however, is not an automatic guarantee of success in providing good governance and thus strengthening national security. For success in realizing this goal, it is also imperative that the government should attach the highest priority to the rule of law so that the rich and the poor, the weak and the strong are treated equally in the application of the laws of the land, and justice is delivered to the poor and the weak virtually at their doorsteps. Equally important is to improve the economic lot of the people by accelerating the rate of economic growth, lowering unemployment and inflation, reducing inequalities of income and wealth, ensuring the provision of necessities of life to the people, and building up social and physical infrastructure, particularly by bringing high-quality education and health facilities within the reach of the common man.

It is also important to devolve powers from the center to the constituent units (provinces in the case of Pakistan) and further to local bodies at district and town levels to allow the people as much participation in running their affairs as possible. This is essential because of the growing political awareness of the people in modern times and their desire to play an effective role in the determination of the policies that affect them directly. The process of devolution of powers must take place consistent with relevant strategic, economic, and administrative considerations. The center or the federation must have the powers and the responsibility for external defense and overall internal security and stability, the management of

foreign affairs including also external trade and economic relations, fiscal and monetary policies to accelerate economic progress and ensure social and economic justice, communications, interprovincial coordination, and for provision of a sense of direction and vision of the future to the nation in the management of its affairs. The provinces must have the residual powers to manage their affairs in accordance with their peculiar social, cultural, and geographical circumstances within the framework of a viable and strong central government. They should, in turn, devolve powers to the local bodies so that the people at district and town levels can manage as much of their day-to-day affairs as possible locally through their elected representatives.

With the adoption of the latest amendments to the constitution of Pakistan, the democratic structure of government has been greatly strengthened. The revival of the local bodies on sound lines, a process that is currently in progress in the country, will also have the effect of adding to the effectiveness of the representative state institutions. It will now be for the elected representatives to demonstrate whether they have the capability to provide good governance and strengthen national security. In particular, Pakistan's federal and provincial governments must demonstrate through their policies their resolve to move in that direction.

Pakistan's internal security has been badly damaged over the past two decades by the menace of terrorism, which, at least partly, is the outcome of its flawed Afghanistan and Kashmir policies of the past. These policies must be reviewed and modified keeping in view the regional and global security environment as well as the limits of our national power. In dealing with the various terrorist groups operating in Pakistan, our strategy should aim at an optimum mix of deterrence, dialogue, and development to suit the time, terrain, and nature of the terrorist groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Jhnagvi confronting us. This strategy should be reviewed from time to time in the light of the changing circumstances. While using force against a terrorist group, we must always keep open the door for negotiations within the framework of the country's constitution and law. Conversely, while initiating or continuing negotiations with the terrorist groups, the government should retain the option of the use of military force if the need arises.

The launch of the Zarb-e-Azb military operation in 2014 to defeat TTP, after the failure of the earlier attempt to find a negotiated solution within the framework of Pakistan's constitution and law, was a step in the right direction. The operation has achieved considerable success in

subduing TTP, though a complete victory still remains elusive as these lines are being written. As TTP is weakened, it would be advisable to keep the doors of talks open so that the remaining members of TTP, or at least the relatively moderate ones among them, can be persuaded to lay down arms and join the mainstream of Pakistani politics.

A similar effort needs to be made to restore normalcy and stability in Balochistan. The government must reach out to disgruntled elements with a view to understanding their political and economic grievances and to reaching a settlement to end the insurgency in that province in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. The people of the province must be made to feel that they are in charge of their affairs and that they are the primary beneficiaries of the resources of the province. The federal government must provide increased resources for the economic development of Balochistan. Simultaneously, steps should be taken to bring to book the culprits responsible for the murder of Nawab Akbar Bugti. At the same time, the government would have no choice but to use force against those elements in Balochistan, who reject initiatives aimed at bringing about a negotiated settlement and who continue to commit terrorist activities and violently defy the writ of the state.

Pakistan has also been the victim of sectarian terrorism for quite some time. This problem assumed extremely menacing proportions in the 1990s because of the emergence of extremist Sunni and Shia militant organizations some of which were allegedly receiving support from abroad. This problem subsided later, but there are signs that it may re-emerge as a threat to internal security and stability. There are also some indications that the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian intelligence agency, may be involved in fomenting terrorism, sectarian and otherwise, in different parts of Pakistan, particularly in Karachi and Balochistan. The Pakistan chief of army staff, General Raheel Sharif, warned foreign governments and agencies on 15 April 2015 against involvement in the insurgency in Balochistan.² Pakistan's foreign secretary, Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, told the media on 14 May 2015, "RAW is involved in terror acts in Pakistan, and we have repeatedly raised this issue with India."³

For fighting the menace of sectarian terrorism, the federal and provincial governments need to adopt well-considered social, educational, cultural, and media policies to promote religious moderation and tolerance. These policies must be combined with energetic efforts by our intelligence agencies to detect and identify terrorist cells with the objective of infiltrating and neutralizing them. Law enforcement authorities at various

levels need to strengthen their antiterrorism operations to preempt terrorist activities with the help of timely and actionable intelligence, and, where preemption fails, to arrest and bring to book speedily the criminals involved in terrorism. Special efforts by our government, especially the intelligence community, would be required for checking the activities of foreign intelligence agencies, particularly RAW, aimed at fomenting insurgency in Balochistan and terrorism in various parts of the country. Finally, if the accusations of RAW's involvement in terrorist activities in Pakistan are well-founded as seems to be the case, we will have to reconsider our overall India policy. In such a situation, we cannot continue business as usual with India.

Obviously, we cannot afford to ignore the military dimension of our national security. We must, therefore, maintain a credible deterrent at the lowest level of forces and armaments. But as pointed out earlier, our long-term survival as a progressive, prosperous, enlightened, and self-reliant nation depends primarily on our ability to accelerate the process of economic development of the country to the maximum extent possible. Unfortunately, we have been treading in the footsteps of the Soviet Union by focusing more on building up military power than strengthening ourselves economically. As a result, our economy is in a vulnerable condition and is a source of acute weakness for our national security, as elaborated in the preceding chapter.

We, therefore, need to take urgent corrective action in line with the policies followed by China since 1978. China under Deng decided to give top priority to the goal of rapid economic development. Everything else was subordinated to the achievement of this goal. It implemented internal reforms to accelerate the pace of economic development. China also adopted a policy of peace in its neighborhood by defusing tensions in relations with the Soviet Union and India to be able to limit the military expenditure and allocate maximum possible resources to the important task of economic growth. The policy of opening to the outside world was adopted to attract foreign investment and technology. As a result of these policies, China has been able to achieve phenomenally high economic growth rates over the past three decades.

It must be emphasized here that economic growth is not just the function of the allocation of resources although resource allocation does play a significant role in determining the rate of growth. The quality of economic management, the economic system, the productivity of workers both in private and public sectors, the quality of physical infrastructure, and the stan-

dards of education and technology have their own influence on the growth rate of an economy. However, other things remaining the same, the higher the allocation of resources to economic development, the higher would be the growth rate of the economy. In the case of Pakistan, economic development has suffered not only from the low level of the allocation of resources, but also from poor economic management and inadequate attention to education in general and the development of science and technology in particular. So we need both to increase significantly the allocation of resources to the task of economic development and to carry out economic reforms to enhance our productivity and accelerate our economic growth. In terms of Fig. 9.1 in the preceding chapter, we should try to push our national security curve from its current position at Y1Y1 to Y2Y2.

It is the primary responsibility of the Foreign Office to assess external challenges and threats to a country's security and to suggest ways and means of overcoming them, keeping in view the nation's economic and military power, its political strength and weaknesses, and the regional and international security environment. Under the present circumstances, it would be advisable for Pakistan to pursue a low-risk and non-adventurist foreign policy to defuse tensions in Pakistan's relations with its close neighbors and preserve peace around Pakistan's borders. This would enable us to allocate the lion's share of the nation's resources to the urgent task of economic development, which is perhaps the weakest link in our national security strategy. While, strategically speaking, Pakistan should pursue a low-risk and non-adventurist foreign policy in the interest of peace in its neighborhood, at the tactical level it should adjust it, from time to time, to respond in a judicious and effective manner to new developments in the regional and global security environment. Needless to say, the tactical aspect of our foreign policy must be closely dovetailed with its strategic direction.

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MECHANISM

The National Security Policy should ideally establish an optimum balance among its political, economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions. As noted by me in a paper entitled "The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan," written in April 2004 at the request of the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) for the benefit of our parliamentarians, Pakistan has historically suffered from the absence of any government agency that can synthesize the various dimensions of national security and present to the government well-considered options

for its contemplation.⁴ The reconstitution of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet as the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) in 2013 supported by its own secretariat holds the promise of filling up this gap. This would be possible, however, only if the secretariat of the CCNS, which should be headed by a high-ranking national security adviser, is able to secure the support and inputs of all the ministries and agencies relevant to the task of the formulation of a comprehensive national security policy.

It appears, however, that so far CCNS and its secretariat have failed to play their proper role due to a variety of factors, the foremost being the resistance of our military establishment to subordinate itself to the authority of a civilian organ of state. For all practical purposes, CCNS is merely functioning as an expanded version of the old Defense Committee of the Cabinet. This is hardly surprising considering the fragility of the political and representative institutions in Pakistan; the traditionally predominant role of the military in the national affairs especially in security and foreign affairs; and inadequate bureaucratic, financial, and political support to the secretariat of the newly established authority. Currently, it is the chief of army staff who plays the predominant role in the consideration of national security issues, whether internal or external. The CCNS and its secretariat will remain marginalized and largely irrelevant to national security issues as long as prime ministers are dependent on the support of the army for their political survival, the civilian national security-related institutions are unable to deliver, and the chiefs of army staff are able to bypass the new authority, nominally in charge of national security, in the consideration of national security issues.

It will take some time before an optimum balance is established between the authority of the political leadership and the power of the military enabling the CCNS, supported by a strong secretariat, to grow into an effective national security apparatus. The effectiveness of the CCNS will also be directly related to the importance that the prime minister attaches in practical terms to this body and its secretariat. This would require not only the provision of adequate bureaucratic and financial resources to the secretariat of the CCNS, but also assigning to the CCNS the central role in the decision-making process concerning all vital and strategically important national security issues. The secretariat of the CCNS needs to be upgraded in terms of both its organizational structure and the quality of its manpower and expertise to enable it to receive and analyze the national security-related inputs from the various ministries and the departments/agencies of the state and submit to the political leadership of the country viable policy options.

The national security adviser heading the secretariat of the CCNS must have direct and easy access to the prime minister in the performance of his duties. Ideally, the national security adviser, whose job is to synthesize the recommendations of various ministries and organs of state into viable policy options, should not head a line department such as the Defense Ministry or the Foreign Office so that he can review and analyze their views and recommendations with the necessary detachment and objectivity. The previous position in Pakistan where the same person acted as the adviser on foreign affairs and on national security did not allow him to perform his duties as the national security adviser effectively because, besides being overburdened, he could be suspected of having a bias in favor of the Foreign Office. A better arrangement would have been to have a regular foreign minister and a separate national security adviser heading the secretariat of the CCNS with the responsibility of putting up well-considered policy options on security-related issues to the government. With the appointment of Lieutenant General (Retired) Nasir Khan Janjua as the national security adviser on 23 October, 2015, the flaw of asking the same person to head the Foreign Office and act as national security adviser was removed. But, ironically, the new appointment would further deepen the already overwhelming influence of the Pakistan army in the government's decision making on security-related issues. It would, thus, accentuate the tendency towards unidimensional and military-dominated national security policies from which the country has suffered in the past.

NOTES

1. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York, NY: Vintage Random House, 1987), p. 439.
2. Baqir Sajjad Syed, "COAS Vows to Crush Insurgency in Balochistan—Foreign Governments and Agencies Warned Against Involvement in the Province," *The Dawn*, 16 April 2015, at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1176207>.
3. Maqbool Malik, "RAW Involved in Terror Acts Across Pakistan: Aizaz," *The Daily Nation*, 16 May 2015, at <http://nation.com.pk/national/15-May-2015/raw-involved-in-terror-acts-across-pakistan-aizaz-fo-rejects-hersh-report-on-osama-bin-laden>.
4. Javid Husain, "The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan," *Briefing Paper for Pakistani Parliamentarians*, Briefing Paper No. 12, PILDAT, April 2004, at <http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP/TheProcessofForeignPolicyFormulationinPakistan.pdf>.

A Grand Strategy for Pakistan

Pakistan is faced with a world in disorder in the twenty-first century. It is a world that is increasingly governed by power politics rather than the principles of the UN Charter or international law on strategically important issues of peace and security. The US unipolar moment after the end of the Cold War when it reigned supreme in the international arena was also marked by some instances of reckless exercise of power by Washington in pursuit of its perceived national interests rather than the upholding of the UN Charter or the principles of international law. The US attack on Iraq in March 2003 without any UN sanction was a prime example of the blatant violation of the UN Charter. Washington's threats of military strikes against Iran in the past before the agreement on Iran's nuclear program was signed in July 2015, if the latter failed to fall in line with its demands on the nuclear issue, were another instance of the disregard of the principles of the UN Charter. The handling of the recent turmoil in Ukraine by both the West and Russia was again governed primarily by realpolitik rather than the principles of the UN Charter or the considerations of international law.

The global scenario is also fast changing with the rise of new powers. In particular, the rapid rise of China and India would have far-reaching consequences for the global and Asian security environment. In contrast with the current situation in which the USA and other Western countries produce about 50% of the world GDP, there will be growing dispersal of economic power as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey,

and other fast-growing economies catch up. Thus, the world is right now passing through a period of transition from the US unipolar moment towards multipolarity. As new centers of power emerge and the world becomes genuinely multipolar, we may witness a new balance and equilibrium in international politics. There is, however, no guarantee that even when a new equilibrium of power in international politics is reached, the new world order would be governed by principles of justice and fair play. The likelihood is that in the foreseeable future, realpolitik rather than the principles of the UN Charter or international law will be the determining factor in international politics in the handling of strategic issues of peace and security. Principles and legitimacy will be relevant in the deliberations on international issues. But, in the ultimate analysis, power considerations will play an overriding role when decisions are to be taken by statesmen on major strategic issues.

We have already elaborated the salient features and characteristics of the emerging global scenario in Chap. 2. The case of China, which is catching up fast with the USA in the economic field, is especially noteworthy. Within a decade and a half, it is likely to become the biggest economy in the world in nominal dollar terms. In purchasing power parity terms, it has already done so according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and technological strength, it will take China several decades to catch up with the USA. The same is true about military strength, in which the USA will remain supreme for a long time to come, till at least the dawn of the second half of the current century after which China may surpass it. The network of the US alliances with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, and its fast-growing strategic partnership with India, however, will continue to give it a formidable advantage over China for a long time to come. Therefore, the balance of power will shift against the USA gradually even if China is able to maintain a high rate of economic growth, which is far from guaranteed. Still as this process takes place, the US ability to undertake unilateral military interventions abroad will correspondingly diminish. One can already see the limitations of the US power in its retreat from Iraq and Afghanistan where it has now only token military presence, as well as in the handling of the crises in Syria and Ukraine.

Asia with China, India, and Japan as the first-, third-, and fifth-biggest economies of the world by 2050 in terms of GDP at market exchange rates (in constant 2011 dollars) will emerge as the center of gravity in

the world in terms of economic power followed by the USA as the second biggest economy.¹ Specifically, the expected GDP of China, the USA, India, and Japan would be \$46.3 trillion, \$38.7 trillion, \$15.4 trillion, and \$6.2 trillion, respectively, at that time in constant 2005 dollars. The combined GDP of the EU in constant 2005 dollars would be \$26.6 trillion by 2050.² If we add the GDP of other fast-growing Asian economies such as South Korea and Indonesia, Asia will be on top economically compared with other regions of the world. In keeping with the historical experience, the concentration of military power will also gradually shift in favor of Asia in the second half of the current century corresponding to the growth of its economic power.

The world will witness shifting alliances in search of a new power equilibrium not only at the global level but also at the regional levels. In this anarchic world lacking both balance and international morality, the ultimate guarantee for any country's security would be its own power and the power of its close allies. The UN will play second fiddle to the exigencies of global power politics. Other factors complicating the global geostrategic scenario would include the civilizational tensions that Huntington elaborated in his celebrated book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, the ascendancy of economic forces in the global and regional politics, the growing importance of science and technology in this knowledge-driven world, emergence and growth of regional economic groupings, and the increasing awareness and recognition of the human rights of individuals. There is no sign that the ideological quest for the right balance between the individual and the society has come to an end in contrast with the claim made by Francis Fukuyama in his book *The End of History and the Last Man*. It is in this complicated world in disorder that Pakistan must determine its goals, work out its strategy, and have tryst with its destiny.

PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL GOALS

Pakistan came into being because of the desire of the Muslims of British India to have a separate homeland where they could lead their lives in accordance with their cultural and religious values free from the domination of the Hindu majority. As the several speeches of the Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah show, its governmental structure and functioning were to be based on Islam's progressive, democratic, and liberal ideals to enable its people to develop their genius and realize fully their potential.

Thus, Pakistan was to provide the fullest scope for this purpose not only to its Muslim citizens but also to the religious minorities enabling them to lead their lives free of religious discrimination. The challenge facing Pakistan, therefore, is to work out a system in which opportunities are available to all of its citizens, irrespective of caste or creed, to live in dignity and realize their potential in an atmosphere of freedom, moderation, and tolerance.

Under such a system, the civil, political, economic, and social rights of all citizens would be protected. There would be no room for religious extremism and bigotry in such a society in accordance with the Islamic injunction that there should be no compulsion in matters relating to religion. The tidal wave of religious extremism and terrorism sweeping the country poses a serious threat to the ideals on which Pakistan was founded. It is the foremost duty of the government and nationals of Pakistan to strive to the utmost in overcoming this menace and establish in the country a democratic, liberal, and progressive system of governance offering full scope and opportunity to all Pakistanis for the development and realization of their potential. A progressive political, social, and economic system in Pakistan would ensure that its citizens have easy access to necessities of life as well as high quality education and health facilities in an atmosphere of internal peace, harmony, and stability. Rapid economic progress, eradication of poverty, provision of employment opportunities, and narrowing down of the inequalities of income and wealth must, therefore, be high on the list of the priorities of any government in Pakistan.

Besides these internal tasks, which have a direct and close link with internal security and stability, Pakistan is faced with serious external threats to its security, the foremost being the threat posed by India's historical animosity to its existence as an independent and sovereign nation and by its hegemonic designs in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Pakistan's grand strategy must take into account the threat posed by India and neutralize it in the best interest of Pakistan.

The evolving situation in Afghanistan, especially in the aftermath of the withdrawal of most of the American military forces from the country, is a matter of direct concern to Pakistan's policy makers. Armed conflict and instability in Afghanistan pose a direct threat to Pakistan's security, especially when viewed in the context of the feared involvement of external powers such as India in the former's internal affairs. Historically speaking, Pakistan has been directly affected by the spillover effects of armed

conflicts, instability, and foreign occupation in Afghanistan as witnessed during the Soviet occupation from 1979 to 1989 and the US occupation since 2001. Afghanistan's irredentist claims against the border areas in Pakistan are another complicating factor in their bilateral relationship. We need to evolve an effective policy for dealing with Afghanistan taking into account all of these complications.

Pakistan's grand strategy must also deal with the changing security environment in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and Persian Gulf regions with which Pakistan enjoys close historical, geographical, economic, cultural, and strategic links. Pakistan's ideological background necessitates that it should maintain close ties of cooperation with the Muslim countries. As the crisis in Yemen shows, this will not be an easy task because of the conflicting expectations of the Arab countries of the Gulf and Iran. Pakistan cannot afford to lose the friendship of either side. This necessitates a well-balanced approach and proactive diplomacy in concert with Turkey for encouraging mutual understanding and reconciliation between Iran and the Arab countries. In any case, Pakistan should refrain from interference in the internal affairs of the Arab countries and taking sides in intra-Arab disputes.

Russia's resurgence under President Putin after its debacle in the Cold War of the last century, Moscow's resistance to the relentless eastward expansion of NATO and the EU, and the growing strategic partnership between China and Russia offer new opportunities for safeguarding Pakistan's national interests. Islamabad must exploit fully these opportunities.

All this must take place within the framework of the evolving security environment at the regional and global levels. Needless to say, the goal of Pakistan's grand strategy would be to safeguard and promote Pakistan's national interests. Specifically, it would mean the safeguarding of Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity against external threats, the maintenance of internal stability and cohesion, ensuring Pakistan's rapid economic progress, and the protection and development of its cultural identity.

STRATEGY AND GRAND STRATEGY

Liddell Hart defines strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy."³ According to him, the true aim of strategy "is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation

so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this. In other words, dislocation is the aim of strategy; its sequel may be either the enemy's dissolution or his easier disruption in battle."⁴ Sun Tzu expresses the same idea differently: "Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."⁵

Liddell Hart stresses the superiority of the indirect over the direct approach in strategy as in other spheres of life. To quote him once again, "effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent's unreadiness to meet it."⁶ The purpose of strategy is "to diminish the possibility of resistance, and it seeks to fulfill this purpose by exploiting the elements of *movement* and *surprise*." This is done by choosing the line of least expectation and exploiting the line of least resistance.⁷ The main guiding principle of war is "the concentration of strength against weakness. And for any real value it needs to be explained that the concentration of strength against weakness depends on the dispersion of your opponent's strength, which in turn is produced by a distribution of your own that gives the appearance, and partial effect of dispersion. Your dispersion, his dispersion, your concentration—such is the sequence, and each is a sequel. True concentration is the fruit of calculated dispersion."⁸ For success in war, enemy's strategic dislocation must be followed by exploitation of the opportunity provided by the dislocation.

However, as Liddell Hart stresses, "pure military strategy needs to be guided by the longer and wider view from the higher plane of grand strategy."⁹ According to him, "the role of grand strategy—higher strategy—is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy."¹⁰ Thus, grand strategy would involve itself with the overall direction of the war or the conduct of the national policy for the attainment of its object. In other words, grand strategy is virtually synonymous with national policy in pursuance of national goals. It is in this sense that the term "grand strategy" is employed in this book.

In some cases, the principles of grand strategy may vary from those of strategy because while strategy focuses on winning a war, grand strategy concerns itself primarily with the overall utilization of a nation's resources for the attainment of national goals through war or otherwise. However, it must be emphasized that the indirect approach is as relevant to the

formulation and conduct of grand strategy as to strategy. The main principles of grand strategy can be summarized as follows:

- Grand strategy of a country should aim at attaining a better peace than what is available for its security and prosperity, keeping in view the nation's overall resources, the resources and aims of its opponent or opponents, and the strengths and weaknesses of both.
- Its focus should be on the development and optimum utilization of the nation's resources and strengths (political, economic, military, diplomatic, moral, and intellectual) so as to concentrate them on the enemy's weaknesses while not allowing its own weaknesses to be exposed to the enemy's offensive.
- A long-term and comprehensive approach, prudence, and caution should be the hallmarks of grand strategy.
- The greatest error in grand strategy is strategic overstretch, which is the direct consequence of pursuing goals that are far beyond the reach of the nation's resources. It leads to a state of strategic exhaustion and national demoralization. "The experience of history brings ample evidence that the downfall of civilized States tends to come not from the direct assaults of foes but from internal decay, combined with the consequences of exhaustion in war."¹¹ The disintegration of the Soviet Union bears testimony to this fundamental truth.
- Rapid economic growth is desirable per se for the welfare and prosperity of the people at large. But it is also imperative that a country, in the interest of its long-term security, must grow economically at a higher rate than its enemy/opponent. (See Fig. 9.1.) Economic stagnation or slower rate of economic growth of a country compared with that of its opponent puts it at a growing disadvantage with the passage of time and, thus, poses a long-term threat to its security.
- An indirect approach in the formulation of grand strategy is as relevant as it is to strategy. Instead of a frontal offensive against the enemy, an attempt should be made to exploit its vulnerabilities through indirect moves. The goal should be to achieve the enemy's strategic dislocation and the required results, preferably without fighting a war, through the elements of surprise and fluidity. The emphasis should be on subtlety, indirect moves, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage through elaborate multilayer maneuvers.

- Thus, the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field.¹²
- When the enemy is superior in strength, it may be advisable to adopt a policy of defense and limited aim with the objectives of preserving what one has and changing the balance of forces in one's favor over time. The essential requirement for its success, of course, is that time should be on one's side and not on the side of one's opponent.
- While strategy is concerned with the conduct of war with a view to achieving victory, grand strategy concerns itself with the peace that is desired. An exclusive focus on victory may exhaust a country so much as to prevent it from benefiting from the peace thereafter.
- "While it is hard to make a real peace with the predatory types (of states), it is easier to induce them to accept a state of truce—and far less exhausting than attempt to crush them."¹³
- "Furthermore, if and when you reach your military goal, the more you ask of the defeated side the more trouble you will have, and the more cause you will provide for an ultimate attempt to reverse the settlement achieved by the war."¹⁴
- The grand strategy must be reviewed from time to time to modify it taking into account new developments and circumstances that may require a change in the goals of national policy and the grand strategy to attain them.

RECOMMENDED GRAND STRATEGY FOR PAKISTAN

It would be advisable here to recapitulate the main threats posed to Pakistan's security and prosperity as follows:

- A serious external threat is posed by India's hegemonic designs in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region and its historical animosity to Pakistan's existence as an independent and sovereign nation. Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, and river-water disputes are additional sources of strains and tensions in Pakistan-India relations. The aim of India's hegemonic designs is to make Pakistan subservient to India politically, economically, and even militarily, virtually turning it into India's satellite. Its maximalist position would be to see Pakistan joining India either in a federation or a confederation.

In view of the possession of the nuclear deterrent by Pakistan, India is unlikely to rely exclusively on military means to bring Pakistan down on its knees. In pursuance of the indirect strategic approach, it would rather take advantage of Pakistan's vulnerabilities in other sectors. For this purpose, it would take steps to weaken Pakistan economically, destabilize it internally, and undermine its cultural identity instead of launching an all-out military offensive. By increasing its own military expenditure rapidly, it would try to force Pakistan to allocate more and more resources to the military sector, thus depriving its economic sector of the resources required for accelerating economic growth and weakening its long-term security. It would also covertly support moves to aggravate political instability in Pakistan. Finally, it would undermine Pakistan's distinct cultural identity by launching a cultural offensive through print and electronic media and other means to persuade the people of Pakistan that culturally they are the same as the Indians. If this line of thinking is accepted by the Pakistanis, Pakistan's *raison d'être* would disappear.

India would also like to use Pakistan's membership of the proposed South Asian Economic Union to make it an appendage of the Indian economy. In such a situation, decisions about Pakistan's economy and even about its politics and security would be taken in New Delhi turning it into India's satellite or a junior partner in a scheme of confederation with India. According to all available indications, India is already pursuing this strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan. (For a detailed exposition of these points, see Chaps. 4 and 5).

- The threat emanating from lack of peace and stability in Afghanistan, especially in the aftermath of the US military withdrawal from it. (For details, see Chap. 6). An unfriendly government in Afghanistan would present Pakistan with the nightmare of two-front scenario.
- The growing US strategic partnership with India to build it up as a counterweight to the expansion of China's power and influence, especially in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. For this purpose, the USA has been behind direct and indirect moves in support of the Indian hegemonic designs in South Asia. The US pressure on Islamabad for permitting India to use the land route through Pakistan for its trade with Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics and to enter into a program of economic integration with India,

which would minimize Pakistan's economic and political autonomy, is designed to support India's hegemonic designs in the region.

- As part of its long-term designs to establish its dominance over Pakistan, India is also engaged in a carefully considered scheme to isolate it at the regional level by weakening its strategic links with China, neutralizing Iran's support to Pakistan, and gaining a strategic foothold in Afghanistan. India hopes that its rapidly growing trade and economic links with China would have the effect of weakening Pakistan-China strategic links. It has been taking advantage of Pakistan-Iran differences on Afghanistan and other issues to weaken their friendship. It is also engaged in efforts to build up strategic ties with Afghanistan with a view to exerting pressure on Pakistan from the West.
- Besides these external threats, Pakistan is also faced with serious internal threats to its security and economic prosperity. The foremost among them is the wave of religious extremism and terrorism sweeping the country. Political instability caused by the insurgency in Balochistan and repeated military takeovers and interventions in political affairs also pose a threat to the country's security. Absence of the rule of law and the denial of quick justice to the weak and the poor are other threats to social harmony and internal cohesion.
- As elaborated earlier in this book, particularly in Chaps. 9 and 10, Pakistan's slow rate of economic growth rate as compared with that of India over the past two decades carries serious implications for Pakistan's long-term security. Figure 9.1 illustrates the threat that such a situation poses to a country's security. Slow economic growth and growing inequalities of income and wealth have serious implications for Pakistan's security also because of their potential to cause social unrest and weaken it vis-à-vis its actual and potential opponents/enemies.

THE WAY FORWARD

Keeping in view the foregoing considerations and the analysis of the regional and global security scenario given in the preceding chapters, the essential elements of Pakistan's grand strategy in dealing with the world of the twenty-first century should be as follows:

Acceleration of economic growth:

- Pakistan, in pursuance of a long-term grand strategy, must set rapid economic growth as its supreme national aim to which everything else

must be subordinated. Our minimum target should be a rate of growth that is higher than that of India, the only country that currently can pose a direct threat to Pakistan's security. Pakistan's GDP growth rates for 2013–14 and 2014–15 were 4.1 % and 4.2% respectively, whereas India's GDP growth rate was as high as 8–9% a few years ago and is about 7.5% currently. Our target should be a GDP growth rate of over 9% at least. This would require the allocation of a much higher proportion of the GDP to economic development than is the case now together with a program of far-reaching economic reforms to enhance the efficiency and productivity of Pakistan's private and public sectors. In other words, Pakistan would have to push its national security curve outward from its current position at Y1Y1 to Y2Y2 in terms of Fig. 9.1.

- In pursuance of the supreme national aim of rapid economic growth, the government of Pakistan should allocate maximum possible resources to the task of economic development while providing necessary resources for maintaining a credible security deterrent at the lowest level of military forces and armaments. In the financial year 2015–16, a total amount of Rs.1135 billion was allocated to the defense sector including Rs.781 billion to defense services, Rs.174 billion to military pensions and Rs.180 billion under contingencies. The total defense sector allocation amounted to 46% of the net federal revenues, which were estimated to be Rs.2463 billion.¹⁵ This high rate of defense expenditure is unsustainable for Pakistan's weak economy. The high ratio of defense expenditure in the net federal revenues should be brought down by rapidly raising the tax-to-GDP ratio and controlling the defense expenditure through innovative military strategies.
- The government should take steps to raise our national saving and investment rates to accelerate our economic growth rate. Our national saving and investment rates of 14.5 and 15.1 % respectively in 2014–15 were nowhere near the desired levels.¹⁶ We should aim at raising them well above 30% if the target of GDP growth rate of 9% is to be achieved. At both national and governmental levels, we should adopt austerity to raise our national saving rate so that we may finance the desired national investment rate without having to rely excessively on external sources of finance, which is the case right now. Austerity and self-reliance should be our national mottos.
- For prospering in this knowledge-driven world, it is imperative that Pakistan assign the highest priority to providing high-quality

education to its people, especially the children on whom the future destiny of the nation depends. The allocation of resources to education as a percentage of GDP should be far above the minimum of 4% required by UNESCO instead of the low level of less than 2% that is the case now, according to the Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2014–15. Similarly, we should allocate a high proportion of our national resources to research and development.

- In the interest of enhancing the welfare of the people and social harmony, we should provide quality health care facilities and other necessities of life at affordable rates to its people. At present, we are spending only 0.4% of GDP on health, which is totally inadequate. Steps should also be taken to reduce the wide inequalities of income and wealth in the country.
- The tax net should be widened and tax evasion should be eliminated to raise the tax-to-GDP ratio to over 25% at least as against our current low level of about 10% and the average of 15% in the developing countries. This would enable us to raise additional resources for meeting the requirements of both rapid economic growth and the maintenance of a credible security deterrent at the lowest level of armed forces and armaments while lowering the ratio of defense expenditure in the net revenues of the federal government. Taxation reforms must, therefore, form part and parcel of any program of rapid economic growth in Pakistan. The main burden of additional taxes should fall on the well-to-do classes in Pakistan instead of those suffering from poverty and deprivation.

Adoption of a low-risk and nonadventurist foreign policy:

- Acceleration of economic growth would require peace around Pakistan's borders. For this purpose, Pakistan should follow a firm but low-risk and non-adventurist foreign policy, especially in the management of its relations with India and Afghanistan, while safeguarding its national interests. Such a policy would reduce the risk of major armed conflicts, thus enabling us to divert our resources to the urgent and massive task of rapid economic development.
- In view of the status of both Pakistan and India as de facto nuclear-weapon states, peace between them is a strategic imperative. We should, therefore, take steps to defuse tensions in our relations with India, continue efforts for the peaceful settlement of outstanding

disputes, and adopt mutually agreed confidence-building measures to minimize the risk of an armed conflict between the two countries, which is not in the interest of either one of them. We should also engage India in mutually beneficial cooperation in various areas including trade on a level playing field while safeguarding the health of Pakistan's economy and its cultural identity.

- While pursuing a policy of peace and dialogue with India, we should remain firm on safeguarding our national interests. Dialogue between Pakistan and India is in the best interest of the two countries. It is not a favor to be granted by one side to the other. This is particularly relevant in dealing with the current Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in India, which has adopted a muscular style of diplomacy and clearly demonstrated its hegemonic designs vis-à-vis Pakistan. (For details, see Chap. 4). A policy of appeasement toward such an expansionist and hegemonic power would merely whet its appetite for more and more one-sided concessions from Pakistan. We should, therefore, combine firmness in maintaining our principled positions on outstanding issues with a nonadventurist and nonprovocative approach.
- Pakistan should adopt a long-term strategy for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute instead of rushing into an agreement that it may regret later. It should be obvious that a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute now when India is placed in a much more favorable position compared with Pakistan, is likely to be on the Indian terms. We must, therefore, bide our time and go for a final settlement at a time of our choice. Meanwhile, we should avoid Kargil-type adventures, maintain our principled position on Kashmir in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and continue our efforts for a negotiated just solution of the Kashmir dispute. Since a satisfactory settlement of the Kashmir dispute may not be attainable in the immediate future because of the Indian intransigence as shown by our historical experience, we may, in the interim, also try to negotiate with India ways and means to improve the human rights condition of the Kashmiri people in the Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK), ensure maximum possible autonomy for them, demilitarize IOK, and promote cross-LOC (Line of Control) trade and travel.
- We should pursue a policy of noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs in coordination with Iran, Turkey, China, and other neighboring countries. We should facilitate and support intra-Afghan dialogue

aimed at national reconciliation and a fair political settlement among the various Afghan parties and groups to ensure durable peace in Afghanistan. Pakistan should also provide development assistance to Afghanistan to help in the reconstruction and economic progress of the country. We should further develop people-to-people contacts between the two countries and build up bridges of understanding and friendship with the various ethnic communities, Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns, in Afghanistan.

- One cannot place enough emphasis on the strategic importance of Pakistan-China friendship and cooperation. We must develop our friendship, strategic ties, economic cooperation, and cultural ties with China to the maximum extent possible. The agreement on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor signed during Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Islamabad in April 2015, which involved Chinese investment amounting to \$46 billion in Pakistan, was hugely significant because of its favorable strategic and economic implications for the two countries. (For details, see Chap. 3). Every effort must be made for the expeditious implementation of this agreement. In pursuance of our drive to overcome religious extremism and terrorism in the country, we should take all possible steps to exterminate any followers of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) who may still be on our soil. This is not only the logical demand of Pakistan-China friendship but also in our own best national interests.
- Our ties with Iran constitute a critically important element in our national security strategy. Iran also offers attractive opportunities for economic and commercial cooperation. The security and the economic well-being of the two countries are closely linked. We must, therefore, preserve and strengthen our friendship and cooperation with Iran in various fields both bilaterally and within the framework of the Economic Cooperation Organization. The expeditious implementation of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, which would serve the best interests of the two countries, must be given top priority now that the hurdle of the Western sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program are out of the way. (For details, see Chap. 7). It would also be in our and Iran's strategic and economic interests to involve it in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project.
- For regional economic cooperation and integration, ECO rather than SAARC should be the regional organization of Pakistan's choice. (For detailed reasons in support of this point of view, see Chap. 5).

- We must pay due attention to the development of our friendly ties and cooperation with other Muslim countries, especially Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Central Asian Republics, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Egypt. We should facilitate the settlement of disputes between the Muslim countries, especially in the Gulf region, and avoid taking sides in intra-Arab disputes. We must play an active role in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to promote cooperation among the Muslim countries in political, security, economic, and cultural fields. It should be Pakistan's effort to promote peace, stability, and security in the Persian Gulf region, which has direct implications for its security and economic progress.
- The USA will remain the most powerful and influential nation of the world, economically and militarily, for a long time to come despite China's rapid rise. It will also continue to be a leading nation in terms of the advancement of knowledge and technology in the foreseeable future. Its democratic values are a source of inspiration to the rest of the world. It exercises vast influence in various multilateral institutions. There are several areas where our interests converge with those of the USA such as peace and stability in South Asia and Afghanistan, the struggle against international terrorism, promotion of democratic values and religious moderation, prevention of nuclear proliferation, and the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in different fields. The USA has also been an important source of economic, military, and technical assistance to Pakistan. We should, therefore, maintain and even strengthen further friendly ties and wide-ranging cooperation with it while making known our views on its efforts to build up India as a counterweight to China, which can disturb strategic balance in South Asia.
- Pakistan must build up friendly ties with Russia and develop mutually beneficial cooperation with it in as many fields as possible.
- Western Europe and Japan are other important players in the international arena deserving Pakistan's especial attention for the development of friendly links and cooperation with them.
- Finally, multilateral institutions play an important role in the development of new norms of international behavior and in their enforcement. We must play an active role in their deliberations to safeguard our national interests and to promote regional and global peace and prosperity.

Strengthening of internal political stability:

- Democratic institutions should be nurtured to strengthen political stability in the country. Military takeovers of the country's government should be totally ruled out.
- Pakistan's distinct cultural identity and way of life must be preserved in line with the spirit of enlightenment and in accordance with the principles of moderation and tolerance.
- Devolution of powers to provincial and local levels should be encouraged to enable the people to have easy access to administrative departments relevant to their day-to-day life.
- The rule of law should be strengthened so that everybody is treated equally before law. Steps should be taken to provide easy and quick justice to the people.
- In dealing with the insurgency in Balochistan or other provincial grievances, reliance must be placed primarily on dialogue and political means rather than the use of force.
- A multidimensional approach incorporating dialogue, deterrence, and development as appropriate should be adopted in rooting out the problem of terrorism in the country. Religious moderation should be promoted in accordance with the true teachings and spirit of Islam. Foreign support, financial or otherwise, to terrorism in Pakistan should be terminated through effective measures. Minorities must be assured of their constitutional and legal rights so that they can live with dignity as proud citizens of Pakistan.

Innovative military strategy:

- Our military strategy must be formulated within the framework of the grand strategy outlined above to form a well-integrated whole in our best national interests. Needless to say, this strategy must be reviewed and modified from time to time taking into account new developments and trends.
- The maintenance of a credible security deterrent at the lowest level of armed forces and armaments should be the central element of our military strategy. This would require the maintenance of both conventional and nuclear forces so as to deter any act of aggression by India against Pakistan and prevent the outbreak of an all-out armed conflict between the two countries. If the deterrent fails, our armed

forces should be in a position to inflict unacceptable damage upon India.

- While the armed forces must be provided with necessary resources and support to enable them to discharge their responsibilities for the defense of the country, the military leadership should come up with innovative approaches for safeguarding the national security without over-burdening the nation's limited resources.
- Increased emphasis on improving the quality of the officers and soldiers through better training as against the tendency to increase merely the numbers may be one way to enhance the effectiveness of the armed forces without placing excessive demands on the country's resources. This may enable the government to allocate maximum possible resources to the task of rapid economic development, which should be the supreme national aim under the proposed grand strategy, while safeguarding the national security.
- We should diversify our sources of advanced military equipment to lessen our vulnerability to any single source. Simultaneously, we should develop our own indigenous defense production capabilities.

CONCLUSION

The linchpin of Pakistan's grand strategy, taking into account the national situation and the security environment at the regional and global levels, should be assigning the top priority to the goal of rapid economic growth and subordinating everything else to the attainment of this supreme national objective. This would require single-minded focus on and maximum possible allocation of resources to the task of economic development. However, this would be possible only if we have peace in our neighborhood and avoid a major armed conflict allowing us to allocate the lion's share of our resources to economic development while maintaining a credible security deterrent. This in turn would require us to pursue a low-risk and non-adventurist foreign policy. Over-ambitious foreign policy goals should be avoided so that we do not fall into the trap of strategic over-stretch and exhaustion in which we are caught at present. We will also have to strengthen ourselves by entering into alliances with like-minded countries to safeguard our security.

Internally, we would have to stabilize ourselves politically, overcome the menace of terrorism and religious extremism, and adopt a program of economic reforms to accelerate our economic growth through the

improvement of economic management in public and private sectors. In other words, we would have to push our national security curve in Fig. 9.1 from the current position at Y1Y1 to Y2Y2.

Such a grand strategy may not produce any dramatic positive results in the immediate future. But it certainly would enable Pakistan to avoid a major national disaster, which might befall it if it continues with its current haphazard policies. The recommended grand strategy in the long run carries the promise of enabling it to promote its national interests as defined earlier and realize its cherished foreign policy goals provided it remains steadfast in pursuing it, bides its time, and exploits the right opportunities.

NOTES

1. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), “The BRICS and Beyond: Prospects, Challenges and Opportunities,” *World in 2050*, PwC Economics, January 2013, at www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-report-january-2013.pdf. (See Table 1.1).
2. Uri Dadush and Bennett Stancil, “The World in 2050,” *Policy Outlook*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2010.
3. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Faber & Faber, 1954, 1967), p. 321.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
5. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Lionel Giles (Blaacksburg, VA: Thrifty Books, 2009), chapter III, paragraph 2.
6. Hart, *Strategy*, p. 5.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 323.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 334.
9. *Ibid.*, p. xvii.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 322.
11. Hart, *Strategy*, p. 359.
12. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, chapter III, paragraphs 2 and 3.
13. Hart, *Strategy*, p. 359.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 357.
15. Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, *Federal Budget 2015–16: Budget in Brief* (Islamabad, Pakistan: Government of Pakistan, 2015), at http://www.finance.gov.pk/budget/Budget_in_Brief_2015_16.pdf.
16. S. Ejaz Wasti (Economic Advisor), *Pakistan Economic Survey 2014–15*, (Islamabad, Pakistan: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, 2015), at http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey_1415.html.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Afghan Peace Accord (Islamabad Accord). 1993. *International Conflict Research (INCORE)*, 7 March 1993. <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/afgan1.pdf>
- AFP. 2015. Pakistan's role in peace talks deserves credit: Ghani. *The Dawn*, 21 February 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1164977>
- Ahmed, Beenish. 2015. Less than 2 percent of terrorist attacks in the E.U. are religiously motivated. *ThinkProgress*, 8 January 2015. <http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/01/08/3609796/islamist-terrorism-europe/>
- Ali, Abullah Yusuf. Trans. 1934. *The glorious Quran*. Lahore, India: Sh. Muhammad Ashaf Publishers.
- Ali, Syed Ameer. 2003. *The spirit of Islam*. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing.
- Allawi, Ali A. 2009. *The crisis of Islamic civilization*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Amin, Shahid M. 2000. *Pakistan's foreign policy: A reappraisal*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Anderlini, Jamil, and Lucy Hornby. 2014. China overtakes US as world's largest goods trader. *Financial Times*, 10 January 2014. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7c2dbd70-79a6-11e3-b381-00144feabdc0.html>
- Angang, Hu. 2015. Embracing China's 'New Normal'. *Foreign Affairs*, May–June 2015 issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-04-20/embracing-chinas-new-normal>
- APP. 2014. US creating Pakistan-Iran rift: Khamenei. *The Nation*, 13 May 2014. <http://nation.com.pk/national/13-May-2014/us-creating-pakistan-iran-rift-khamenei>
- Armstrong, Karen. 2000. *Islam: A short history*. New York: Modern Library.

- Asad, Muhammad. 2003. *The message of the Qu'ran*. London: Book Foundation.
- Asia Regional Integration Center (ARIC). *Integration Indicators Database*. <https://aric.adb.org/integrationindicators>
- Aslan, Reza. 2005. *No God but God: The origins, evolution and future of Islam*. New York: Random House.
- Associated Press. 2014. Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani meet in attempt to repair ties. *The Daily News*, 16 November 2014. <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/pakistan-pm-sharif-afghan-prez-ghani-meet-repair-ties-article-1.2012596>
- Axworthy, Michael. 2008. *A history of Iran*. New York: Basic Books.
- Baabar, Mariana. 2015. Pakistan ready for mediation between Kabul, Taliban: FO. *The News*, 21 February 2015. <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-35998-Pakistan-ready-for-mediation-between-Kabul,-Taliban:-FO>
- Baloch, N.A. 1989. *Great books of Islamic civilization*. Islamabad: Pakistan Hijra Council.
- Behera, Laxman K. 2012. India's defence budget 2012–13. *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, 20 March 2012. http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasDefenceBudget2012-13_LaxmanBehera_200312
- Biddle, Stephen. 2013. Ending the war in Afghanistan. *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2013 issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2013-08-12/ending-war-afghanistan>
- Bird, Mike. 2015. China's new development bank is becoming a massive embarrassment for Obama. *Business Insider*, 31 March 2015. <http://www.businessinsider.com/us-allies-joining-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-aiib-embarrassment-2015-3>
- Boesche, Roger. 2003. Kautilya's Arthashastra on war and diplomacy in ancient India. *The Journal of Military History* 67(1): 9–37.
- Bringing disputes to UN won't help, says Modi. *The Daily News*, 28 September 2014.
- Brooks, Stephen G., John G. Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth. 2013. Lean forward. *Foreign Affairs*, January–February 2013 issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2012-11-30/lean-forward>
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 2012. *Strategic vision—America and the crisis of global power*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Burke, S.M., and Lawrence Ziring. 1991. *Pakistan's foreign policy*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Bush, George W. 2002a. *Remarks at 2002 graduation exercise of the United States Military Academy*. West Point, New York, 1 June 2002. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>
- Bush, George W. 2002b. *The national security strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: The White House. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>

- Buzan, Barry. 1991. New patterns. *International Affairs* 67(3): 448–449.
- Chang, Gordon G. 2014. Blame capital flight for China's biggest ever fall in forex reserves. *Forbes/World Affairs*, 19 October 2014. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2014/10/19/blame-capital-flight-for-chinas-biggest-ever-fall-in-forex-reserves/>
- Chasing the Chinese dream. *The Economist*, 4–10 May 2013, pp. 20–22.
- Chatterjee, Saikat, and Rachel Armstrong. 2014. China currency claims a bigger share of reserve manager portfolios. *Reuters*, 29 October 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/29/us-china-summit-reserves-reuters-summit-idUSKBN0II0VX20141029>
- China's defense budget. *GlobalSecurity*. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget-table.htm>
- Choudhry, G.W. 1993. *The last days of United Pakistan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cowper-Coles, Sherard. 2012. *Cables from Kabul*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Dadush, Uri, and Bennett Stancil. 2010. The world in 2050. *Policy Outlook*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2010.
- Dao, James. 2002. A nation challenged: President Bush sets role for US in Afghan rebuilding. *The New York Times*, 18 April 2002. <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/18/world/a-nation-challenged-the-president-bush-sets-role-for-us-in-afghan-rebuilding.html>
- Doniger, Wendy. 2014. *On Hinduism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Economic and Financial Indicators. *The Economist*, 18–24 April 2015, p. 76.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. 2006. *Foresight 2020*. New York, NY: The Economist, http://graphics.eiu.com/files/ad_pdfs/eiuForesight2020_WP.pdf
- Eghbal, Media. 2013. Forecast: World's largest economies in 2010. *Euromonitor International*, 16 May 2013. <http://blog.euromonitor.com/2013/05/forecast-worlds-largest-economies-in-2020.html>
- Elmasry, Mohammad. 2015. Chapel Hill shooting and western media bigotry. *The Nation*, 13 February 2015. <http://nation.com.pk/international/13-Feb-2015/chapel-hill-shooting-and-western-media-bigotry>
- Excerpts from Pentagon's plan: Prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. *The New York Times*, 8 March 1992. <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/excerpts-from-pentagon-s-plan-prevent-the-re-emergence-of-a-new-rival.html>
- Fairbank, John King, and Merle Goldman. 1992. *China—A new history*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Friedel, Jay. 2013. Iran-Pakistan relations. [Blog post.] *Jafriedel*, 11 September 2013. <https://jafriedel.wordpress.com/2013/09/11/iran-pakistan-relations>
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. The end of history? *The National Interest* 16(Summer), pp. 3–18.

- Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The end of history and the last man*. New York, NY: Avon Books.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political order and political decay: From the industrial revolution to the globalisation of democracy*. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Full Text: President Obama's 2015 State of the Union Address. *Forbes*, 20 January 2015. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2015/01/20/full-text-president-obamas-2015-state-of-the-union-address>
- Ghani's remarks. *The Dawn*, 11 August 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1199889>
- Golwalkar, M.S. 1939. *We, or our nationhood defined*. Nagpur: Bharat Publications.
- Gorbachev, Mikhail. 1988. *Address to the 43rd United Nations General Assembly Session*. New York, 7 December 1988. <http://www.c-span.org/video/?5292-1/gorbachev-united-nations>
- Government of Pakistan, Finance Division. 2014. *Federal budget 2014–15: Budget in brief*. Islamabad, Pakistan: Government of Pakistan. http://www.finance.gov.pk/budget/Budget_in_Brief_2014_15.pdf
- Government of Pakistan, Finance Division. 2015. *Federal budget 2015–16: Budget in brief*. Islamabad, Pakistan: Government of Pakistan. http://www.finance.gov.pk/budget/Budget_in_Brief_2015_16.pdf
- Haas, Richard N. 2008. The age of nonpolarity. *Foreign Affairs*, May–June 2008 issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-05-03/age-nonpolarity>
- Haider, Mateen. 2015. China ready to support Kabul-Taliban reconciliation. *The Dawn*, 12 February 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1163118>
- Haider, Mateen, and Irfan Haider. 2015. Nawaz Sharif pledges support in Afghan fight against Taliban. *The Dawn*, 12 May 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1181502>
- Haider, Mehtab. 2015. Foreign hand in terror activities won't be tolerated: PM. *The News*, 20 January 2015. <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-35358-Foreign-hand-in-terror-activities-wont-be-tolerated-PM>
- Hart, B.H. Liddell. 1954/1967. *Strategy*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Holtom, Paul, Mark Bromley, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman. 2013. *Trends in international arms transfers, 2012*. Stockholm: SIPRI. http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=455#.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. The clash of civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993 issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations>
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York, NY: Touchstone.
- Husain, Javid. 2004. The process of foreign policy formulation in Pakistan. *Briefing Paper for Pakistani Parliamentarians*, Briefing Paper No. 12. Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT),

- April 2004. <http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP/TheProcessofForeignPolicyFormulationinPakistan.pdf>
- Husain, Javid. 2006a. National security redefined. *The Dawn*, 26 June 2006.
- Husain, Javid. 2006b. National security redefined. *The Dawn*, 29 April 2006.
- Husain, Javid. 2007. Iran: An estranged friend. *The Dawn*, 26 March 2007. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1069954>. Re-used with the permission of *The Dawn*.
- Husain, Javid Husain. 2013. Pakistan's option: SAARC or ECO? *Criterion Quarterly* 7(4). http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/pakistans-option-saarc-or-eco/#_ftn1
- Husain, Javid. 2013a. Case for comprehensive security. *The Nation*, 15 October 2013.
- Husain, Javid. 2013b. China's rise and the global order. *Criterion Quarterly* 8(3). <http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/china%E2%80%99s-rise-and-the-global-order/>
- Husain, Javid. 2013c. Towards comprehensive security. *The Nation*, 23 July 2013.
- Husain, Javid. 2014a. Long on promises. *The Nation*, 10 June 2014. <http://nation.com.pk/columns/10-Jun-2014/long-on-promises>
- Husain, Javid. 2014b. Long-term prospects of Pakistan-India relations. *Criterion Quarterly* 9(3). <http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/long-term-prospects-of-pakistan-india-relations/>
- Husain, Javid. 2014c. Nawaz Sharif's visit to Iran. *The Nation*, 13 May 2014. <http://nation.com.pk/columns/13-May-2014/nawaz-sharif-s-visit-to-iran>
- Husain, Javid. 2014d. The enduring Indian threat. *The Nation*, 14 October 2014. <http://nation.com.pk/columns/14-Oct-2014/enduring-the-indian-threat>
- Husain, Javid. 2015a. Afghanistan after Mullah Omar. *The Nation*, 18 August 2015. <http://nation.com.pk/columns/18-Aug-2015/afghanistan-after-mullah-omar>
- Husain, Javid. 2015b. Kautilya's Arthashastra and Pakistan. *The Nation*, 17 March 2015. <http://nation.com.pk/columns/17-Mar-2015/kautilya-s-arthashastra-and-pakistan>
- Husain, Javid. 2015c. Unrealism and incompetence at Ufa. *The Nation*, 22 July 2015. <http://nation.com.pk/columns/22-Jul-2015/unrealism-and-incompetence-at-ufa>
- Ikenberry, John G. 2008. The rise of China and the future of the West. *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2008 issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west>
- IMF. 2014. Report for selected countries and subjects. *World Economic Outlook Database*, April 2014. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx>
- India: Military budget. *GlobalSecurity.org*. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/budget.htm>
- Indian defence budget hiked by 11pc. *The Nation*, 1 March 2015. <http://nation.com.pk/international/01-Mar-2015/indian-defence-budget-hiked-by-11pc>
- Iqbal, Javid. 2005. *Ideology of Pakistan*. Lahore, Pakistan: Sang-e-Meel Publications.

- Iqbal, Anwar. 2015a. Afghan Taliban armed insurgents, not terrorists, says White House. *The Dawn*, 31 January 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1160617>
- Iqbal, Anwar. 2015b. Obama calls for addressing grievances that terrorists exploit. *The Dawn*, 20 February 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1164742>
- Iqbal, Anwar, and Masood Haider. 2014. PM reiterates stance on Kashmir in UN speech. *The Dawn*, 27 September 2014. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1134604>
- Jones, Bruce. 2014. *Still ours to lead*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Kennedy, Paul. 1987. *The rise and fall of the great powers*. New York, NY: Vintage Random House.
- Khan, Azmat Kayat. 2000. *The Durand Line and its geostrategic importance*, ed. M.Y. Effedni. Peshawar, Pakistan: University of Peshawar.
- Khan, Mubarak Zeb. 2015. Pakistan, Iran eye trade at \$5 billion. *The Dawn*, 23 April 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1177635>
- Khilji, Jalaluddin (ed.). 1989. *Muslim celebrities of Central Asia*. Peshawar: University of Peshawar, Area Study Centre for Central Asia.
- Kissinger, Henry. 1979. *White House years*. New York: Little, Brown and Co.
- Kissinger, Henry. 2011. *On China*. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
- Kissinger, Henry. 2014. *World order*. New York, NY: Penguin Press.
- Kronsstadt, K. Alan. 2007. *CRS report for congress: India-US relations*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007. Updated 13 February 13 2007. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80669.pdf>
- Kurzman, Charles. 2015. Muslim-American terrorism. *Charles Kurzman*, February 9, 2015. <http://kurzman.unc.edu/muslim-american-terrorism>
- Lamb, Alastair. 1991. *Kashmir: A disputed legacy, 1846–1990*. London: Roxford Books.
- Lewis, Bernard. 1990. The roots of Muslim rage: Why so many Muslims deeply resent the West and why their bitterness will not be easily mollified. *Atlantic Monthly*, September 1990.
- Mackey, Sandra. 1998. *The Iranians—Persia, Islam and the soul of a nation*. New York: Plume.
- MacLeod, Calum. 2015. Chinese economy posts lowest growth rate since 1990. *USA Today*, 20 January 2015. www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/01/19/china-2014-growth/22028737/
- Malik, General V.P. 2011. *Kargil: From surprise to victory*. New Delhi: HarperCollins India.
- Malik, Maqbool. 2015a. Pakistan, India exchange conflicting narratives. *The Nation*, 4 March 2015. <http://nation.com.pk/national/04-Mar-2015/pakistan-india-exchange-conflicting-narratives>
- Malik, Maqbool. 2015b. RAW involved in terror acts across Pakistan: Aizaz. *The Daily Nation*, 16 May 2015. <http://nation.com.pk/national/15-May-2015/raw-involved-in-terror-acts-across-pakistan-aizaz-fo-rejects-hersh-report-on-osama-bin-laden>

- Matinuddin, Kamal. 1999. *The Taliban phenomenon—Afghanistan 1994–97*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mazari, Shireen M. 2003. *The Kargil conflict 1999*. Islamabad, Pakistan: Institute of Strategic Studies.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The tragedy of great power politics*. New York, NY: WW Norton & Company.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault—The liberal delusions that provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014 issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault>
- Menon, Shiv Shankar. 2012. Speech of Indian National Security Advisor on 18 October: Kautilya Today. *South Asia Monitor*, 18 October 2012. southasia-monitor.org/detail.php?type=pers&nid=4114
- Micklethwait, John, and Adrian Wooldridge. 2014. The state of the state—The global contest for the future of government. *Foreign Affairs*, July–August 2014 issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-05-29/state-state>
- Mohan, C. Raja. 2006. India and the balance of power. *Foreign Affairs*, July–August 2006 issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-07-01/india-and-balance-power>
- Musharraf, Pervez. 2006. *In the line of fire*. New York: Free Press.
- Myrdal, Gunnar Myrdal. 1957. *Economic theory and underdeveloped regions*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
- Myrdal, Gunnar. 1968. *Asian drama: An inquiry into the poverty of nations*. New York: Twentieth Century Fund.
- Nasr, Vali. 2014. *The dispensable nation—American foreign policy in retreat*. New York: Anchor.
- Noorbaksh, Mehdi. 1997. Religion, politics, and ideological trends in contemporary Iran. In *Iran and the Gulf: A search for stability*, ed. Jamal S. al-Suwaidi. New York: I.B. Taurius.
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*, New York, 1 July 1968. *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol 729, no 10485. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20729/volume-729-I-10485-English.pdf>
- Obama blasts extremists who seek to 'hijack religion'. *The Nation*, 6 February 2015. <http://nation.com.pk/national/06-Feb-2015/obama-blasts-extremists-who-seek-to-hijack-religion>
- Obama, Barack. 2015. *State of the Union Address*, 20 January 2015.
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 2014a. *National defense budget estimates for FY 2015*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/FY15_Green_Book.pdf
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 2014b. *US Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2014 budget request*. Washington, DC: Department of

- Defense. http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/fy2015_Budget_Request.pdf.
- Page, Jeremy. 2014. China to boost military budget by 10.1%. *Wall Street Journal*, 4 March 4 2014. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-boost-military-budget-by-about-10-1425457646>
- Pakistan lauded for hosting Afghan peace talks. *The Dawn*, 9 July 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1193363>
- Peddalling Prosperity—Special Report-China's Economy, *The Economist*, 26 May-1 June 2012, p. 4.
- Peshawar Accord. 1992. International Conflict Research Institute (INCORE), 24 April 1992.
- Press Information Department, Government of Pakistan. 2015. *PR No. 190 joint statement between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the People's Republic of China on establishing the all-weather strategic cooperative partnership*. Press release, 20 April 2015. <http://www.pid.gov.pk/press20-04-2015.htm>
- PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). 2013. The BRICS and beyond: Prospects, challenges and opportunities. *World in 2050*. PwC Economics, January 2013. www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-report-january-2013.pdf, 23.
- Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain. 1965. *The struggle for Pakistan*. Sindh, Pakistan: University of Karachi.
- Qureshi, Emran, and Michael Sells (eds.). 2003. *The new crusades—Constructing the Muslim enemy*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Rashid, Ahmed. 2000. *Taliban—Islam, oil and the new great game in Central Asia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Rizvi, Mujtaba. 1971. *The frontiers of Pakistan*. Karachi: National Publishing House Ltd.
- Sarotte, Mary Elise. 2014. A broken promise?—What the West really told Moscow about NATO expansion. *Foreign Affairs*, September–October 2014 issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-11/broken-promise>
- Sattar, Abdul. 2007. *Pakistan's foreign policy 1947–2005: A concise history*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University.
- Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. 1980. *Pakistan, China and America*. Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies.
- Singh, Jaswant. 2013. *India at risk*. New Delhi, India: Rupa Publications.
- Singh, Kishore. 2010. Legal and policy framework for financing basic education. *UNESCO Future Seminar on "Innovative Financing for Education."* 14 September 2010. <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Education/SeminaInnovativeFinancingEducation.pdf>
- Statement by President Hassan Rouhani of Iran at the ECO Meeting in Tehran, *The Daily Dawn*, 27 November, 2013.
- Sun, Tzu. 2009. *The Art of War*. Trans. Lionel Giles. Blacksburg, VA: Thrifty Books.

- Syed, Baqir Sajjad. 2015a. COAS vows to crush insurgency in Balochistan—Foreign governments and agencies warned against involvement in the province. *The Dawn*, 16 April 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1176207>
- Syed, Baqir Sajjad. 2015b. Iran wants expanded relations with Pakistan: Zarif. *The Dawn*, 14 August 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1200373>
- Syed, Baqir Sajjad. 2015c. RAW instigating terrorism, says army. *The Daily Dawn*, 6 May 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1180243>
- Text of President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address. *Washington Post*, 29 January 2002. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm>
- The 70-year itch. *The Economist*, 8–14 August 2015.
- The dragon's new teeth. *The Economist*, 7–13 April 2012.
- The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. 2014. *Statement by the President [Barack Obama] on the End of the Combat Mission in Afghanistan*. Press statement, 28 December 2014. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/28/statement-president-end-combat-mission-afghanistan>
- The World in Figures. *The World in 2014. The Economist*, 18 November 2013.
- Tomsen, Peter. 2013. *The wars of Afghanistan*. New York: Public Affairs.
- ud Din, Musleh, and Ejaz Ghani. 2011. Strengthening intra-regional trade and investment in the ECO region. *PIDE Viewpoint*, October 2011. <http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/viewup.pdf>
- UN Department of Political Affairs. *UN Peacemaker*. http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/AF_920424_PESHAWAR%20ACCORD.pdf
- Vajpeyi, Ananya. 2014. The triumph of the Hindu right. *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014 issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/triumph-hindu-right>
- Walker, Dinah. 2014. Trends in US Military spending, council on foreign relations. *Council on Foreign Relations*, 15 July 2014. www.cfr.org/defense-budget/trends-us-military-spending/p28855
- Wasti, S. Ejaz (Economic Advisor). 2014. *Pakistan economic survey 2013–14*. Islamabad, Pakistan: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan. http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey_1314.html
- Wasti, S. Ejaz (Economic Advisor). 2015. *Pakistan economic survey 2014–15*. Islamabad, Pakistan: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan. http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey_1415.html
- Who are the Northern Alliance? *BBC News*, 13 November 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1652187.stm
- World Bank. Military expenditure (% of GDP). *The World Bank*. data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS.
- Zakaria, Fareed. 2008. *The post-American world*. New York, NY: WW Norton & Company.
- Zhenglong, Wu. 2015. US should agree to democratize the IMF—Or get out of the way. *The World Post*. Updated on 14 March 2015. www.huffingtonpost.com/wu-zhenglong/us-democratize-imf_b_6458146.html

INDEX

9/11, 12, 20, 87, 89–91, 93–5, 108,
109, 116–20, 139, 166, 167

A

A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial), 40
Afghanistan, 10, 12, 18, 20, 24, 54,
57, 66, 70, 81, 83, 85–102, 105,
107–18, 120–2, 137, 145, 162,
165–8, 175, 177, 184, 186, 187,
191, 192, 194, 196, 197
Afghan jihad, 87, 107, 108,
166–7
Africa, 25, 44, 55, 69, 133
Ahmad Shah Massoud, 88
Al-Bayruni, 132
Al-Farabi, 132
Ali, Abdallah Yousaf, 131
Ali, Ameer, 132
Al-Khwarzimi, 132
Al Qaeda, 18, 20, 21, 89, 92–4, 97,
116, 129, 135
al-Razi, 132

Amin, Hafizullah, 86, 87
Amin, Shahid M., 47n2, 67n15,
124n3
Arabian Sea, 34, 46
Arthashastra, 60
Asad, Muhammad, 130, 131
ASEAN, 15–17, 27, 34, 46,
69, 74
Asia, 17, 20, 23, 25, 26, 34, 37, 41,
44–7, 52, 54–7, 59–61, 63, 65,
69, 70, 72, 77, 79, 80, 95, 133,
145, 147, 156, 164, 167, 184–6,
191, 197
Asian Development Bank,
44
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB), 44, 46
Asia-Pacific region, 17, 26, 34, 41, 45,
46, 52, 60
Australia, 16, 17, 34, 41, 46, 52,
184
Azerbaijan, 70, 72, 81
Aziz, Sartaj, 112

Note: Page number followed by ‘n’ refers to footnotes.

B

Bangladesh, 54, 55, 73, 145
 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 53, 57,
 58, 60, 78, 147, 195
 Biddle, Stephen, 97, 98
 Brazil, 8, 15, 16, 19, 183
 BRICS, 44
 BRICS New Development Bank,
 44
 British India, 144, 147, 185
 Brooks, Stephen G., 42
 Broujerdi, Allauddin, 110, 111
 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 37, 55
 Burke, S.M., 47n2, 67n15, 124n3,
 169n1
 Bush, George H.W., 9
 Bush, George W., 9, 10, 109,
 118
 Buzan, Barry, 135

C

Central Asia, 5, 17, 25, 47, 54, 70,
 133, 167, 191
 Central Asian Republics, 66, 70, 72,
 191, 197
 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
 (CPEC), 34, 46, 122, 196
 China, People's Republic of, 37,
 47n1, 162-3
 Chinese dream, 37, 38
 clash of civilizations, 3, 13-14, 136,
 138, 140
 Clinton, Hillary, 95
 Cold War, 1, 8-14, 17, 18, 54, 106,
 107, 135, 147, 153, 156, 159,
 183, 187
 comprehensive security, 171-82
 containment of China, 17, 34, 41
 Cowper-Coles, Sherard, 93
 Crimea, 75
 customs union, 27, 74, 75, 77,
 80, 81

D

Deng Xiaoping, 26, 37-9, 148, 159,
 164, 174
 dialogue among civilizations, 3, 13

E

East China Sea, 44
 Economic Cooperation Organization
 (ECO), 27, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73,
 80-3, 102, 113, 187, 196
 economic policy, 148
 Economic Union, 27, 63, 74, 77,
 80, 81, 191
 ECOTA (ECO Trade Agreement),
 83
 ECO Trade and Development
 Bank, 83
 ECO Vision 2015, 82
 ECOWAS (Economic Community of
 West African States), 69
 end of history, 3, 11-13
 enlightenment, 128-30, 134, 137,
 140, 198
 Esposito, John, 135
 European Union (EU), 15-17, 27, 69,
 71-5, 77, 102, 137-8, 185,
 187
 evolutionary path of regional
 economic cooperation, 75

F

Far East, 60, 97
 First Island Chain, 40
 foreign policy, 1, 2, 8, 9, 33, 36, 38,
 59, 80, 92, 113, 114, 118,
 143-69, 174, 175, 180,
 194-7
 free trade area, 74, 82
 Free Trade Area of the Americas
 (FTAA), 77
 Fukuyama, Francis, 11, 13, 185

G

- G-20, 53
 Gandhi, Mahatma, 64, 78
 Gawadar, 34, 46, 122
 GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council),
 27, 69, 197
 Germany, 44, 77, 153, 159
 Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf, 95, 98, 101
 globalization, 3, 13, 26, 27
 global order, 2, 33–47
 global politics, 3, 13, 14, 42, 43, 53
 global security environment, 4, 14–28,
 35, 60, 128, 162, 163, 165–6,
 168, 169, 177, 180
 Golwalkar, Madhav Sadashiv, 78
 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 8, 9
 grand strategy, 1, 2, 7, 28, 35, 51, 54,
 148, 149, 151, 159–2, 164, 168,
 169, 174, 183–200
 Gujrat, 57, 79

H

- Haas, Richard N., 14
 Hedgewar, Keshav Baliram, 79
 hegemony, 3, 9, 51, 52, 54, 62, 72,
 74, 79, 147
 Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin, 88
 Hindutva, 57, 60, 78, 79, 147
 Holbrooke, Richard, 95
 Hu Angang, 36, 39
 Huntington, Samuel P., 10, 13, 135,
 136, 138, 185
 Husain, Javid, 1

I

- Ibn al-Haytham, 132
 Ibn al-Nafis, 132
 Ibn Khaldun, 132
 Ibn Rushd, 132
 Ibn Sina, 132
 Ijtihad, 130, 133, 137, 140

- Ikenberry, G. John, 42
 IMF (International Monetary Fund),
 15, 19, 35, 43, 44, 46, 184
 India, 51–66
 Indian National Congress, 144
 Indian Ocean, 17, 46, 53–5, 60, 186,
 190, 191
 India's grand strategy, 54
 Indonesia, 16, 19, 26, 46, 52, 118,
 119, 183, 185, 197
 Institute of Oriental Studies,
 Moscow, 94
 international law, 8, 12, 18, 19,
 23–4, 28, 42, 45, 56, 64, 78,
 123, 183, 184
 international morality, 185
 Iqbal, Javid, 67n18, 103n14, 142n40
 Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), 106, 107, 112
 Iran, Islamic Republic of, 22
 Iraq, 8–10, 12, 17, 18, 23, 95, 106,
 107, 118, 120, 137, 156, 183, 184
 IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guards
 Corps), 105
 ISAF (International Security Assistance
 Force), 91, 92, 95, 96, 100, 121
 ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), 110,
 114
 ISIS, 17, 129, 135, 138
 Islam, 63, 77, 79, 90, 127–40, 147, 198
 Islamabad Accord of March, 1993, 88
 Islamic civilization, 63, 73, 124, 130,
 132–4, 137, 140
 Islamophobia, 136–40

J

- Jaish-ul-Adal, 120
 Japan, 15–17, 22, 34, 35, 37, 40, 41,
 44, 46, 52, 60, 153, 184, 185, 197
 Jihad, 59, 128, 131, 166–7
 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 63, 78, 146,
 185
 Jundullah, 120

K

Kargil, 59, 65, 148, 157, 160, 162, 166, 170n15, 175, 195
 Karmal, Babrak, 85, 87
 Karzai, Hamid, 93, 96
 Kashmir, 51, 56–8, 65, 73, 79, 114, 120, 143, 145, 156, 160, 161, 165–8, 175, 177, 190, 195
 Kautilya, 60, 61
 Kayani, Ashfaq Parvez, 94
 Kazakhstan, 72, 81
 Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali, 120
 Khan, Liaqat Ali, 146
 Khatami, Muhammad, 13, 105, 112, 113, 116, 117
 Kissinger, Henry, 24–5, 36, 55, 60, 162, 163
 Krauthammer, Charles, 14
 Kurzman, Charles, 139
 Kyrgyzstan, 81

L

Lamb, Alastair, 169n2
 Latin America, 25, 44, 69, 77
 Lewis, Bernard, 136
 liberal democracy, 11, 12
 Liddell Hart, B.H., 62, 148, 165, 187, 188

M

Malaysia, 46, 118, 119, 197
 Malik, V.P., 170n15
 Malta Summit, 9
 Mao Zedong, 37
 Mazar-e-Sharif, 89, 90, 109–12
 Mazari, Shireen, 170n15
 Mearsheimer, John J., 19, 45, 46, 54, 83n1
 Menon, Shiv Shankar, 60
 Mercosur, 27, 69

Mexico, 16

Middle East, 5, 54, 94, 107, 118, 119, 121, 133
 Modi, Narendra, 53, 57–9, 61, 78, 79, 195
 Moghul Empire, 134
 Mohan, C. Raja, 54
 Monroe Doctrine, 55
 Mousavian, Hossein, 114–17
 Muhammad, Prophet, 128–33, 135, 139
 Mulford, David, 53
 Mullah Umar/Omer, 18, 97, 110
 multilateralism, 10
 multipolar world, 11, 16
 Musharraf, Pervez, 91, 100, 112, 113, 118, 119, 148, 160, 166, 175
 Myrdal, Karl Gunnar, 76, 83n2

N

NAFTA, 27, 69
 Najibullah, Mohammad, 85, 87, 96, 108, 167
 Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, 132
 Nasr, Vali Reza, 93–5
 NATO, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22
 Netherlands, the, 1, 22
 new world order, 8–10, 19, 184
 Nigeria, 15, 16, 19
 Northeast Asia, 45
 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), 21–3, 123
 nuclear proliferation, 21, 22, 197
 Nuclear Suppliers' Group, 22, 53

O

Obama, Barack Hussein, 10, 43, 92, 94, 95, 121, 138, 139
 Opium War, 37

Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC), 72, 118,
119, 140, 197
Osama bin Laden, 23, 89
Ottoman Empire, 134

P

Pakhtunistan/Pashtunistan, 145
Pakistan, 1–200
Pakistan-China Border Agreement, 33
Pakistan-China friendship, 33, 34, 196
Pakistan Institute of Development
Economics, 82
Pakistan's economic policy, 2, 27, 37,
148, 160, 168, 169
Pakistan's foreign policy, 2, 4, 143–69
Pakistan's grand strategy, 4, 7, 28,
186, 187, 192, 199. *See also*
grand strategy
Pakistan's ideology, 63, 147, 187
Pakistan's national goals, 185–7
Pakistan's national interests, 59, 81,
144–7, 187
Pakistan's political policy, 161, 174
Pakistan's security policy, 2, 4, 27, 74,
75, 161, 174–82. *See also*
comprehensive security
Partition (of the Indian sub-
continent), 56, 143–5, 147
PDDPA (People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan), 86, 87, 96
Pentagon, 9, 40
Persian Gulf, 5, 34, 46, 107, 112,
123, 187, 197
Peshawar Accord of April, 1992, 88
Philippines, the, 17, 34, 41
political policy, 161, 174
Power politics/realpolitik, 3, 10, 12,
18–20, 23, 24, 26, 28, 183, 185
pre-requisites for regional cooperation,
71–4

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC),
15, 35, 52
Putin, Vladimir, 17, 75, 187

Q

Quran, the, 128–33, 135
Qureshi, Emran, 136, 137

R

Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 88, 108, 116
Radcliffe Award, 143
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),
57, 59, 60, 78, 79, 147
rationale for regional cooperation, 70–1
RAW (Research and Analysis Wing),
64, 178, 179
RCD (Regional Cooperation for
Development), 81, 106
regional economic integration, 27,
77, 81
regionalism, 69–83
regional security environment, 2, 4, 7,
28, 34
religious fundamentalism, 10
renaissance, 127, 132
Rouhani, Hassan, 90, 114–17
Russia, 8, 10, 15–17, 22, 44, 47, 59,
60, 66, 75, 88, 97, 99, 109, 183,
187, 197

S

SADC (Southern African Development
Community), 69
Safavid Empire, 134
Sattar, Abdul, 114, 117
Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar, 78
security policy, 2, 27, 74, 75, 161,
174–82 comprehensive security
Sells, Michael, 136, 137

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 17, 47
 Sharif, Nawaz, 57–9, 91, 101, 112, 114, 120, 160, 175
 Sharif, Raheel, 178
 Siachen/Siachin, 190
 Singh, Jaswant, 37, 144
 Sir Creek, 56, 190
 socialism with Chinese characteristics, 38
 South Africa, 15, 16, 19
 South Asia, 23, 34, 47, 52, 54–7, 59–61, 63, 65, 70, 77, 79, 80, 145, 147, 186, 190, 191, 197
 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 27, 58, 66, 69, 70, 72–4, 77, 79–82, 196
 South Asian Customs Union, 80
 South Asian Economic Union, 63, 80
 South China Sea, 34, 40, 42, 44
 South Korea, 15–17, 34, 41, 46, 52, 183–5
 Soviet Union, 9, 16, 22, 24, 33, 38, 85–7, 106, 148, 150, 156, 159, 164, 165, 167, 172, 179, 189
 Sri Lanka, 73
 strategy, 1, 2, 7, 9, 28, 35, 51, 54, 61, 94, 108, 148, 149, 151, 159–2, 164, 168, 169, 174, 183–200
 Sun Tzu, 188

T

Taiwan, 34, 40
 Taliban/Afghan Taliban, 18, 88–102, 105, 108–13, 115, 116, 118, 166
 Taraki, Nur Mohammad, 86
 terrorism, 20–3, 140
 tests of a sound foreign policy, 1, 144, 147
 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 77

Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 77
 Tsinghua University, 36
 TTFA (ECO Transit and Transport Framework Agreement), 83
 TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan), 77, 91, 100, 177, 178
 Turkey, 15, 16, 19, 24, 66, 70, 72, 73, 81, 82, 100, 106, 118, 119, 137, 138, 183, 187, 195, 197
 Turkmenistan, 72, 81

U

Ukraine, 10, 17, 44, 47, 75, 97, 183, 184
 UN, 8–13, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 28, 33, 53, 56, 58, 65, 116, 123, 145, 156, 183–5, 195
 UN collective security system, 23, 24
 unified C4ISR, 41
 unipolar world, 14
 UN Security Council, 10, 12, 19, 21, 23, 53, 56, 58, 123, 156, 195
 US, 8–10, 12, 14–18, 20, 22, 23, 26, 34–7, 40–7, 52, 53, 57, 60, 77, 81, 83, 87, 91, 93, 95, 96, 98, 106, 107, 109, 118, 119, 121, 137, 154, 156, 159, 163, 183, 184, 187, 191
 US-China rivalry, 43

W

Wang Yi, 98
 West Asia, 20, 70
 Western Bloc, 106, 107, 156, 157
 Western powers/the West, 36, 42–4, 134, 135
 Wohlforth, William C., 42
 World Bank, 19, 43, 44, 61
 world order, 8–11, 19, 42, 43, 45, 184

World Wars I and II, 71, 153
WTO (World Trade Organization),
26, 42

X

Xi Jinping, 33, 34, 37, 43, 196
Xinjiang, 34

Z

Zakaria, Fareed, 16, 39
Zarif, Mohammad Jawad,
122
Zia-ul-Haq, Muhammad, 86, 106,
107, 114, 175
Ziring, Lawrence, 47n2, 67n15,
124n3, 169n1